ISSUE 5. MAY 2021

JOLCEL

JOURNAL OF LATIN COSMOPOLITANISM AND EUROPEAN LITERATURES



THEME

IMPERIALISM AND COSMOPOLITAN LITERATURE

The *Journal of Latin Cosmopolitanism and European Literatures* (*JOLCEL*) (ISSN 2593–743X) is an online peer-reviewed open access journal, published multiple times a year.

The journal's contents are closely linked to the activities of the research group RELICS (Researchers of European Literary Identity, Cosmopolitanism and the Schools), an international network of researchers interested in the themes developed throughout the journal issues.

For more information, visit the JOLCEL website, or contact `relics@ugent.be`.

Subscriptions (membership, newsletter, upcoming events, call for papers): `relicsresearch.com/contact/.`

Submission: `jolcel.ugent.be/about/submissions.`

Contents

Editorial Note

The JOLCEL spring issue of 2021 is a thematic issue about one of the central concepts in the name of the journal itself: cosmopolitanism. The name JOLCEL refers to Latin cosmopolitanism and European Literatures. The three articles assembled here describe the difficult dynamics in European literatures between empire, imperialism, and cosmopolitanism.

As Theo D'haen observes in his response piece, what unites the three articles in this issue is "the opposition between the ideal and the real, cast as a distinction between in- and outgroup [and] framed by classical texts." All three articles demonstrate how literature created concepts of cosmopolitanism to explore the fissures between (historical) imperialism and idealisations of that imperialism by means of cosmopolitan ideologies.

The issue starts with an article by Christoph Pieper about 'Cosmopolitanism and the Roman Empire,' in which he looks at three versions of cosmopolitanism that are grafted on the idea of the Roman Empire and shows how their idealistic cosmopolitanisms necessarily come into conflict with the harsh realities of imperialism. Pieper discusses Cicero's ideas of world citizenship, Augustine's city of God as a cosmopolitan state, and Lorenzo Valla's linguistic imperialism. He concludes that "cosmopolitan ideas often arise in times of strong imperialistic claims; they serve as alternatives to a seemingly uncontested world order of dominion, submission and egoism. Alternatives are not automatically perfect, perhaps not even better than the concepts they criticize—but they always open up discursive fields and trigger new reflection about the status quo."

Helena Bodin offers an impressive bird's-eye view of Byzantine cosmopolitanism, while tackling a related opposition within cosmopolitanism, namely that between unity and diversity. The Byzantine Empire is often called cosmopolitan. Bodin shows that various cosmopolitan tendencies exist and develop within the Byzantine tradition. She discusses Adam and Moses as Stoic cosmopolitans and Pentecost as a cosmopolitan event. This leads her to the conclusion that the Byzantine tradition encompasses both homogenising, monolingual Greek, and

heterogenising, multilingual, modes of cosmopolitanism. The homogenising mode opposes the local to the whole created world as the motherland of humans. The heterogenising mode opposes the *kosmos*, with its multitude of languages, ethnicities, and religions, to the heavenly world.

The last article, by Tycho Maas, turns to the European colonial empires at the end of the seventeenth century. While not engaging explicitly with the term cosmopolitanism, Maas touches on the same difficult relationship between the ideologies behind imperialism and classical and Christian idealism about shared world citizenship. The article centres on a letter written by Johannes Willem van Grevenbroek, a secretary of the Council of Policy at the Cape for the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Maas first describes how colonial discourses use Roman literature to construct degrading stereotypes about the native Koi peoples, and then analyses how Grevenbroek uses these same classical authors to argue against dominant representations of these peoples, thereby turning a mirror to Europeans.

Finally, in response to his reading of the three articles, Theo D'haen zooms out again, in order to reflect on the status of cosmopolitanism in European literatures, from his perspective as a scholar of modern literature.

For further information about RELICS and announcements about forthcoming issues of JOLCEL, you can consult our websites at `relicsresearch.com` and `jolcel.ugent.be`.

THE JOLCEL EDITORIAL BOARD
MAY 2021

JOLCEL

Journal of Latin Cosmopolitanism and European Literatures.

Current Contribution

Christoph Pieper, "Cosmopolitanism and the Roman Empire. Political, Theological and Linguistic Responses—Three Case Studies (Cicero, Augustine, Valla)," JOLCEL 5 (2021): pp. 1–26. DOI: 10.21825/jolcel.v5i0.16573.

*

Note

This contribution is part of a larger dialogue of three articles and one responding piece that form the current issue of JOLCEL. The other contributions are "From Adam to Tsar' Kosmos: Cosmopolitanism in the Byzantine Tradition" by Helena Bodin (pp. 28–51) and "The Classics at World's End. A VOC Secretary Reframes the Cape Khoi" by Tycho Maas (pp. 53–71). The response piece is "Thinking about Cosmopolitanism" by Theo D'haen (pp. 73–79).

*

Cosmopolitanism and the Roman Empire. Political, Theological and Linguistic Responses—Three Case Studies (Cicero, Augustine, Valla)*

CHRISTOPH PIEPER

Leiden University

ABSTRACT

This article explores the tension between idealized cosmopolitan ideas, of a single citizenry for all people in the world, and imperial Roman nationalism between the late Roman Republic and the Italian Renaissance. In the form of three case studies (and without any claim that those are representative for the development) it focusses on three important thinkers whose work shows affinity with cosmopolitan discourse, but who at the same time also explicitly reflected on the political realities they were living in: Cicero, Augustine, and Lorenzo Valla. All three favour cosmopolitan ideals over political egoism, and all three reflect on whether and how the historical reign under which they are living can live up to the philosophical or theological ideals they advocate. Finally, all three authors do not only share similar discursive patterns, but also react to each other intertextually (links will be mentioned especially between Cicero and Augustine and between Augustine and Valla). Thus, while all three are distinct in their argument and use cosmopolitan concepts for hugely different aims, the comparison can share light both on the boundaries and the discursive power of the concept in Latin literature.

***

* I thank the organizers of the RELICS workshop in Ghent (December 2018) for their hospitality, all participants for the discussion and especially Karl Enenkel for his response to my paper. I am equally grateful to the two anonymous peer reviewers for JOLCEL for their constructive criticism and to the editors for their encouragement and care. Laura Napran has kindly corrected my English. Research for this article has been made possible by a VIDI grant of the 'Dutch Research Council' (NWO), funding no. 276–30-013.

1 Introduction

Modern theories of cosmopolitanism come in many jackets: they can focus on culture, language, economics, age or gender.[1] Yet one of the uniting features is that the world is conceptualized as truly shared among all humans—an idea that ultimately rests on the assumption that all men are equal and should have the same rights, as they share the earth as their common homeland. As Nick Stevenson formulates, "[t]he idea of cosmopolitanism joins together a notion of global citizenship as well as the capacity to live with the 'Other'. Cosmopolitan critique is suspicious of dogmatism."[2] As a consequence, imperialism can be defined as one of its most distinct opposites, as the latter is directed towards inequality and the dominion of a minority at the costs of suppressing or even enslaving a majority of the people. From this perspective the *imperium Romanum*, one of the most conspicuous Empires of the ancient world, seems a curious object of cosmopolitan studies.[3] Rome had subdued the Mediterranean and large parts of the known world; it had forced the inhabitants of the conquered regions to serve Rome's armies, to pay taxes and to accept Roman state cults. It is simply impossible to deny that Rome controlled its Empire with force and military suppression; yet at the same time recent research has also shown that parts of its success was based on Rome's tolerance towards local habits, cults and languages. The process of Romanization is no longer interpreted as a purely top-down process, but as dynamic. Inhabitants of the provinces adopted a Roman identity and at the same time kept their local one—a process that has been labelled 'ancient globalization' and has been described as the result of a profoundly interconnected world.[4] From such a perspective, few historians would deny that the *imperium Romanum* had cosmopolitan characteristics. To mention just four: a high mobility of people within the Empire; the co-existence within the capital city of Rome of people with diverse cultural and territorial backgrounds (the same holds true for the Roman army as a unifying factor of the Empire); international trade; and festival calendars that were synchronized all over the Mediterranean area.[5] Nevertheless, one must not forget that such an ideal of harmonious globalization was not more than that: an ideal. Of course, Rome's elite culture regularly prided itself on being an inclusive society.[6] But the same upper class actively fuelled the suppressive

1 See Cebolla Sanahuja, "The Right of the Subject," 59.

2 Stevenson, "Cosmopolitan Citizenship," 244.

3 See Cebolla Sanahuja, "The Right of the Subject," 59–61, esp. 59: "and so, in ancient times, colonization and subjection defined the limits of the universal community of men. The *kosmos* [sic] *polites*, the citizen or the right of the subject that extends beyond the boundaries of the city or state, is in most cases determined or defined in relation to a previous state of war."

4 See Pitts and Versluys (eds.), *Globalisation and the Roman World*. In their introduction the editors write (p. 7): "Within Roman archaeology and history, we argue there is an urgent need to transcend post-colonial approaches and a general concern with identity, and to engage more seriously with concepts of connectivity."

5 See, for example, Moatti, "Mobility and Identity," 130–52; on mobility see Tacoma, *Moving Romans*; on festivals, see van Nijf, "Political Games," 47–88.

6 Sallust famously captures this ideology at the beginning of his Roman excursus at *Conspiratio Catilinae* 6.2: "hi postquam in una moenia convenere, dispari genere, dissimili lingua, alii alio more viventes, incredibile memoratu est, quam facile coaluerint: ita brevi multitudo dispersa atque vaga concordia civitas

nature of Rome's imperial intentions, both by recurring to military achievements as a means of gaining esteem and political influence, and by exploiting the provinces for personal enrichment.[7] Cosmopolitan ideas, which will be at the core of this article, could be seen as one element of this Roman idealization and self-fashioning, almost as a kind of ideological embellishment of a harsh imperialistic reality.[8]

My article builds on this tension between idealized cosmopolitan ideas and outspoken imperialism. I will introduce three case studies that deal with three different eras (late Republican Rome, Late Antiquity and the Italian Renaissance). The three authors, Cicero, Augustine and Lorenzo Valla, have been chosen because, as I will argue, all three engage with the intriguing and intrinsic ambiguity between cosmopolitanism and imperialism: they favour cosmopolitan ideals over (political) egoism and reflect on how the historical system of their times can live up to the philosophical or theological ideals they advocate. A further reason why I have combined the three authors in one article is that their texts show how cosmopolitan discourse has always been open to recontextualizations and adaptations to new conceptual frameworks. In this discursive process it is used more and more metaphorically in order to reflect on philosophical, theological and even linguistic matters. Cosmopolitanism thus can also be defined as a powerful tool for thinking, especially in debates that have a strong utopian element in them. In my three case studies I argue that the authors not only share similar discursive patterns, but also react to each other via marked intertextual links.

I start with Cicero, whose philosophical treatises seem to have imported Greek cosmopolitan ideas into Latin discourse. He makes use of cosmopolitan ideas as a means to develop his highly idealized alternative draft for Rome's political crisis in the 50s and 40s BCE. The second case study is dedicated to Augustine, a fervent imitator and at the same time critic of Cicero's philosophy. I contend that he also recurs to elements of cosmopolitan terminology in order to advocate *his* idealized counterpart to the political realities of the beginning of the fifth century CE: that is, citizenship in the reign of God. Augustine thereby applies Cicero's philosophical and political cosmopolitanism to theology. The third case study will be dedicated to Lorenzo Valla, who recurred to both Cicero and Augustine when drafting his utopia of a linguistic permanence of Roman cosmopolitanism: the Latin language in his view was the heir of the *imperium Romanum* in that it had to be the language of the whole world. While all three thinkers are distinct in

facta erat" ("After these two peoples, different in race, unlike in speech and living according to different customs, came together within the same walls, it is unbelievable to relate how easily they merged, so quickly did harmony change a heterogeneous and roving throng into a body of citizens." (Translation: J. C. Rolfe. *Loeb Classical Library* 116, Cambridge, MA: 2013).

7 The tension between cosmopolitan ideal and imperialistic reality in Roman literature has already been highlighted more than 100 years ago in a seminal study on Roman exemplarity by Litchfield, "National *exempla virtutis*," 11–13. In accordance with the world in which he lived (1914 was a time in which nationalism and patriotism were very powerful in many countries of the world), his interpretation of the moral hierarchies in Rome depicts cosmopolitanism as a threat to the highest value of patriotism; see *ibid*. 13: "Yet amid polemic and detraction, amid material corruption and disaster, for centuries the ancient cult of patriotism subsisted."

8 I owe this formulation to the insightful remark of an anonymous peer reviewer.

their argument and use cosmopolitan concepts in different discursive contexts (philosophy, theology and linguistics), they share at least one element: the rootage of their debates in Rome and its Empire, which offers them the historical and political foil for their argumentation. I hope that this comparative approach will shed light on the discursive power of the concept in the long history of Latin literature from Antiquity to the Renaissance, while not glossing over its boundaries that it reaches when being applied to these hugely diverse fields.

2 Cicero's struggle with Stoic cosmopolitanism

Cicero might not seem an obvious candidate to begin a contribution about cosmopolitanism. As a politician he was attached to the city of Rome and not very keen on being absent from it for reasons other than periods of study in one of his villas. His notorious unwillingness to leave Rome for the provinces is best captured in the famous anecdote he himself has transmitted in his speech *Pro Plancio*. When returning from his quaestorship in the Sicilian city of Lilybaeum, Cicero imagined that Rome wouldn't talk about anything else than his excellent conduct of the office. But nothing was less true: he met a man who asked him what news he was bringing from Rome, and when he indignantly answered that he had returned from his service in the province, the passer-by first said: "O right, in Africa, wasn't it?" After Cicero's even more irritated answer that he had been in *Sicily*, another interlocutor reproached the first one by saying "But didn't you know that he had been in Syracuse?"[9] In other words: not even the man who pretends to be reasonably well informed and to know that Cicero was in Sicily gets the exact city of his quaestorship right. The charmingly self-ironic anecdote is introduced with a sentence that seems to summarize Cicero's attitude towards cosmopolitanism quite nicely: "sed ita multa Romae geruntur ut vix ea quae fiunt in provinciis audiantur."[10] In other words: most Romans do not have any interest in affairs that happen outside their own urban environment; therefore, an ambitious young politician should not leave the city for too long.

Yet the decisions that Cicero made in his life as a politician are a different matter to what he discusses in his philosophical writings. In these he regularly invokes the notion of the world as a shared fatherland of all human beings,[11] which he mostly borrowed from the Stoics. As far as we know, the first Greek to coin the term κοσμοπολίτης was the cynic Diogenes, but his cosmopolitanism was rather individualistic and dissociative, as Anna Busetto, based on the arguments

[9] Cicero, *Pro Plancio* 65: "itaque hac spe decedebam ut mihi populum Romanum ultro omnia delaturum putarem. at ego cum casu diebus eis itineris faciendi causa decedens e provincia Puteolos forte venissem, cum plurimi et lautissimi in eis locis solent esse, concidi paene, iudices, cum ex me quidam quaesisset quo die Roma exissem et num quidnam esset novi. cui cum respondissem me e provincia decedere: 'etiam me hercule,' inquit, 'ut opinor, ex Africa.' huic ego iam stomachans fastidiose: 'immo ex Sicilia,' inquam. tum quidam, quasi qui omnia sciret: 'quid? tu nescis,' inquit, 'hunc quaestorem Syracusis fuisse?'"

[10] Cicero, *Pro Plancio* 63: "But in the bustle of life at Rome it is almost impossible to attend to what goes on in the provinces." (Translation: N.H. Watts, *Loeb Classical Library* 158, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1923).

[11] Cicero is also one of the few Roman authors whom one regularly finds in indexes of modern companions to cosmopolitan studies, as for example in Delanty, ed., *Routledge International Handbook of Cosmopolitan Studies*.

by John Moles, has shown.[12] It was the Stoics and above all Chrysippus who connected cosmopolitanism with the idea of a world citizenship based on a shared ὀρθὸς λόγος of all human beings.[13] They thereby redefined the concept as a social obligation and the fundament for their idea that a wise man should not withhold from the duties imposed on him by his country. Cicero, for whom philosophy and politics formed a close unity throughout his life,[14] was obviously attracted by this concept and regularly includes it in his philosophical dialogues.[15]

Malcolm Schofield has collected and discussed the most important passages of Cicero's philosophical works that deal with the Stoic notion of cosmopolitanism: *De re publica* 1.19, *De legibus* 1.23, *De finibus* 3.64, and *De natura deorum* 2.154. Based on the premise that gods and men are equally obliged to obey the natural law, all passages assert that the world is the homeland of gods and men alike (for example, *De legibus* 1.23: "ut iam universus <sit> hic mundus *una civitas communis* deorum atque hominum").[16] This divine gift to all men implies the consequence that all human beings are equal (*De re publica* 1.19: "sed mundus hic totus, quod domicilium quamque *patriam di* nobis *communem* secum *dederunt*")[17] and that they have an elevated status in the hierarchy of nature: everything within the world is created so that it serves for the human beings' usufruct (*De natura deorum* 2.154: "principio ipse mundus deorum hominumque causa factus est, quaeque in eo sunt, ea *parata ad fructum hominum* et inventa sunt").[18] The common ground on which this shared *patria* of men and gods is built is their shared *ratio* (the Stoic λόγος), which enables them to live together under a legal system and according to commonly accepted laws (*ius* and *leges*): "est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs utrorumque; *soli enim ratione utentes iure ac lege vivunt* (*De natura deorum* 2.154)."[19] Of course we must bear in

12 Busetto, "The Idea of Cosmopolitanism," 302–17; Moles, "Cynic Cosmopolitanism," 105–20.

13 See, for example, Chrysippus fr. 337 (in *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, volume 3): "τὸν δὲ ἀρχηγέτην ἐκεῖνον οὐ μόνον πρῶτον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ καὶ μόνον κοσμοπολίτην λέγοντες ἀψευδέστατα ἐροῦμεν. ἦν γὰρ οἶκος αὐτῷ καὶ πόλις ὁ κόσμος" ("If we call this first founder not only the first man, but almost a cosmopolitan, then we will speak very true things. For his house and his state was the kosmos"). See Schofield, *The Stoic Idea*, chapter 3, and Vogt, *Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City*, especially chapter 2.

14 See, for example, Cicero, *De divinatione* 2.6–7 with Zarecki, *Cicero's Ideal Statesman*, esp. 136, and Butler, *The Hand of Cicero*, 110–11.

15 See Schofield, "Cosmopolitanism," 105–46. My summary is much indebted to his analysis.

16 "Hence we must now conceive of this whole universe as one commonwealth of which both gods and men are members." (Translation: C.W. Keyes, *Loeb Classical Library* 213, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1928). See Girardet, *Die Ordnung der* Welt, 135–38 and 145–50. Similarly, *De finibus* 3.64.

17 "But [it] is the whole universe, a home and a fatherland which the gods have given us the privilege of sharing with them." (Translation: C.W. Keyes, *Loeb Classical Library* 213, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1928).

18 "In the first place the world itself was created for the sake of gods and men, and the things that it contains were provided and contrived for the enjoyment of men." (Translation: H. Rackham, *Loeb Classical Library* 268, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1933). Like the *ThLL*, I understand *fructus* here in its legal technical meaning (*-usus fructus*), see *ThLL* s.v. I A.

19 "For the world is as it were the common dwelling-place of gods and men, or the city that belongs to both; for they alone have the use of reason and live by justice and by law." (Translation: H. Rackham, *Loeb Classical Library* 268, Cambridge, MA: Loeb 1933). Similarly, *De legibus* 1.23: "prima homini cum deo *rationis societas*. inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est: quae cum sit lex, *lege quoque consociati homines cum dis putandi sumus*" ("The first common possession of man and God is reason. But those who have reason in common must also have right reason in common. And since right reason is Law, we must believe that men have Law also in common with the gods." Translation: C.W. Keyes, *Loeb*

mind that the passages are uttered by different speakers in different dialogues; but as one of them is Cicero's own literary *persona* (*De legibus*) and the two others are politicians he deeply admired (Scipio Aemilianus in *De re publica* and Cato Uticensis, whose encomium Cicero had written almost contemporarily,[20] in *De finibus*), I do not see any reason why we should not interpret the passages as proof of a genuine interest of Cicero in the concept. Taken together, they express an idealistic view of men's social competence: if all humans are equal, share the same laws and consider themselves compatriots of the same universal state, nature will also compel all to behave altruistically rather than to follow their personal desires. In this view, human beings are first and foremost seen as political animals that care for the well-being of the community rather than for their personal advantage: "ex quo illud *natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus*. ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit."[21]

There is another important aspect of Cicero's cosmopolitan theory that is worth mentioning here, for it concerns the relationship between a cosmopolitan and a Rome-centred view of the world.[22] As Malcolm Schofield has put it, "[t]he cosmic city can be seen ... as a concept which mediates the transition from republicanism to natural law theory." As citizenship is no longer based on "physical proximity or mutual acquaintance,"[23] the concept is potentially very attractive for the world order that had gradually emerged since the fourth century BCE with the Empire of Alexander the Great, through which huge parts of the known world had become parts of one political entity under Greek dominion. When in the third and especially the second centuries BCE the Romans in turn conquered increasingly more regions of the Hellenistic world, they also inherited the fascination for the Stoic concept. Schofield argues that especially after the Italic wars, when the inhabitants of Italy had received Roman citizenship, the definition of citizens as persons who live within the same city walls was no longer valid and needed to be adapted to the universal needs of the Empire.[24]

It is obvious that the idealized image does not correspond to the realities Cicero encountered in his life. On the one hand, the contradiction lies within his own character. As already mentioned, he often was not able to see the whole world as his fatherland, but wanted to stay in Rome at all costs. His depressed letters during his exile of 58/57 BCE are the most telling example for this and contrast

Classical Library 213, Cambridge, MA: Loeb 1928). See Schofield, "Cosmopolitanism," 109; Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero, De Legibus*, 125 on *recta ratio* as "attribute of the gods and the Stoic sage." One might relate this to the famous definition of the *populus* in *De re publica* 1.39: *populus* is not every *coetus multitudinis,* but a *coetus iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.*

20 On Cicero's *Cato*, see Kierdorf, "Ciceros Cato," 167–84.

21 Cicero, *De finibus* 3.64: "... from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and law-abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual." (Translation: H. Rackham, *Loeb Classical Library* 40, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1914).

22 See Márquez, "Between *urbs* and *orbis*," 181–211.

23 Schofield, *The Stoic Idea*, 103.

24 Schofield, "Cosmopolitanism," 110–11.

starkly with the philosophical ideal. This becomes obvious in a passage from the *Tusculanae Disputationes*, where he recommends embracing the Pacuvian verse that "patria est, ubicumque est bene" and praises the second-century politician (and Epicurean!) Titus Albucius for having borne his exile in an exemplary manner—he used the time to continue his philosophical studies in Athens—with utmost tranquillity: "itaque ad omnem rationem Teucri vox accommodari potest: 'Patria est, ubicumque est bene' [Pacuvius, *Teucer*]. Socrates quidem cum rogaretur, civitatem se esse diceret, 'mundanum' inquit [see Plutarch, *De exilio* = *Moralia* 600]; totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur. Quid? T. Albucius nonne *animo aequissimo* Athenis exul philosophabatur?"[25] During his own exile Cicero did nothing similar. His unphilosophical behaviour was a reason for countless attacks on his stableness (*constantia*) ever since antiquity—one has only to think of Cassius Dio's treatment in which a philosopher called Philiscus consoles Cicero and encourages him to stop "weeping like a woman" (38.18.1),[26] or of Petrarch's famous letter addressed to Cicero in Book 24 of his *Epistulae familiares*.[27]

The second and more substantial reason for the discrepancy between philosophical ideal and reality is the time in which Cicero was living. It is well known that all the philosophical treatises mentioned above were composed in periods of his life when he was excluded from active politics (in the late 50s after his return from exile during the first triumvirate, and in 45/44 under Caesar's dictatorship) and fell victim to the egoistic behaviour of the major political players of the time. Cosmopolitanism therefore might have seemed attractive to Cicero not because he cared so much for all people in the whole world, but because he could present it as a political alternative in which the idea of unanimity and equality would also be embraced by the political agents in Rome.[28] His reflections are nurtured by the

[25] Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 5.108: "And so Teucer's saying can be fitted to every condition: 'One's country is wherever one does well.' Socrates, for instance, on being asked to what country he claimed to belong, said, 'To the world'; for he regarded himself as a native and citizen of the whole world. What of T. Albucius? Did he not study philosophy at Athens with complete tranquillity in exile?" (Translation: J.E. King, *Loeb Classical Library* 141, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1927). See Woolf, *Cicero*, 246 (on the problematic lack of political engagement during exile).

[26] See Gowing, "Greek Advice," 359–72, and Jansen, "Cicero, toon karakter!" 161–66. Similarly, Plutarch criticizes Cicero's behaviour in exile as unworthy for a man of his erudition, who considered himself to be a philosopher, see Plutarch, *Life of Cicero* 32.4–5: "πολλῶν δὲ φοιτώντων ἀνδρῶν ὑπ᾽ εὐνοίας καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων διαμιλλωμένων πρὸς αὐτὰς ταῖς πρεσβείαις, ὅμως ἀθυμῶν καὶ περίλυπος διῆγε τὰ πολλά, πρὸς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ὥσπερ οἱ δυσέρωτες, ἀφορῶν, καὶ τῷ φρονήματι μικρὸς ἄγαν καὶ ταπεινὸς ὑπὸ τῆς συμφορᾶς γεγονὼς καὶ συνεσταλμένος, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τις ἄνδρα παιδείᾳ συμβεβιωκότα τοσαύτῃ προσεδόκησε. καίτοι πολλάκις αὐτὸς ἠξίου τοὺς φίλους μὴ ῥήτορα καλεῖν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφον" ("But although many people visited him out of goodwill, and the Greek cities vied with one another in sending him deputations, still, he passed his time for the most part in dejection and great grief, looking off towards Italy like a disconsolate lover, while in his spirit he became very petty and mean by reason of his misfortune, and was more humbled than one would have expected in a man who had enjoyed so lofty a discipline as his. And yet he often asked his friends not to call him an orator, but a philosopher." Translation: B. Perrin, *Loeb Classical Library* 99, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1919).

[27] On this famous letter, see recently McLaughlin, "Petrarch and Cicero," 26–30 (with further literature); an intriguing interpretation is offered by Enenkel, "Heilige Cicero, help mij!," 19–27.

[28] See Girardet, *Die Ordnung der Welt*, 137 on the "Wechselwirkung von theologischer Spekulation und politischer Situation" (with regard to Cicero, *De leg*ibus 1.23), and Schofield, "Cosmopolitanism," *passim*. Similarly, see Stevenson, "Reverberations of Empire," 184–85, and, ground-breaking, Griffin, "*Iure plectimur*," 85–111. See the overview by Eckstein, "Conceptualizing," 568–89.

increasingly disruptive competition among mighty generals like Pompey and Caesar for whom warfare was only a means to increase their own influence (and who in their overambitious emulation did not even shrink back from forcing Rome into a civil war). Cicero therefore constructs a dichotomy between a still reasonably good past, in which the Romans were patrons, but not rulers of the world ("illud patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari"),[29] and the harsh present, in which the Romans degenerated so much that they have almost lost their *res publica*, if one defines it as a state based on shared values, laws and rationality ("itaque parietes modo urbis stant et manent, iique ipsi iam extrema scelera metuentes, *rem vero publicam penitus amisimus*").[30]

This quotation again shows how closely Cicero connects the Roman city-state (the nucleus of Rome's existence) and its dominion over the world (the cosmopolitan view of Rome's role in the world): "the corruption of imperial rule abroad inevitably undermines the *res publica* at home."[31] The same can also be deduced from the passage in *De finibus* quoted above.[32] The explanation of Cato, the main representative of Stoic thought in this dialogue, starts with an idealistic assumption that everyone is part of the same world that unites gods and men: "unumquemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem." But obviously even Cicero's spokesman Cato was not able to feel the interests of all inhabitants of distant lands in a similar way. The next argumentative step therefore returns to the term *res publica*: a *proditor patriae* must be punished, whereas someone who dies for the *res publica* deserves praise, "because it is fitting that the fatherland is dearer to us than our own life" ("quod deceat cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos"). The terminology will automatically invite Roman readers to think of Cicero's engagement for his own state, the *res publica Romana*. This neatly fits the argument of Book 1 of *De legibus*, where the global Stoic citizenship and the acceptance of the same natural laws for everyone had led men to form the first *local*

[29] Cicero, *De officiis* 2.27: "... our government could be called more accurately a protectorate of the world than a dominion." (Translation: W. Miller, *Loeb Classical Library* 30, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1913).

[30] Cicero, *De officiis* 2.29: "And so in Rome only the walls of her houses remain standing—and even they wait now in fear of the most unspeakable crimes—but our republic we have lost for ever." (Translation: W. Miller, *Loeb Classical Library* 30, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1913). See Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis*, 407 on the discourse of moral decline that led to the loss of the Republic in Roman theory.

[31] Schofield, "Cosmopolitanism," 135; the *De officiis*-passage being referred to on p. 29.

[32] Cicero, *De finibus* 3.64: [Cato:] "mundum autem censent regi numine deorum eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unumquemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis offici non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. ex quo fit ut laudandus is sit qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos." ("Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and law-abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves." Translation: H. Rackham, *Loeb Classical Library* 40, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1914).

citizenries. This shows Cicero's Roman interpretation of the Stoic concept: Rome and its Empire appear as a kind of factual representation of the cosmic city, yet as one that threatens to lose its moral roots; therefore the cosmopolitan ideal is invoked as a corrective of contemporary misbehaviour.[33] This concentration on Rome as the centre of a cosmopolitan Empire partly mitigates the contradiction between the cosmopolitan ideas uttered in Cicero's dialogues and his fixation on the city of Rome in his political career.

3 Augustine's city of God as a cosmopolitan state?

The tension between a supranational, all-encompassing *civitas mundi* and the Roman Empire, which we have seen in Cicero, continued to interest authors of later periods—especially the relation of the abstract concept of a cosmic city and the Roman Empire as its concrete representation was negotiated. As Johannes van Oort has shown, imperial Stoic thinkers often stressed the dichotomy between the earthly and the cosmic city.[34] Epictetus for example, in a synthesis of Stoic and Platonic ideas, interprets the earthly *polis* as a shadowy image of the cosmic one;[35] when Seneca in *De otio* speaks about the two *res publicae*, the *civitas mundi* is defined as *res vere publica*.[36] But even if many authors construct a strong opposition between the two *civitates*, they thereby subscribe to the idea that the only *visible* transnational political entity of their time is Rome. As in Cicero, Rome's name is associated with an (albeit imperfect, non-philosophical) version of cosmopolitan citizenry. Aelius Aristides expresses this very concisely in his praise of Rome (*Encomium Romae* 63 = *Orationes* 14.214 Dindorf). According to him, *τὸ Ῥωμαῖον* is no name of a concrete state, but the name of a sort (*γένος*) that is common to all ("*καὶ τὸ Ῥωμαῖον εἶναι ἐποιήσατε οὐ πόλεως, ἀλλὰ γένους ὄνομα κοινοῦ τινος*"). According to Daniel Richter, Aristides reflects Rome's status as a *polis* composed of many *poleis*, a "post-local" entity transforming a concrete imperialistic Roman presence in the provinces into a kind of a-political Roman-ness.[37]

[33] See Schofield, "Cosmopolitanism," 124: "What really interests him is still the *civitas* and *res publica* of *On the Commonwealth*, with Rome and its laws and historic customs taken as the paradigm of the best constitution"; see also Girardet, *Die Ordnung der Welt*, 148–50 on Cicero's wish for a newly constituted Roman Empire based on the legislation he proposes (which Girardet calls the *codex Ciceronianus*).

[34] See van Oort, *Jerusalem and Babylon*, 250.

[35] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.5.26: "*τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; μέρος πόλεως, πρώτης μὲν τῆς ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τῆς ὡς ἔγγιστα λεγομένης, ἢ τί ἐστι μικρὸν τῆς ὅλης μίμημα.*" ("For what is a man? A part of a state; first of that state which is made up of gods and men, and then of that which is said to be very close to the other, the state that is a small copy of the universal state." Translation: W.A. Oldfather, *Loeb Classical Library* 131, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1925).

[36] See Seneca, *De otio* = *Dialogi* 8.4.1: "duas res publicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et vere publicam qua di atque homines continentur, in qua non ad hunc angulum respicimus aut ad illum sed terminos civitatis nostrae cum sole metimur, alteram cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi." ("Let us grasp the idea that there are two commonwealths—the one, a vast and truly common state, which embraces alike gods and men, in which we look neither to this corner of earth nor to that, but measure the bounds of our citizenship by the path of the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigned by the accident of birth." Translation: J.W. Basore, *Loeb Classical Library* 254, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1932); see Schofield, *The Stoic Idea*, 93.

[37] Richter, *Cosmopolis*, 4.

In the following, I will briefly discuss Augustine's *De civitate dei*, in which ethico-political cosmopolitanism is redefined within a religious discourse. The starting point, however, is still the political entity of Rome's Empire. When Augustine wrote his *De civitate dei*, Rome's cultural and political identity was very much at stake. Already since the fourth century, the rise of Christianity had questioned the cultural canon of the Roman elite in a radical way (suffice to think of the famous debates about whether it was acceptable for a Christian to read pagan authors like Vergil or Seneca). In this debate, Augustine was one of the most influential Christian authorities to defend the adaptation of classical culture. Cicero was especially dear to him. It is well established that Cicero's writings profoundly influenced him in almost all phases of his life and that he very regularly referred to or quoted this late-Republican model.[38] This veneration was not restricted to Cicero's rhetorical abilities, but also encompasses his philosophical acumen—the role of the *Hortensius* as a first step towards Christianity in the *Confessiones* is perhaps the most famous example. Especially for Platonic and Stoic concepts, Cicero seems to have been Augustine's "most important intermediary:"[39] This is especially true for his *De civitate dei*, in which quotations from Cicero's philosophical oeuvre abound and where Cicero is "unus e numero doctissimorum hominum idemque eloquentissimus omnium."[40]

At the same time, Augustine's treatise questions the political legitimation of the eternal *imperium Romanum*.[41] Written as a reaction to the Gothic sack of Rome of 410 CE and the resulting "ideological uncertainty" among the Romans, Augustine has to defend the Christian god from accusations that he has proven to be a less powerful protector of the city and the Empire than the pagan gods had been before.[42] Gerard O'Daly has linked Augustine's work, composed in a moment of political crisis, to Cicero's philosophical works (and especially his *De re publica*), which were written in similarly unstable periods.[43] For both authors, the Stoic ideal of a cosmic city based on moral perfection functioned as a corrective of the present political turmoil, which lay bare the imperfections of the present political realities. But while for Cicero the Roman *res publica* in principle resembled the cosmopolitan ideal in that it was based on the same idea of equality of men, for Augustine the Roman state was profoundly imperfect in its foundation. For him, it therefore was no representative, but only a contrasting foil for his conception of an ideal cosmic state.[44]

Of course, Augustine was not the first Christian author to reply to the Stoic concept of cosmopolitanism in this way. Already in the later second and earlier

38 See the classical study by Testard, *Saint Augustin et Cicéron*, especially volume 2. See also the recent overview of Taylor, "Augustine's Reception of Cicero," 17–34. According to him Cicero "functions as a kind of metaphysical anchor" for Augustine's thoughts, at 25.

39 Van Oort, *Jerusalem and Babylon*, 242.

40 Augustine, *De civitate dei* 22.6: "one of a number of very learned men and himself the most eloquent of all men" (Translation: W.M. Green, *Loeb Classical Library* 417, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1972).

41 See Baier, "Cicero und Augustinus," 121–40.

42 See the concise overview in O'Daly, *Augustine's City of God*, 27–33 (quotation on p. 28).

43 See O'Daly, "Thinking through History," 49.

44 This idea of two opposing states (a good and a bad one) was less based on Stoic thought, but influenced by Manichean and Jewish sources, as van Oort, *Jerusalem and Babylon*, has shown at length.

third centuries CE we find references. Tertullian in his *Apologeticus* writes that Christians recognize only one state (*res publica*) for all people, namely the world, and thereby renounce all earthly glory and all ardent engagement in the worldly politics as the ordinary states, alien to Christians ("at enim nobis ab omni gloriae et dignitatis ardore frigentibus nulla est necessitas coetus nec ulla magis res aliena quam publica. unam omnium rem publicam agnoscimus, mundum").[45] Similarly, Clement of Alexandria in his *Stromata* explicitly refers to the Stoics when asserting that heaven is a proper city, whereas places on earth are not because a real city must be morally good ("λέγουσι γὰρ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν κυρίως πόλιν, τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐνταῦθα οὐκέτι πόλεις· ἔγεσθαι μὲν γάρ, οὐκ εἶναι δέ· σπουδαῖον γὰρ ἡ πόλις καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἀστεῖόν τι σύστημα καὶ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικούμενον").[46]

We find a similar dichotomy in Augustine's *De civitate dei* as well. The adapted cosmopolitan approach to the *civitas terrena* becomes evident when Augustine explicitly refutes Cicero's famous definition of a *res publica* as the *res populi* ("est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus").[47] He turns the definition against Cicero and against the political realities of his time by declaring that the Roman state never was a state because it never belonged to the people ("numquam fuit Romana res publica quia numquam fuit res populi").[48] The reason for this is the lack of *iustitia*, which Cicero (with the formulation *iuris consensus*) had defined as the *conditio sine qua non* for any citizenry. As, however, most inhabitants of the Empire have never agreed to live under Roman jurisdiction, the Roman state cannot be considered legal.[49] Augustine hereby substitutes Cicero's *ius* (or more precisely: the public consent about the law) with *iustitia*: instead of Cicero's legal and political terminology, which defines the relationship of men among each other, he

[45] Tertullian, *Apologeticus* 38.3: "We, however, whom all the flames of glory and dignity leave cold, have no need to combine; nothing is more foreign to us than the State. One state we know, of which all are citizens—the universe" (my translation).

[46] Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 4.26: "The Stoics say that the universe is in the proper sense a city, but that those here on earth are not—they are called cities, but are not really. For a city or a people is something morally good, an organization or group of men administered by law which exhibits refinement." (Translation: Schofield, *The Stoic Idea*, 61).

[47] Cicero, *De re publica* 1.39: "Well, then, a commonwealth is the property of a people. But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good." (Translation: C.W. Keyes, *Loeb Classical Library* 213, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1928).

[48] Augustine, *De civitate dei* 19.21: "There never was a Roman state, for there never was a people's estate." (Translation: W.C. Greene, *Loeb Classical Library* 416, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1960). See Adams, *The Populus of Augustine and Jerome*, 17–22. Smolak, "*Res publica res populi Dei*," 109–39, comments on p. 113: "Die Definition Ciceros wird also grundsätzlich für zulässig erachtet—allein ihre Anwendung auf die res publica Romana für nicht zutreffend." Similarly Taylor, "Augustine's Reception of Cicero," 26. It is noteworthy that Augustine does not mention Cicero's critical stance on his own time in *De officiis* 2.29, in which the loss of Rome's moral compass has almost led to a loss of the state, see above (with n. 30).

[49] On this famous passage in Augustine, see, for example, Treloar, "Cicero and Augustine," 571–77; Smolak, "*Res publica res populi Dei*," *passim*; and Baier, "Cicero und Augustinus," 137–38.

speaks about justice between God and men.[50] Still, the consequences of Augustine's provocative claim for his contemporary readers are considerable: he undermines the political legitimacy of half a millennium of Rome's imperial reign in the Mediterranean world, yet he does so with a terminology that Roman readers knew from classical political theory. This ambiguity has led to diverse interpretations of Augustine's take on the earthly Empire. According to Ada Neschke, *De civitate dei* is meant to undermine the belief of Rome that it is an imitation (*mimēsis*) of a philosophical ideal.[51] Gerard O'Daly argues in the opposite direction and stresses that Augustine "gives an account of how Christians may, and why they must, be good citizens of the Empire, by defining the limited but significant area where the aims and interests of the two cities, in their historical form, coincide."[52]

My contribution will not attempt to solve this riddle. Instead, I will briefly turn to how Augustine describes the earthly and celestial cities. Johannes van Oort has argued that Augustine's choice to label God's reign as a *civitas* suggests that he is not referring to a single political state, but rather to the equivalent of the Greek πόλις, that is, a community based on "its own politics, legal standards, ethics, economics and, last but not least, its own religion."[53] In other words, it is very close to Cicero's legal definition of his ideal cosmic city, and by consequence also resembles his ideal (Roman) *res publica*. This means that in contrasting God's rightful *civitas* with the unrightful earthly *civitas*, Augustine, following earlier Christian thinkers, has not only created one cosmic city as the Stoics did, but two: one deficient and earthly (the Empire of Rome which dominates the world through injustice and force) and one perfect and heavenly.[54] Both are cosmopolitan in that they are transnational, all-encompassing entities. What is more: both are places where Christians live.[55] God's city is their final destination, whereas worldly citizenship is temporary, but still common to all, as a passage from *De opere monachorum* testifies, where Augustine explains that it does not matter to which monastery one gives one's alms and charities, because "for all Christians there is one res publica" ("omnium enim christianorum una res publica est").[56]

Admittedly, *De opere monachorum* is quite another text than *De civitate dei*, but also in the latter we find similar references. In Book 5, Augustine declares that Christians can live well and without harming their souls under whatever

50 See Neschke, "La cité n'est pas à nous," 236–37; Smolak, "*Res publica res populi Dei*," 115–20. Smolak also mentions (p. 120) that Augustine inherited the redefinition of *iustitia* as transcendent Christian justice from Lactantius.

51 Neschke, "La cité n'est pas à nous," 240: "Par conséquent, et à différence du platonisme politique, jamais la cité terrestre, même en tant que cité temporelle, peut être une μίμησις de la cité céleste ou spirituelle".

52 O'Daly, *Augustine's City of God*, 209.

53 Van Oort, "*Civitas dei—terrena civitas*," 161.

54 Or even three, if we consider the (imperfect) church in Augustine's time as another earthly entity spanning the whole world. See O'Daly, "Thinking through History," 57: "The church is not presented in Augustine as the equivalent of a political society. Yet it shares some of the undesirable characteristics of secular institutions."

55 See Taylor, "Augustine's Reception of Cicero," 28: "These cities are 'interwoven' and 'mingled' in everyday life, and we participate in each according to that love that motivates us—we dwell in the earthly city as we act on our self-love, and we participate in the Holy City when we are moved by our love for God."

56 Augustine, *De opere monachorum* 33.

earthly dominion, as long as the rulers don't force them to do injustice ("quantum enim pertinet ad hanc uitam mortalium, quae paucis diebus ducitur et finitur, quid interest sub cuius imperio uiuat homo moriturus, si illi qui imperant ad impia et iniqua non cogant?").[57] For the time being, the earthly reign in which the Christians live is the Roman one, the second all-encompassing cosmopolitan empire in the history of mankind.[58] This means that the *terrena civitas* in Augustine's time is equivalent to the *res publica Romana:* when reflecting on Romulus and his murder of Remus, he introduces the section with the sentence "the first founder of the earthly state ('terrenae civitatis conditor') thus was a fratricide."[59] Whereas Augustine has refuted Cicero with Cicero's own definition when denying the existence of the Roman Empire as a legal entity, in other passages Cicero's shifting from *civitas mundi* to (Roman) state (which we have seen in the *De finibus*-passage) is taken up by Augustine. In order to be able to do so, he proposes a weaker, non-ethical definition: a state is a "coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus."[60] According to James O'Donnell, the sentence reveals Augustine's attitude towards Cicero as follows: "Cicero and his tradition are not rejected, refuted, denied—they are, in the best sense, transcended."[61] However, Kurt Smolak has argued—convincingly in my view—that the pragmatic and at first seemingly neutral definition has negative associations: first, the lacuna of any legal element in the definition makes the state

[57] Augustine, *De civitate dei* 5.17: "As far as this mortal life is concerned, which is passed and ended in a few days, what difference does it make for a man who is soon to die, under what ruler he lives, if only the rulers do not force him to commit unholy and unjust deeds?" (Translation: W.M. Green, *Loeb Classical Library* 412, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1963).

[58] Augustine, *De civitate dei* 18.2: "sed inter plurima regna terrarum, in quae terrenae utilitatis vel cupiditatis est divisa societas—quam civitatem mundi huius universali vocabulo nuncupamus—duo regna cernimus longe ceteris provenisse clariora, Assyriorum primum, deinde Romanorum, ut temporibus, ita locis inter se ordinata atque distincta. nam quo modo illud prius, hoc posterius: eo modo illud in Oriente, hoc in Occidente surrexit; denique in illius fine huius initium confestim fuit. regna cetera ceterosque reges velut adpendices istorum dixerim." ("But among the numerous kingdoms of the world, into which the society motivated by worldly advantage or satisfaction, which we call by the general name the 'city of this world', has been divided, we note that two powers have gained far greater fame than the rest, first that of the Assyrians, and later that of the Romans, as neatly arranged and well spaced from each other in time as in place. For just as the one arose earlier and the other later, so also the one arose in the east and the other in the west, and, to conclude, the beginning of the one followed immediately upon the end of the other. All other kingdoms and kings I should describe as appendages of these empires." Translation: E.M. Sanford and W.M. Green, *Loeb Classical Library* 415, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1965).

[59] Augustine, *De civitate dei* 15.5.

[60] Augustine, *De civitate dei* 19.24: "A people is a large gathering of rational beings united in fellowship by their agreement about the objects of their love." (Translation: W.C. Greene, *Loeb Classical Library* 416, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1960). On the replacement of *consensus iuris* with *concors communio* and possible (almost ironic) implications see Kempshall, "*De re publica* in Medieval and Renaissance Political Thought," 99–135, here 102–3; on p. 105, he summarizes Augustine's definition as "nothing other than a multitude of humans tied together by some bond of association" (with reference to Augustine, *De civitate dei* 15.8). *Contra*, Taylor, "Augustine's Reception of Cicero," 30, believes that Augustine with this formulation tries to connect his concept of the earthly *civitas* closely with Cicero's in *De re publica*, in that both need a skilled and moral statesman in order "to discipline and bend his fellow citizens toward divine truth."

[61] O'Donnell, "Augustine—Cicero redivivus," 110. According to O'Donnell, Augustine is in constant dialogue with Cicero in "thinking about communities of people as communities, taking questions of polity and politics back to fundamentals." On p. 111, he even tentatively compares the structural imitation of Cicero in *De civitate dei* with Macrobius' *Saturnalia*.

susceptible to arbitrariness; second, it connects it to two empires of the Old Testament, Egypt and Assyria, which always acted as unlawful opponents of Israel.[62] Taking these elements into account, one could say that Augustine defines the *imperium Romanum* as part of God's creation and as a necessary step in the history of human salvation—necessary, but highly imperfect.[63] Its imperfection lies not only in the lack of justice, but also in the lack of a true feeling of unity among its inhabitants. In chapter 19.7 Augustine alludes to Cicero's idea (expressed at *Fin.* 3.62–64) of a plural identity of men who are part of familiar and urban societies as well as of the common citizenship of the world. Accordingly, Augustine speaks of three steps of human societies ("gradus societatis humanae"): *domus, urbs* and *orbis*. The larger the entity becomes, the more dangers arise, which arguably threaten even Augustine's 'weaker' definition of a state as a gathering of people united by common interests:

> post civitatem vel urbem sequitur orbis terrae, in quo tertium gradum ponunt societatis humanae, incipientes a domo atque inde ad urbem, deinde ad orbem progrediendo venientes; qui utique, sicut aquarum congeries, quanto maior est, tanto periculis plenior. in quo primum linguarum diversitas hominem alienat ab homine. ... quando enim quae sentiunt inter se communicare non possunt propter solam diversitatem linguae, nihil prodest ad consociandos homines tanta similitudo naturae, ita ut libentius homo sit cum cane suo quam cum homine alieno. at enim opera data est, ut imperiosa civitas non solum iugum, verum etiam linguam suam domitis gentibus per pacem societatis inponeret, per quam non deesset, immo et abundaret etiam interpretum copia. verum est; sed hoc quam multis et quam grandibus bellis, quanta strage hominum, quanta effusione humani sanguinis comparatum est?[64]

The Roman state as the present representative of the *civitas terrena* suffers from the lack of unity among its citizens: as they do not speak the same native language and therefore do not understand each other, they do not feel close to each other (the sneer that they prefer to live with their own dogs rather than with people from other regions undermines another core element of the definitions offered so far, that is, a state as based on shared rationality that only human beings possess). Only a huge effort of suppression and violence can force the subdued to accept

[62] See Smolak, "*Res publica res populi Dei*," 125–27; on Rome as the *Babylonia secunda*, see also van Oort, *Jerusalem and Babylon*, 119.

[63] See Neschke, "La cité n'est pas à nous," 243: "[S]ur le registre thétique ou catéchisant, il affirme que la cité temporelle occupe une place déterminée et tout-à-fait instrumentale dans l'ordre de ce monde ... Dans le registre apologétique et polémique, Augustin souligne qu'il faut rejeter la prétention de la cité païenne existante, Rome, de procurer le salut à ses habitants."

[64] Augustine, *De civitate dei* 19.7: "After the state or city comes the world, to which they assign the third level of human society; they begin with the household, then progressively arrive at the city, and then at the world. And this, like a confluence of waters, is the fuller of dangers as it is the larger. In the first place, the diversity of languages separates one man from another. ... For where they cannot communicate their views to one another, merely because they speak different languages, so little good does it do them to be alike by endowment of nature, so far as social unity is concerned, that a man would rather have his dog for company than a foreigner. But the imperial city has taken pains to impose on conquered peoples, as a bond of peace, not only her yoke but her language, so that there has been far from a lack, but rather a superfluity, of interpreters. True; but at what a cost has this unity been achieved, all those great wars, all that human slaughter and bloodshed!" (Translation: W.C. Greene, *Loeb Classical Library* 416, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1960). Note how this passage obliterates Sallust's vision of Rome's uniting capacity (see n. 6 above)

the shared Roman language as a minimal base of civic union. By contrast, God's *civitas caelestis* will generously provide this union in that all inhabitants share the same (Christian) faith, and as a consequence the same ethical beliefs.

We have seen that Augustine, apart from using Cicero explicitly as a source and framework for his historical and political reflections,[65] also inherited Cicero's *interpretatio Romana* of the Stoic concept of the cosmopolitan state. But he goes one decisive step further: he defines two common and all-encompassing states. The *imperium Romanum* is the earthly *civitas mundi*, but it is a defective and even illegal state. It therefore does not invite associations with ethical cosmopolitanism, but with submission under an imperialistic power. God's state, on the other hand, is perfectly just and therefore highly ethical. Ethical goodness is an aspect that is discussed in modern sociological approaches of cosmocitizenship.[66] But is the *civitas dei* therefore cosmopolitan in our modern sense? In some ways it is: it admits people from all kinds of ethnicities, regions and social strata. But if one sees cosmopolitanism as a project for recognizing multiple identities, including religious ones, it hardly qualifies for cosmopolitanism, as Christian faith is the passport one needs to become a true citizen.

4 Lorenzo Valla's 'res publica Romanae linguae'

For this last part, I make a huge step forwards in time, from the fifth to the fifteenth century. Lorenzo Valla's preface to the *Elegantia lingue latine*, his major work on Latin grammar and style, revives the connection between Roman imperialistic discourse and ideas of cosmopolitanism by moving it from an ethico-political or religious to a linguistic level.[67] The text was written around 1441 when the author was in service of King Alfonso of Naples;[68] it was also the time when the papal curia took the first steps to restore the physical city of Rome to its ancient glory (the so-called *restauratio Urbis* which would continue for the rest of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries). In Valla's time, however, the ancient monuments were mostly still in a disastrous state. The need to preserve the ancient heritage was urgently felt; and the renewed interest in the physical city of Rome also made it an important theme in the literature of the time.[69] It is important to realize this background to appreciate Valla's treatise fully. As well, he is interested in preserving Rome's ancient Empire, yet he transposed the debate onto a non-material level. Valla starts from the assessment that the Empire of antiquity has obviously been destroyed as a political entity; yet, so he claims, its heritage is not completely gone, for it lives on through the Latin language, which is still one of the most important media for transnational communication. But, as the physical remains of ancient Rome are in danger of disappearing completely and have to be rescued, so also the language of ancient Rome needs the united effort of the

65 On Augustine's Ciceronian method, see O'Daly, "Thinking through History".

66 See, for example, Vernon, "Cosmocitizens?" 317: "[S]hould the cosmopolitan be a good citizen?"

67 Part 4 of my article develops aspects of my earlier interpretation of Valla's focus on Rome in "Laurentius Valla, Romanus, orator," 152–67.

68 See Regoliosi, *Nel cantiere del Valla*, 60–61.

69 On this aspect, see the forthcoming study by de Beer, *The Renaissance Battle for Rome*.

humanists in order to survive. Valla invites all educated men to contribute to its 'defence', which for him means the purification of the language from all non-classical medievalisms.

In modern times the text has gained the iconic status of a manifesto of humanist learning; it is often seen as the most explicit definition of a *res publica litteraria*, a republic of letters that is open to anyone who subscribes to the ideals of humanistic education, no matter what nationality (s)he has. From this idealistic standpoint that still sees humanism as a mostly intellectual movement, the *res publica litteraria* would classify very nicely for a cosmopolitan 'state', an intellectual world citizenship based on shared cultural values, in this case the love for the language and culture of Antiquity.[70] More recently, however, interpreters have rooted Valla's claim in the national Italian or even local Roman discourse of his time (Valla was a native Roman) and have thus questioned the idealism of the text. According to such an interpretation, Valla's linguistic programme is connected to the debate on which city could claim to be the true heir of ancient Rome: contemporary Rome itself (especially because of the papal Curia), or a city like Florence, which had been a driving force of humanist learning in the early fifteenth century.[71] Valla's close association of the Roman language with the Roman Empire (which in Antiquity always had its heart in the city of Rome) could become useful as one argument in favour of Rome as the intellectual centre of the humanist movement.

The preface to the first book in particular is quoted regularly for the famous claim that the *imperium Romanum* can be vindicated solely through the excellence of the Latin language. The preface is built on a huge comparison of the Roman Empire and its language.[72] Valla contrasts the loss of Rome's political hegemony in the world with the triumph of its language, which constitutes the basis for what could be called a cosmopolitan state of the intellect in that it encompasses in principle the whole known world. In contrast to Augustine, who had highlighted the Eastern empires as predecessors of the Roman imperium, Valla marks the difference between them: only the Roman Empire has also spread its language all over the world[73] and thereby turned language into a constituting aspect of imperialism. As long as the inhabitants of other countries still speak Latin, the nucleus of the Roman Empire has not ceased to exist—its language is explicitly called a ruler of the world: "nostra est Italia, nostra Gallia, nostra Hispania, Germania, Pannonia, Dalmatia, Illyricum multaeque aliae nationes. *Ibi namque Romanum imperium est ubicumque Romana lingua dominatur*."[74] The quotation exemplifies that for Valla Empire and language are two sides of the same coin, and

70 See, for example, La Penna, "La tradizione classica nella cultura italiana," 1319–72; Hanna-Barbara Gerl, *Rhetorik als Philosophie*, especially 248.

71 Gaeta, "Sull'idea di Roma," 181; Mazzocco, *Linguistic Theories in Dante and the Humanists*, 69–81.

72 See Valla, *De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum* 19: "Ac, ne pluribus agam, de comparatione imperii sermonisque romani hoc satis est dixisse" ("But in order not to make my argument too lengthy, I have spoken enough about the comparison of the Roman Empire and language"). All translations from Valla's preface are my own. The Latin text is taken from Regoliosi, *Nel cantiere del Valla*, 120–25.

73 See Johnson, "The Linguistic Imperialism," 33.

74 *Ibid*. 23: "Italy belongs to us, as does France, Spain, Germany, Hungary, the Balkan (Dalmatia and Illyricum), and many other nations. For the Roman Empire exists wherever the Roman language rules."

indeed he constantly switches between both.[75] It is worth noting that as a Roman patriot[76] he markedly labels Latin as the *lingua* Romana; he defends this choice by asserting that the more common alternative term, *lingua Latina*, is ultimately related to the city of Rome as well ("[lingua Romana] que eadem Latina a Latio *ubi Roma est*").[77] Generally, we recognize a method that Augustine and Cicero had applied as well, namely to connect an apolitical, all-encompassing ideal closely with the political entity of the boundless *imperium Romanum*.[78]

More specifically, Valla looks back to Augustine when he uses the Roman Empire both as a metaphor (or rather analogy)[79] for the global proliferation of his alleged linguistic empire and as a negative foil that helps him *ex negativo* to aggrandize the authority of the Latin language. The political Empire is proven to have been defective (as also Augustine had presented it) and therefore has ended, whereas the idealized alternative (the *civitas dei* in Augustine, the *lingua Romana* in Valla) is perfect and therefore non-terminated. Another parallel between the two authors is the stress on the amount of bloodshed and suppression that was needed to enable and control political unity, whereas the alternative is based on love and concord instead: "neque enim armis aut cruore aut bellis dominatum adeptus est, sed beneficiis amore concordia."[80] Valla's encomium of the exceptionality of Latin goes so far that he recurs to words that link his linguistic discourse to a quasi-religious sphere: "magnum igitur latini sermonis *sacramentum* est! magnum profecto *numen*! qui apud peregrinos, apud barbaros, apud hostes *sancta et religiose* per tot secula custoditur ut non tam dolendum nobis Romanis quam gaudendum sit atque *ipso etiam orbe exaudiente* gloriandum."[81] While the holy

75 See De Caprio, "La rinascita della cultura di Roma," 170.

76 On Valla's patriotism, see Fisher, "The Project of Humanism," 303.

77 Valla, *De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum* 4: "... the Roman language, which is the same as the Latin, called 'Latin' from Latium where Rome is situated." See Nauta, *In Defense of Common Sense*, 278: "For the Roman Valla, it was in Rome that Latin had developed and from whence it had spread." See also di Napoli, *Lorenzo Valla*, 328: "la *romanitas* è per lui [that is, Valla, CP] una *plena humanitas*, quasi paradigmatica di fronte alla barbarie della non romanità."

78 The *apparatus fontium* by Regoliosi, *Nel cantiere del Valla*, does not mention Augustine for the preface, but links it mostly to Ciceronian and Quintilian concepts of the greatness of the Latin language, but see Fisher, "The Project of Humanism," 316–17 on Christian (Pauline) associations of his imperial metaphor (without reference to Augustine, though).

79 Fisher, "The Project of Humanism," 303 doubts that one should call this a metaphor because Latin was used for actual colonization in the past; but Valla's focus is less on actual colonization than on the *essence* of the political vs. the linguistic Empire; see also Johnson, "The Linguistic Imperialism," 32–38, for the complexity of Valla's metaphor (which according to Johnson is meant to contrast the transcendent Rome of the Latin language and the political Empire).

80 Valla, *De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum* 15: "And the dominion has not been achieved by weapons, blood, or war, but by benefactions, love, and concord." See the *concors concordia* in Augustine, *De civitate dei* 19.24 (quoted above) and the reference to blood and war in 19.7: "sed hoc quam multis et quam grandibus bellis, quanta strage hominum, quanta effusione humani sanguinis comparatum est?" (quoted in its context above).

81 Valla, *De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum* 21: "Great is the mystery of the Latin language! Great indeed is its divinity! It has been protected by foreigners, barbarians and enemies for so many centuries that we Romans must not bemoan but rejoice and be proud while the whole world itself is listening." Regoliosi, *Nel cantiere del Valla, ad loc.*, refers to Paul, *Letter to the Ephesians* 5:32 and *First Letter to Timotheus* 3:16; for *magnum numen* one can also think of Cicero, *Philippics* 3.32: "magna vis est, magnum

language might refer back to Augustine, too, it is of course also rooted in the humanistic presence, in which Rome is closely connected to the papal Curia (see below).

The assertion that even barbarians (etymologically those who speak a foreign language) and political enemies (those who fight against Rome's dominion) embrace the holiness of the Latin language, is a truly cosmopolitan claim. The inclusive character of his praise is enforced at the end of the quote, where Valla calls the whole *orbis terrarum* as witness for his claim ("ipso etiam orbe exaudiente"). Love of Latin is the tie that unites all inhabitants of the globe. Yet, as in the preface, there is also ambiguity in this quote. The self-presentation as 'we Romans' ("nobis Romanis") thwarts the inclusive rhetoric and roots the claim of the dominion of Latin in traditional imperial discourse: 'we' (the ingroup) bring 'our' benefits to 'them' (the 'others') and 'we' can be proud of this 'civilizing' act. Moreover, the described unity of all men in the world is only an ideal, and Valla is honest enough to acknowledge that the ingroup of the 'linguistic Romans' stands against an outgroup of linguistic opponents. These are people who do not share Valla's love and engagement for Latin. His rhetorical weapon against those opponents is radical: they are excluded from the group of rational people and are stigmatized as new barbarians.

The consequence is that Valla, who had previously stressed that the spreading of Latin was an act of benefaction and love, now turns to military metaphors. The grammatical restoration he aspires to is presented as a war against barbarism, and Valla sees himself as its military leader: he compares himself to Camillus who had driven the Gauls out of Rome in 390 BCE.[82] Where does this leave cosmopolitan ideas? Again things are ambiguous. On the one hand, membership of the ingroup of Valla's reform, or (put differently) citizenship of the *res publica litteraria*, is explicitly not confined to national boundaries. In order to stress this, Valla redefines the word 'Quirites', Roman citizens, in a radical way: "quousque tandem, Quirites, (litteratos appello et Romane lingue cultores, qui et veri et soli Quirites sunt, ceteri enim potius inquilini) quousque, inquam, Quirites urbem nostram, non dico domicilium imperii, sed parentem litterarum, a Gallis captam esse patiemini, id est latinitatem a barbaria oppressam?"[83] On the other hand, the passage is dense with historical symbolism—as mentioned above, in the rest of the preface Valla elaborates the idea of fighting against the Gauls in order to protect Rome—and plays with the dichotomy of supra-nationality versus Rome-centeredness. All people from the whole world are invited, yet those who accept the invitation will become the new *Roman* citizens in that they defend the Roman language, the

numen unum et idem sentientis senatus," where it refers to unanimity between opponents, as well (in this case the senators during the civic struggle after Caesar's death).

82 Valla, *De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum* 39–41: "Camillus vobis, Camillus imitandus est ... equidem, quod ad me attinet, hunc imitabor, hoc mihi proponam exemplum." ("Camillus—you must imitate Camillus ... As far as I am concerned, I will imitate him and chose him as my example.")

83 Valla, *De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum* 23: "How long, citizens (for this is how I call the intellectuals and conservators of the Roman language who are the true and only Quirites, the others being immigrants), how long, citizens, will you tolerate that our city, I do not say the dwelling of the empire, but the parent of learnedness, is captured by the Gauls, that is, Latinity suppressed by barbarism?"

symbol of Rome's everlasting *imperium*. Cosmopolitanism means Romanization at a very basic level.

But which Rome and which empire is Valla referring to? Is he dreaming of turning the tide and does he believe that his linguistic reform can ultimately resurrect a kind of political Roman Empire again?[84] Or is he merely speaking as a humanist and grammarian whose interest is in language, not in politics? At the end, an answer depends on how strongly the Roman metaphor will resonate in any reader's mind and, as a consequence, how strongly it will define the actual city of Rome as the necessary centre of European humanism.[85] Valla always keeps both interpretations alive: a national Roman and a transnational cosmopolitan community, as the following quotation once more demonstrates: "confido propediem linguam romanam vere plus quam urbem, et cum ea disciplinas omnes, iri restitutum. Quare pro mea in patriam pietate, immo adeo in omnes homines, et pro rei magnitudine cunctos facundie studiosos ex superiore loco libet adhortari."[86] Valla connects his linguistic program with the beginning of *restauratio Urbis* under the popes Eugene IV and Nicolas V, yet at the same time relativizes the physical renewal of Rome by asserting that his linguistic reform is more valuable (*plus quam*). He is driven by love for Rome (his *patria*), but even more for all men (that is, all inhabitants of the world, the compatriots of the newly formed *res publica litteraria*). The dreamt-of papal (religious and political) Empire and the references to defending the Roman state are both real, in that they are situated in Valla's historical context, and metaphorical at the same time, in that they stress the urgency and extent of his cultural, cosmopolitan endeavour.

The ambiguity with which Valla refers to the *imperium Romanum* has repercussions on whether we could label his humanist Republic of letters a cosmopolitan state. Similar in certain ways to Augustine's *civitas dei*, his *imperium linguae* is cosmopolitan because it disrespects physical borders and is open to all. Yet similarly to Cicero's cosmopolitan city, it is oriented towards the actual city of Rome.[87] Moreover, even if it is interpreted idealistically as a manifesto for a *res*

[84] Fisher, "The Project of Humanism," 305–6 partly suggests this, when he speaks of the ideal and factual (present) Empire, and p. 309 on humanism as "colonial enterprise"; on pp. 314–15, however, he proposes a more philosophical interpretation (the political metaphor stands for "the capacity to receive the fullness of the primary truths"), and on pp. 316–17 a Christian one (see above n. 74). As his is a "poetic" reading of the metaphors ("the rhetorical surfaces") of the text, he advocates semantic ambiguity (see p. 322).

[85] On the (also emotional) intensity of the manifold imagery of Rome in Valla's preface ("Rome as empire, Rome as fallen and yet somehow persisting commonwealth, and this new and spiritual Rome as a republic to be restored and defended"), see Johnson, "The Linguistic Imperialism," 36–37.

[86] Valla, *De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum*, 33–34: "I am confident that very soon the Roman language will be restored more than the city, and with it all other sciences. Therefore according to my duty and respect towards my fatherland, nay rather towards all people, and according to the greatness of the matter I am disposed to encourage all experts of eloquence from the highest range."

[87] The Roman connection of Valla's linguistic reforms will become stronger with the years. In 1455, when in the meantime he had moved to Rome, Valla delivered a speech for the opening of the Academic Year of Rome's *studium Urbis*: Valla, *Oratio in principio studii die XVIII Octobris MCCCCLV*, in Valla, *Orazione per l'inaugurazione*, 192–216. In this speech he recurred to many of the arguments he had voiced in the preface of the *Elegantia*. The most obvious innovation, however, is the role of the papal Curia that guarantees the persistence of the ancient Roman traditions (§34). See Bianca, "La curia," 97–113, on the Curia as *domicilium sapientiae*, and Pieper, *Elegos redolere*, 223–26 for a more detailed discussion of Valla's *Orazione* as opposed to the *Elegantia*.

publica litteraria, the preface invokes a state which is not fully cosmopolitan in that not everyone can be member of it (see the clear distinction between *cives* and *inquilini* in the passage quoted above)—learnedness and the belief in the holiness of the Roman/Latin language is the passport one needs to show, as Christian faith had been for Augustine.

5 Conclusion

The three case studies of this article have shown the diversity of cosmopolitan discourse in Latin literature. Starting from Cicero's reception and Roman interpretation of Greek Stoic ideas of a world citizenship, they move towards Christian philosophy and theology in Augustine and towards cultural imperialism in Valla. Only in Cicero's case is the link to Stoic thought made explicit, whereas the two other authors react in a looser way to the philosophical discourse. Nonetheless, they all pose an important question: what is the relation between the philosophical/theological/linguistic ideal and the historical realities? More concretely, the question that has interested me is: what is the role of the Roman Empire within the three case studies, a political entity that once had conquered large parts of the then known world? Two answers that unite the three cases emerge: first, the Roman Empire is used as a representative and/or contrastive foil of an idealized cosmopolitan world. Second, all three authors doubt that the Roman Empire may truly be classified as a cosmopolitan state. Cicero and Augustine question its legal or moral fundament, whereas Valla sees the ancient Empire already as a past entity that has proven to be vulnerable, and which has finally been conquered and destroyed. Whether the papal Curia will be able to fill the gap, is very much a question that kept Valla, and with him many humanists of his generation, busy.

The question remains, then, whether the *ideal* alternatives offered by Cicero, Augustine and Valla can at least be classified as a cosmopolitan state. An answer depends on which criteria for cosmopolitanism we apply. From an ancient perspective, they all would, as they are based on justice, equality of men and voluntary submission under a dominion. From a modern perspective, however, they are all deficient in that they entail dichotomies of in- and outgroups and define a legal, theologian or linguistic *Leitkultur* that all citizens of the community have to embrace. As in modern theoretical approaches the ability and willingness to live with the 'Other' and a critical attitude towards dogmatism are defined as crucial elements of cosmopolitanism,[88] most Latin texts dealing with it will not entirely fulfil these criteria. Rather, they can sensitize us to the vicinity of cosmopolitan and imperial discourses. The ancient and humanistic texts show that cosmopolitan ideas often arise in times of strong imperialistic claims; they serve as alternatives to a seemingly uncontested world order of dominion, submission and egoism. Alternatives are not automatically perfect, perhaps not even better than the concepts they criticize—but they always open up discursive fields and trigger new reflection about the status quo. In this sense, the history of Latin

[88] See Stevenson, "Cosmopolitan Citizenship" (quoted above with n. 2).

cosmopolitanism has much to offer for modern readers to make sense of the world in which we live.

References

Adams, Jeremy Duquesnay. *The Populus of Augustine and Jerome: A Study in the Patristic Sense of Community*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1971.

Aelius Aristides. *Orationes*. Edited by Wilhelm Dindorf. Leipzig: Weidmann, 1823.

Augustine. *City of God*. 7 vols. Translated by George E. McCracken et al. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957–72.

Baier, Thomas. "Cicero und Augustinus: Die Begründung ihres Staatsdenkens im jeweiligen Gottesbild." *Gymnasium* 109 (2002): 121–40.

de Beer, Susanna. *The Renaissance Battle for Rome. Competing Claims to the Ancient Roman Legacy in Humanist Latin Poetry*. Forthcoming.

Bianca, Concetta. "La curia come 'domicilium sapientiae' e la 'sancta rusticitas'." In *Humanisme et église en Italie et en France méridionale (XV^e siècle – milieu du XVI^e siècle)*, edited by Patrick Gilli, 97–113. Rome: École française de Rome.

Busetto, Anna. "The Idea of Cosmopolitanism from its Origins to the 21st Century." In *Citizens in the Graeco-Roman World: Aspects of Citizenship from the Archaic Period to 212 AD*, edited by Lucia Cecchet and Anna Busetto, 302–17. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2017.

Butler, Shane. *The Hand of Cicero*. London: Routledge, 2002.

Cicero. *On Duties*. Translated by Walter Miller. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913.

———. *On Ends*. Translated by Harris Rackham. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914.

———. *Pro Archia. Post Reditum in Senatu. Post Reditum ad Quirites. De Domo Sua. De Haruspicum Responsis. Pro Plancio*. Translated by Neville H. Watts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923.

———. *Tusculan Disputations*. Translated by John E. King. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927.

———. *On the Republic. On the Laws*. Translated by Clinton W. Keyes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928.

———. *On the Nature of the Gods. Academics*. Translated by Harris Rackham. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933.

Cebolla Sanahuja, Lorena. "The Right of the Subject to Become a Citizen of the World: Kantian Anti-Colonial Cosmopolitanism." In *Cosmopolitanism: Between Ideals*

and Reality, edited by Lorena Cebolla Sanahuja and Francesco Ghia, 59–82. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015.

Delanty, Gerard, ed. *Routledge International Handbook of Cosmopolitan Studies*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2018.

Di Caprio, Vincenzo. "La rinascita della cultura di Roma: La tradizione latina nelle Eleganze di Lorenzo Valla." In *Umanesimo a Roma nel Quattrocento: Atti del convegno, New York, 1–4 dicembre 1981*, edited by Paolo Brezzi e.a., 163–90. Rome/New York: Istituto di Studi Romani, 1984.

Di Napoli, Giovanni. *Lorenzo Valla: Filosofia e religione nell'umanesimo italiano*. Rome: Edizione di Storia e Letteratura, 1971.

Dyck, Andrew R. *A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.

——. *A Commentary on Cicero, De Legibus*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004.

Eckstein, Arthur M. "Conceptualizing Roman Imperial Expansion under the Republic: An Introduction." In *A Companion to the Roman Republic*, edited by Nathan Rosenstein and Robert Morstein-Marx, 568–89. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007.

Enenkel, Karl. "Heilige Cicero, help mij! Hoofdlijnen van de Cicero-receptie in het Italiaanse Renaissance-humanisme." In *Zoals de ouden zongen: Over de receptie van de klassieken in de Europese literatuur*, edited by Karl Enenkel, Paul van Heck, and Rudi van der Paardt, 9–42. Emmeloord: Hermaion, 1998.

Epictetus. *Discourses, Books 1–2*. Translated by W. A. Oldfather. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925.

Fisher, Alan. "The Project of Humanism and Valla's Imperial Metaphor." *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 23 (1993): 301–22.

Gaeta, Francesco. "Sull'idea di Roma nell'umanesimo e nel Rinascimento." *Studi Romani* 25 (1977): 169–86.

Gerl, Hanna-Barbara. *Rhetorik als Philosophie: Lorenzo Valla*. Munich: Fink, 1975.

Girardet, Klaus M. *Die Ordnung der Welt: Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen und politischen Interpretation von Ciceros Schrift De legibus*. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1983.

Gowing, Alain M. "Greek Advice for a Roman Senator: Cassius Dio and the Dialogue between Philiscus and Cicero (38.18–29)." In *Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar 10: Greek Poetry, Drama, Prose, Roman Poetry,* edited by Francis Cairns and Malcolm Heath, 359–72. Leeds: Cairns, 1998.

Griffin, Miriam T. "Iure plectimur: The Roman Critique of Roman Imperialism." In *East & West. Papers in Ancient History Presented to Glen W. Bowersock*, edited by T. Corey Brennan and Harriet I. Flower, 85–111. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.

Jansen, Leanne. "Cicero, toon karakter!" In *Vertrouw mij! Manipulaties van imago*, edited by Jaap de Jong, Olga van Marion, and Adriaan Rademaker, 161–66. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018.

Johnson, Lawrence J. "The 'Linguistic Imperialism' of Lorenzo Valla and the Renaissance Humanists." *Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy* 7, vol. 3 (1978): 29–49.

Kempshall, Matthew S. "De re publica in Medieval and Renaissance Political Thought." In *Cicero's Republic*, edited by Jonathan Powell and John A. North, 99–135. London: Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, 2001.

Kierdorf, Wilhelm. "Ciceros Cato: Überlegungen zu einer verlorenen Schrift Ciceros." *Rheinisches Museum* 121 (1978): 167–84.

La Penna, Antonio. "La tradizione classica nella cultura italiana." In *Storia d'Italia*, Vol. 5.2, 1319–72. Turin: Einaudi, 1973.

Litchfield, Henry Wheatland. "National exempla virtutis in Roman Literature." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 25 (1914): 1–71.

Márquez, Xavier. "Between urbs and orbis: Cicero's Conception of the Political Community." *In Cicero's Practical Philosophy*, edited by Walter Nicgorski, 181–211. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012.

Mazzocco, Angelo. *Linguistic Theories in Dante and the Humanists: Studies of Language and Intellectual History in Late Medieval and Early Renaissance Italy*. Leiden et al.: Brill, 1993.

McLaughlin, Martin L. "Petrarch and Cicero: Adulation and Critical Distance." In *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Cicero*, edited by William H.F. Altman, 19–38. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2015.

Moatti, Claudia. "Mobility and Identity between the Second and the Fourth Centuries: The 'Cosmopolitization' of the Roman Empire." In *The City in the Classical and Post-classical World. Changing Contexts of Power and Identity*, edited by Claudia Rapp and H.A. Drake, 130–52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Moles, John L. "Cynic Cosmopolitanism." In *The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy*, edited by R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, 105–20. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996.

Nauta, Lodi. *In Defense of Common Sense: Lorenzo Valla's Humanist Critique of Scholastic Philosophy*. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2009.

Neschke, Ada. "La cité n'est pas à nous: Res publica et civitas dans le XIXe livre du De Civitate Dei d'Augustin d'Hippone." In *La repubblica di Platone nella tradizione antica*, edited Mario Vergetti and Michele Abbate, 219–44. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1999.

van Nijf, Onno M. "Political Games." In *L'organisation des spectacles dans le monde romain: Huit exposés suivis de discussions*, edited by Kathleen Coleman and Jocelyne Nelis-Clément, 47–88. Geneva/ Vandœuvres: Fondation Hardt, 2012.

O'Daly, Gerard. "Thinking through History: Augustine's Method in the City of God and its Ciceronian Dimension." In *History, Apocalypse, and the Secular Imagination: New Essays on Augustine's City of God*, edited by Mark Vessey, Karla Pollmann, and Allan D. Fitzgerald, 45–57. Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Centre, 1999 [= *Augustinian Studies* 30, vol. 2 (1999): 45–57].

———. *Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

O'Donnell, James J. "Augustine—Cicero redivivus." In *Kampf oder Dialog? Begegnung von Kulturen im Horizont von Augustins De ciuitate dei = Conflict/Dialogue? Augustine's Engagement with Cultures in De ciuitate dei*, edited by Christof Müller, 103–13. Würzburg: Augustinus bei echter: 2015.

van Oort, Johannes. *Jerusalem and Babylon: A Study into Augustine's City of God and the Sources of his Doctrine of the Two Cities*. Leiden et al.: Brill, 1991.

———. "Civitas dei—terrena civitas: The Concept of the Two Antithetical Cities and Its Sources (Books XI-XIV)." In *Augustinus, De civitate dei*, edited by Christoph Horn, 157–69. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1997.

Pieper, Christoph. *Elegos redolere Vergiliosque sapere: Cristoforo Landinos Xandra zwischen Liebe und Gesellschaft*. Hildesheim: Olms, 2008.

———. "Laurentius Valla, Romanus, orator: Valla over Rome als humanistisch centrum." *Lampas: Tijdschrift voor Nederlandse classici* 45 (2012): 152–67.

Pitts, Martin, and Versluys, Miguel John (eds.). *Globalisation and the Roman World: World History, Connectivity and Material Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Plutarch. *Lives*, Vol. 7: *Demosthenes and Cicero. Alexander and Caesar*. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1919.

Regoliosi, Mariangela. *Nel cantiere del Valla: Elaborazione e montaggio*

delle Elegantie. Rome: Bulzoni, 1993.

Richter, Daniel S. *Cosmopolis: Imagining Community in Late Classical Athens and the Early Roman Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Sallust. *The War with Catiline. The War with Jugurtha*. Edited by John T. Ramsey. Translated by John C. Rolfe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.

Schofield, Malcolm. *The Stoic Idea of the City*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

——. "Cosmopolitanism, Imperialism, and the Idea of Law." In id., *Cicero. Political Philosophy*, 105–46. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.

Seneca. *Moral Essays*, Vol. 2: *De Consolatione ad Marciam. De Vita Beata. De Otio. De Tranquillitate Animi. De Brevitate Vitae. De Consolatione ad Polybium. De Consolatione ad Helviam*. Translated by John W. Basore. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932.

Smolak, Kurt. "Res publica res populi Dei: Ciceros *De re publica* bei Augustinus (civ. 19) und Prudentius (*Symm*. 2)." In *Wiener humanistische Blätter / Sonderheft: Zur Philosophie der Antike,* 109–39. 2nd ed. Vienna: Wiener Humanistische Gesellschaft, 1999.

Stevenson, Nick. "Cosmopolitan Citizenship." In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism*, edited by Maria Rovisco and Magdalena Nowicka, 243–59. Farnham/Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011.

Stevenson, Tom. "Reverberations of Empire: Cicero, Caesar and the Post-Sullan Empire." In *A Companion to Roman Imperialism*, edited by Dexter Hoyos, 181–93. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013.

Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, edited by Hans van Arnim. 4 vols. Leipzig: Teubner, 1905–1924.

Tacoma, Laurens E. *Moving Romans: Migration to Rome in the Principate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Taylor, Brandon. "Augustine's Reception of Cicero." In *The Ciceronian Tradition in Political Theory*, edited by Daniel J. Kapust and Gary Remer, 17–34. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2021.

Testard, Maurice. *Saint Augustin et Cicéron*. 2 vols. Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1958.

Treloar, John L. "Cicero and Augustine: The Ideal Society." *Augustinianum* 28 (1988): 565–90.

Valla, Lorenzo. *Orazione per l'inaugurazione dell'anno accademico 1455–1456. Atti di un seminario di filologia umanistica*, edited by Silvia Rizzo. Rome: Roma nel Rinascimento, 1994.

Vernon, Richard. "Cosmocitizens?" In *Routledge International Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies*, edited by Gerard Delanty, 316–25. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2018.

Vogt, Katja Maria. *Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City. Political Philosophy in the Early Stoa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Woolf, Raphael. *Cicero: The Philosophy of a Roman Sceptic*. London/New York: Routledge, 2015.

Zarecki, Jonathan. *Cicero's Ideal Statesman in Theory and Practice*. London: Bloomsburg, 2014

JOLCEL

Journal of Latin Cosmopolitanism and European Literatures.

Current Contribution

Helena Bodin, "From Adam to Tsar' Kosmos: Cosmopolitanism in Byzantine Tradition," JOLCEL 5 (2021): 28–51. DOI: 10.21825/jolcel.v5i0.11455.

*

Note

This contribution is part of a larger dialogue of three articles and one responding piece that form the current issue of JOLCEL. The other contributions are "Latin Cosmopolitanism and the Roman Empire" by Christoph Pieper (pp. 1–26) and "The Classics at World's End. A VOC Secretary Reframes the Cape Khoi" by Tycho Maas (pp. 53–71). The response piece is "Thinking about Cosmopolitanism" by Theo D'haen (pp. 73–79).

*

From Adam to Tsar' Kosmos: Cosmopolitanism in the Byzantine Tradition

HELENA BODIN

Stockholm University

ABSTRACT

Setting out from the short dialogue in which the Cynic philosopher Diogenes of Sinope, upon being asked "Where are you from?," replied "I am a citizen of the world" (a cosmopolitan), the purpose of this article is to explore cosmopolitanism in Byzantine tradition, which surpasses the actual empire in both space and time and includes even later Orthodox Christian practices. This is done by considering its significance for literary world-making within the framework of languages used in Byzantine tradition, most importantly Greek. Textual examples from the first centuries AD, of importance for later discussions in Byzantium, present Adam, Moses and Christian believers as citizens of the world (cosmopolitans). In subsequent examples from the twelfth century, Orthodox Christian monks are instead called citizens of heaven (ouranopolitans), and the Constantinopolitan writer John Tzetzes records the many languages of the capital of the empire, which often has been described as a cosmopolitan city. Furthermore, examples of hymnography, homilies, and icons from the Orthodox Christian celebration of Pentecost are examined. The Pentecostal miracle offers a multilingual event which unites and enlightens *kosmos* in contrast to the confusion of tongues in Babel. As a whole, the article is inspired by discussions of cosmopolitanism as a travelling concept and as a controversial concept that encompasses both unity and plurality. It is proposed that cosmopolitanism in Byzantine tradition borders between homogenising (monolingual) and heterogenising (multilingual) modes.

***

The question "Where are you from?" marks the beginning of the conceptual history of cosmopolitanism. We know it from Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (around AD 200), where he narrates the life of Diogenes of Sinope,

the Cynic.[1] Through his clever reply, "I am a citizen of the world [*kosmopolitēs*]," that is, a cosmopolitan, the Cynic avoided being associated with exile and created a new context of belonging that was larger than all thitherto imaginable communities, which at that time consisted of Greek *poleis* (cities or city-states).

The purpose of this article is to explore and discuss functions and meanings of cosmopolitanism in Byzantine tradition. My argument is inspired by Diogenes' miniature dialogue with its single question and single reply, a dialogue which nevertheless covers a wide span of time. When the question was posed to Diogenes of Sinope in the fourth century BCE, it was already old. It echoes the somewhat longer enquiry, "Who are you and where are you from?," which Odysseus—the traveller and trickster, regarded as a stranger—was repeatedly asked, and it functions like an epic question, one which arouses expectations of a narrative. Its reply is still viable at the turn of the third millennium, when Julia Kristeva, for example, declares "I am a cosmopolitan," or when Kwame Anthony Appiah writes "we cosmopolitans" in his book on ethics in a world of strangers.[2] The question "Where are you from?" will therefore reoccur in several of the texts on which this article focuses. As will be demonstrated, the dialogue oscillates between two strategies, involving homogenising and monolingual as well as heterogenising and multilingual modes of cosmopolitan practices.

In the following exploration of cosmopolitanism, Byzantine tradition signifies not only the historical Byzantine Empire (325–1453) but, moreover, a tradition which is embraced by the whole so-called Byzantine Commonwealth.[3] It surpasses the actual empire in both space and time and includes even later Orthodox Christian practices. The discussion will be expanded from theoretical and historical perspectives which are grounded in world literature studies and involve recent theories on cosmopolitanism and literary world-making, necessarily including linguistic practices.[4] My particular intent is to consider the issue of cosmopolitanism within the framework of languages used in Byzantine tradition. Among them, Greek will be paramount, though Church Slavonic is also considered. The Greek examples referring to cosmopolitans primarily derive from a small number of Jewish-Hellene and Early Christian texts, dating back to the first centuries AD, which are listed in the digital library of Greek literature, *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*. In addition, a few texts from the Middle Byzantine period are used as examples, and the Orthodox Christian celebration of Pentecost, with its festal icon and hymns, plays a particular role. In this way, various communicative situations and contexts

1 "Asked where he came from, he said, 'I am a citizen of the world'." Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers,* Book 6, 63.3, 64–5.

2 Kristeva, *Nations Without Nationalism*, 15; Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 63 and 144.

3 The expression "the Byzantine Commonwealth" refers to Dimitri Obolensky's seminal work *The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe 500–1453*. For an updated discussion of Obolensky's view, see Shepard, "The Byzantine Commonwealth 1000–1500," with further references. On the Byzantine Commonwealth and Byzantine cosmopolitanism, focusing on Thessalonica, see Russell, *Literature and Culture in Late Byzantine Thessalonica*, 11–14.

4 See the online presentation at worldlit.se of the Swedish research programme "World Literatures: Cosmopolitan and Vernacular Dynamics" (2016–2021), in which I am a participant. This article benefits from the theoretical groundings of my ongoing sub-project on Constantinople around 1900 as a literary world, as well as from my earlier research on the reception of Byzantine culture.

involving potential cosmopolitans as well as mono- or multilinguistic practices will be more important for this exploration than the abstract '-ism'.[5] As the selected texts exemplify conceptions of the world—the Byzantine *kosmos*—they are important for the significance of cosmopolitanism, and thereby for the immanent world-making of these texts as well.

This means that I will not address cosmopolitanism as it is known in Europe from the Early Modern period, the Enlightenment, the Grand Tour, or the nationalism of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, this article involves philosophical as well as theological aspects, based on established etymological and philological definitions of cosmos, cosmopolitan, cosmopolitanism, and world. From the point of view of conceptual history, Rebecka Lettevall and Kristian Petrov discuss cosmopolitanism as "a controversial concept that dialectically indicates as well as constructs the world," treating it "not only as an empirical concept but also as an analytical tool."[6] In a similar way, the RELICS research network has decided to consider cosmopolitanism as a *travelling concept*, that is, a concept which not only travels between academic discourses but which has the ability to change the very objects it analyses.[7] Against this background, this article proposes that cosmopolitanism may be operationalised not only as a travelling concept but furthermore as a concept without fixed values, one that *borders on* homogenising and monolingual modes, on the one hand, and heterogenising and multilingual modes, as these are practiced in Byzantine tradition, on the other hand.[8]

1 Historical and Byzantine approaches to cosmopolitanism

What does it mean, then, to declare oneself a cosmopolitan, as Diogenes of Sinope did? Considering what cosmopolitanism indicates and constructs, and how it changes in its capacity as a travelling concept, it could hardly mean the same to him or his namesake Diogenes Laertius, some five hundred years later, as it does to us today. In what ways does it matter which *kosmos* one refers to, in which *polis* one is a citizen, in which time one lives, what language one speaks?[9] Since there are a multitude of potential worlds and citizenships throughout the history of

[5] Due to my intention to discuss occurrences and uses of certain words and notions as examples of various conceptions of cosmopolitanism, texts in Greek will be quoted in English translations with insertions of the individual important words in transliterated Greek. Aside from the texts listed in *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu, some of the selected texts are part of consistent liturgical practices within the Orthodox Church. In these cases, as well, I quote English translations, often easily accessed on the internet, and references to editions of the source texts in Greek are always presented in the footnotes. See n. 61.

[6] Lettevall and Petrov, "Toward a Critique of Cosmopolitan Reason," 9 and 6.

[7] See the abstract for the workshop "Mapping Cosmopolitanism" at Ghent University, arranged by RELICS in May 2018, 2020, https://relicsresearch.com/events/mapping-cosmopolitanism/. The article is based on my lecture at this workshop. For "travelling concept", see Bal, *Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide* and Neumann, Nünning and Horn, *Travelling Concepts for the Study of Culture*.

[8] For a presentation and thorough exploration of several border concepts and their intersections in aesthetic studies, see Schimanski and Wolfe, *Border Aesthetics: Concepts and Intersections*, especially the introduction by Rosello and Wolfe, 1–24, and the conclusion by the editors, 147–70, with further references.

[9] Similar questions are posed by Lettevall and Petrov, "Toward a Critique of Cosmopolitan Reason," 3.

cosmopolitanism, there is reason to speak about several different cosmopolitanisms—in the plural—, as literary scholars Bruce Robbins and Paulo Lemos Horta do in their volume on contemporary cosmopolitanisms, even when studying historical examples of texts.[10]

Popular presentations of the Byzantine Empire like to describe it as cosmopolitan, perhaps as a means to emphasise such features as are easily shared with contemporary, western readers. Judith Herrin has dedicated a whole chapter of her widely translated book on Byzantium to the question of "A Cosmopolitan Society."[11] Due to the empire's many diverse ethnic groups in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, she highlights its cosmopolitan mixing and emphasises that Byzantium was always an empire rather than a nation: to be a Byzantine citizen was to pay taxes and benefit from the empire's protection and its law.[12] As is well-known, the citizens of the Byzantine (or Eastern Roman) Empire regarded themselves as Romans, as heirs to the Roman Empire, though their language was mainly Greek—thus, they were *Romaioi*.[13]

Herrin particularly mentions the cosmopolitan character of the empire's capital, Constantinople.[14] Other scholars have described Constantinople similarly: in the medieval period, it was "the largest and the richest city known to Europeans; it was the city *par excellence*, ten times more populous than any Western rival, a cosmopolitan city."[15] The many special names Constantinople was given in different languages testify to its cosmopolitan character as well. A few examples are *Kostantiniyye* in Arabo-Persian and Ottoman Turkish, *Tsar'grad* (Царьград) in Slavonic, and *Miklagarðr* in Old Norse. An exploration of Byzantine Constantinople, with its many spoken languages, seems therefore to resonate with what Stephanos Stephanides and Stavros Karayanni describe as the ambition of their edited volume *Vernacular Worlds, Cosmopolitan Imagination* (2015): "to view the vernacular and the cosmopolitan as unstable overlapping categories located within the specificity of place."[16] As we will see, cosmopolitanism in the Byzantine (and Constantinopolitan) case borders on different linguistic practices.

John Tzetzes, a twelfth-century Byzantine writer of Georgian origin, demonstrates his skill in the many languages of the city in one part of the epilogue to his *Theogony*, written in Greek and dedicated to a royal lady, the *sebastokratissa* Eirene.[17] Though there is no explicit mention of cosmopolitanism in this text, it is intriguing that the question that once was directed to Diogenes of Sinope—

10 Robbins and Horta, *Cosmopolitanisms*.

11 Herrin, *Byzantium*, 242–51.

12 Herrin, *Byzantium*, 251.

13 The name Byzantium was itself not used as long as the empire existed and is therefore a retronym and an exonym, a later Western designation for the empire, see further Bodin, "Whose Byzantinism—Ours or Theirs?", 17.

14 Herrin, *Byzantium*, 250.

15 Melling, "Constantinople," 127. See also Magdalino, "Byzantium = Constantinople," 43–54.

16 Stephanides and Karayanni, "Introduction: Vernacular Worlds, Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Intimate Estrangement of Homecoming," xiii.

17 Agapitos, "John Tzetzes and the blemish examiners," 36–38. The epilogue is rendered in Greek as well as in English translation at pp. 39–48. For earlier editions and translations, see Agapitos' rich footnotes at p. 39.

where are you from?—is the same one as Tzetzes activates to show off (and sell) his multilingual skills.[18] The languages he uses may be characterised as foreign, but in the context of this exploration of Byzantine cosmopolitanism and its linguistic practices, the point is rather that they were all spoken in Constantinople. Tzetzes seems to be friendly, or perhaps unctuous, to everyone he meets:

> You will find me to be a Scythian among Scythians, a Latin among Latins,
> and among all other nations being like one of their race.
> [...]
> The Latin I address according to the Latin language:
> [...]
> "*From where are you and from what province have you come?*"
> Unde es et de quale provincia venesti?[19]

Tzetzes also directs his question—where are you from?—to the groups he calls Persians (Seljuks) and Alans (speaking Old Ossetian), each "according to their language":

> To the Persians in Persian I speak thus:
> *"Good day to you my brother, where are you going, from where are you, friend?"*
> Asan khais kuruparza khaneazar kharandasi [garu barsa? Xanta(n) ä(r)sär? garindaš]?
> [...]
> To the Alans I speak according to their language:
> *"Good day, my master, my lady, from where are you?"*
> Tapankhas mesfili khsina korthi kanda, and the rest.[20]

To the Arabs as well, Tzetzes speaks "Arabically" to ask the repeated question "where are you from", and he welcomes even Russians in their own language.[21] Jews are the only ones he insults—in an ironically "fitting" way, that is, in Hebrew—according to standard medieval anti-Semitism.[22] Finally, Tzetzes boasts about his proficiency: "In this manner I address everyone with useful and appropriate words, / knowing this to be the work of the best disposition."[23] If Tzetzes' epilogue is regarded against the background of the short dialogue in which Diogenes of Sinope once replied that he was a cosmopolitan, the difference between them appears clearly. While the earlier dialogue was pursued in Greek, without any change of language, Tzetzes works instead within a cosmopolitan, multilingual

[18] For an analysis of Tzetzes' self-presenting, self-legitimising and self-protecting practices, see Pizzone, "The *Historiai* of John Tzetzes: a Byzantine 'Book of Memory'?"

[19] Agapitos, "John Tzetzes and the blemish examiners," 45 (lines 765–66, 774, 777–78). "Scythian" refers to Cuman, a Turkish language, see p. 39. While Agapitos' translation renders the foreign languages in Greek letters, exactly as in the manuscript, I have instead chosen to quote these lines in Roman letters from the transcription in the translation by Kazhdan and Wharton Epstein, *Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries*, 259.

[20] Agapitos, "John Tzetzes and the blemish examiners," 45 (lines 771–73, 783–85). For Seljuk and Old Ossetian, see p. 39.

[21] Agapitos, "John Tzetzes and the blemish examiners," 45 (lines 788–89 and 791–93). In this case, "Russians" refer to the Rus (living in Rus and speaking a Slavonic language), as in the Greek text at p. 42.

[22] Agapitos, "John Tzetzes and the blemish examiners," 45 (lines 794–98).

[23] Agapitos, "John Tzetzes and the blemish examiners," 45 (lines 799–800).

setting in which the question is posed in numerous languages, all of them used in Constantinople.[24]

As Herrin puts it, the Byzantine imperial structure "could accommodate much diversity, provided it was loyal," thanks to its confidence in its own political and social organization.[25] In a note that takes us back to the Homeric *Odyssey* and its epic question about origins, she writes that "Byzantium never lost its Homeric world-view of migration and hospitality to strangers."[26] Herrin's characterisation of Byzantium as a cosmopolitan society, because of its imperial features, seems to tie in with the view of the editors of *Cosmopolitanism and Empire* (2016). Myles Lavan, Richard E. Payne, and John Weisweiler write in their introduction that the practice of cosmopolitanism "translated the fundamental problem of distance and difference into assets, by facilitating the exploitation of ever larger populations and territories."[27] Their subsequent critical reflections are still more helpful for the study of cosmopolitanism from historical and literary perspectives, as they remark that the term cosmopolitan "performs little analytical work in ancient historiography" and describes it as a problematic instance of presentism:

> The label tends to characterise the openness of a culture to the commodities and ideas of outsiders, or simply its comparative diversity. It is almost always a compliment, a sign that a particular ancient society practiced the same values we—the implied readers of such studies—espouse.[28]

For purposes of historical analysis, therefore, they suggest a "more rigorous use of the term."[29] Their proposed definition, which I find productive, is that cosmopolitanism is "theoretical universalism in practice": "Cosmopolitanism designates a complex of practices and ideals that enabled certain individuals not only to cross cultural boundaries but also to establish an enduring normative framework across them."[30]

There is a striking similarity between this definition, intended to be valid for historical analyses of cosmopolitanism, and Appiah's current, ethically grounded definition of the notion, which reads "universality plus difference"—"in a slogan," as he puts it.[31] Needless to say, such a combination of universality and difference is not a contested explication of cosmopolitanism. It is also presented in dictionaries, where it is said that 'cosmopolitan' and its derivative cosmopolitanism may include people from many different countries or be associated with travel and a mixture of cultures. The concept thus contains aspects of both unity and plurality,

[24] Even after its conquest by the Ottomans in 1453, Constantinople remained what Philip Mansel, in his famous book *Constantinople: City of the World's Desire*, 1453–1924, has described as "a world city" (p. 7). He dubs it the "only multinational capital in Europe," "a city which defied nationalism" (p. 20). It remained multilingual until the language reform of the Turkish Republic in 1928. For Constantinople around 1900 as a multilingual literary world, see Bodin, "'The clamour of Babel, in all the tongues of the Levant'."

[25] Herrin, *Byzantium*, 248.

[26] Herrin, *Byzantium*, 251.

[27] Lavan, Payne, and Weisweiler, "Cosmopolitan Politics," 28.

[28] Lavan, Payne, and Weisweiler, "Cosmopolitan Politics," 9.

[29] Lavan, Payne, and Weisweiler, "Cosmopolitan Politics," 10.

[30] Lavan, Payne, and Weisweiler, "Cosmopolitan Politics," 10.

[31] Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 151.

aspects that will prove productive to examine yet further in Byzantine tradition, in particular with respect to their interrelation with different linguistic practices.

In his study *An Ecology of World Literature* (2015), which spans from antiquity to the present day, Alexander Beecroft describes and discusses the history and conditions of world literature in terms of ecologies, setting out from the precondition that literature is necessarily made out of language.[32] He calls one such ecology cosmopolitan and declares that it is found "wherever a single literary language is used over a large territorial range and through a long period of time."[33] Greek is one of the languages that Beecroft considers to be cosmopolitan, in the Hellenistic culture (under Roman rule) as well as in Constantinople (within the Byzantine Empire).[34]

However, Greek was not just the language of Byzantine literature but also one of the languages in which poetic texts for liturgical use were produced within the Eastern and Orthodox churches. They comprise an enormous and variegated corpus which, as a salient part of Byzantine tradition, specifically its cultural and literary heritage, cannot be neglected. Due to the imaginative, performative, and expressive features of these texts, they may be regarded as "workly" texts.[35] Within the Eastern and Orthodox churches, however, there was never any single language that functioned like Latin in the Western, Roman Catholic Church. Thus for liturgical use, Greek has never been equivalent to Latin as the preferred or single church language. Instead, besides koine Greek, different regional languages such as Syriac, Coptic, Armenian, Georgian, and Slavonic were used for liturgical purposes—that is, for all kinds of liturgical texts such as prayers, hymns and homilies, as well as for translations of the Bible texts. Over several hundred years, however, these languages have hardened into fixed church languages, which for contemporary users today are perhaps reminiscent of a particular holy dialect or solemn linguistic variety, one exclusively associated with liturgical celebration according to received tradition.

By regarding Greek as a cosmopolitan language and literature, and by explicitly mentioning Byzantine Constantinople, Beecroft completes and corrects both Pascale Casanova's and Sheldon Pollock's earlier studies on similar themes.[36] I agree with Beecroft on Greek as a third cosmopolitan language for literary use, but since the situation in Byzantium and in the Eastern Churches was not monolingual but multilingual, I would like to emphasise that Greek influenced a much larger area than where it was spoken. This was done by means of translations, which often and typically were calques, and cultural transfers all over the so-called Byzantine Commonwealth. In this respect one could say that Greek as a cosmopolitan language, rather than being "single," as Beecroft puts it, was one that multiplied its effects in translations.

[32] Beecroft, *An Ecology of World Literature*, 3.
[33] Beecroft, *An Ecology of World Literature*, 34.
[34] Beecroft, *An Ecology of World Literature*, 101–144.
[35] For such "workly" texts, see Pollock, *The Language of Gods in the World of Men*, 3, 283, et passim (drawing on Heidegger); see also Beecroft, *An Ecology of World Literature*, 105.
[36] Casanova, *The World Republic of Letters,* and Pollock, *The Language of Gods in the World of Men*.

2 World-making with words

Returning to Lettevall's and Petrov's introductory question, which cosmos did the Byzantine version of cosmopolitanism imply, and how big was it? Which meanings were evoked by the words for 'world' in two of the major Orthodox Christian languages, Greek and Slavonic? As we will see, both the Greek and Slavonic words provide holistic models for gaining a purchase on the world.

Kosmos was the word for world in Greek, while *oikoumenē* signified the totality of the known, inhabited world and *gē* designated the earth. *Kosmos* was conceived as the universe, comprising both heaven and earth, as was visually depicted in the famous illuminated manuscripts of Kosmas Indikopleustes' *Christian Topography* (6th c.).[37] Most importantly, *kosmos* included man *and* God. Both the Ancient Greek and the Christian *kosmos* were a world with human beings and gods or God, respectively, as its precondition. *Kosmos* signified good order or good behaviour, sharing its linguistic root with 'cosmetics' as adornment and a means of beautification. The world named *kosmos* was therefore viewed as a reality of unity, harmony and beauty.[38] In this respect, *kosmos* was also the opposite of *chaos*.[39] In the Septuagint translation from Hebrew to Greek (3rd–2nd c. BCE) the word *kosmos* was accordingly chosen to designate the wholeness of the fulfilled creation of heaven and earth by God (Gen 2:1).[40] *Kosmos* is also what the totality of the created world is called when John the Evangelist tells its new beginning in his prologue on Christ as Logos (John 1). Furthermore, it is used whenever the creation of the world is mentioned in the New Testament, when Christ says he is the light of the world (John 8:12), and in the Great Commission, where Christ sends forth the disciples by saying: "Go into all the world and proclaim the good news to the whole of creation" (Mark 16:15). Also, as we will see below, when celebrating Pentecost in the Orthodox Church, the seasonal hymns say that it is *kosmos* which is enlightened by the Holy Spirit's light.

The Slavic peoples, who lived in the area of today's Bulgaria, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, in the region named *Rus'*, were Christianised in the late tenth century from Byzantium and received their Cyrillic alphabet as an adaptation of the Greek one. To match the new Christian vocabulary, many translations were required. An already existing Slavonic word, *mir*, was picked as the translation of *kosmos*, while the alternative word for world in Greek, *oikoumenē* (the inhabited world), was translated into Slavonic as *vselennaya* by means of a neologism, calqued on both parts of the Greek word. The word for world in Slavonic, *mir*, is indistinguishable in pronunciation from the word for peace. *Mir* is the created world but also what

37 See further Kominko, *The World of Kosmas,* and Anderson, *Cosmos and Community in Early Medieval Art*, 107–149. For conceptions and representations of *kosmos* in Rus', see Caudano, *"Let There Be Lights in the Firmament of Heaven*."

38 Karl-Heinz Uthemann, "Cosmos," 537.

39 Lettevall and Petrov, "Toward a Critique of Cosmopolitan Reason," 3.

40 See Runia's comment on Philo of Alexandria, *On the Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses*, viz. that Philo translates this passage as "when the heaven and earth and all their adornment [*kosmos*] were completed" (183). See also Runia's comment on the Septuagint's use of *kosmos* as "adornment applied to [the world's] parts" (266), and his emphasis that the relation between "adornment, order, rationality, and beauty is fundamental for Greek cosmology" (199).

the congregation hears when a Russian Orthodox priest says the blessing "*Mir vam*" ("Peace be with you"). Thus—at least for listeners—*mir* may cover the same meaning as *kosmos* in Greek: simultaneously world and peace, a world in order and harmony.

This wholeness of the world, implied by *kosmos* in Greek and *mir* in Slavonic, is further complicated by their equivalent in English, the word *world*, at least when its etymology is considered. The Latinate and Germanic origin of 'world' makes it also include the dimension of time, centred on man.[41] Since English is the working language of the present and many other discussions on cosmopolitanism, as well as on world literature and its world-making capacity, it does matter that the English word designates the world as the age of man, as the place where man and time coincide, thereby always implying a certain view-point.[42]

In this case, I rely on one of several holistic models deployed in literary and cultural studies (e.g., cultural semiotics, translation studies, world literature studies), presented and applied by Eric Hayot in *On Literary Worlds* (2012). When Hayot operationalises the word 'world' as an analytical tool, he sets out from Heidegger's *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (*The Origin of the Work of Art*) but also from the English word's etymology, as noted above. Indeed, there is *the* world, comprising its supposed and singular whole, but—because of the coincidence of man and time in every single world—there are simultaneously also various worlds, in the plural, such as 'Homer's world,' 'the Byzantine world,' or 'our modern world.' 'World' signifies in this respect both the whole and its parts. When 'world' is operationalised for any kind of literary or cultural analysis, its inherent doubleness may be criticised for its indisputable ambiguity or vagueness, but, at the same time, this very quality may just as well be considered as an analytic resource. According to Hayot, the literary (or aesthetic) world—that is, the immanent world of a literary work—can be analysed, measured and described in relation to other, surrounding worlds, in order to gain knowledge about its potential particularity or generality. In this way, a certain literary world may deviate from or connect to literature from other epochs as well as relate in various ways to the un-narrated 'real' world which frames it, and where its readers live.[43]

In addition, I would like to emphasise that the peculiar holism of words for 'world' is first and foremost a phenomenon grounded in language, deeply immersed in the various languages engaging in literary world-making. The exploration of cosmopolitanism in Byzantine tradition has thereby gained yet another motive for examining its monolingual as well as multilingual modes. In the next section, our focus will be on homogenising and monolingual qualities of cosmopolitanism, before the following section on the many tongues of Pentecost turns to a more heterogenising literary world, comprising multilingual cosmopolitan practices.

41 See Spira, "'World': An Exploration of the Relationship between Conceptual History and Etymology," 27–39; for the etymology of the English word 'world,' see p. 32.

42 Hayot, *On Literary Worlds*, 53.

43 Hayot, *On Literary Worlds*, 42–47.

3 Adam, Moses, and Christians as cosmopolitans

Who, then, was a cosmopolitan in the Byzantine world conceived as a Greek *kosmos*—holistic, ordered, of beauty and harmony—and created as good by the one and only God, as both Jewish and Christian traditions have it? As we will see, in the Byzantine, Orthodox Christian tradition, Adam and Moses were suggested as cosmopolitans, as models for Christians, before there emerged in the Middle Byzantine period a distinction between citizens of the world and citizens of heaven.

Even though modern discussions on cosmopolitanism, such as those by Appiah or Martha Nussbaum,[44] tend to go back to the Stoics and sometimes involve even Socrates, it is only through source texts from later periods that we have any knowledge of their writings. Diogenes of Sinope's famous reply was reported by Diogenes Laertius as late as around AD 200. Mentions of cosmopolitans by the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria are, however, somewhat earlier, dating from the first decades AD.

In Philo's books on *The Special Laws*, all virtues associated with the Stoics seem to be fulfilled by the cosmopolitans, who are "schooled to hold things indifferent as indeed indifferent" and who live close to nature in many different respects. Being "true 'cosmopolitans'," they have "recognized the world [*kosmos*] to be a city having for its citizens the associates of wisdom."[45] In accordance with leading Stoic ideas about "living according to nature" and the "world-citizen," Philo also underlines the importance of the law. This is done from the very beginning of his *On the Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses*, in which he engages with the first chapter of Genesis. The translator, David T. Runia, has in this case rendered the Greek word *kosmos* as the English *cosmos*: "[T]he man who observes the law is at once a citizen of the cosmos, directing his actions in relation to the rational purpose of nature, in accordance with which the entire cosmos also is administered."[46] Philo's first example of such a life is the creation of Adam:

> If we describe that original ancestor not only as the first human being, but also as the only real citizen of the cosmos, we shall be telling the absolute truth. The cosmos was his home and city [...]. He resided in the cosmos [...] like in his native land [...].[47]

Philo's view of Adam as a cosmopolitan should, however, be regarded as original, rather than as a quotation from earlier Stoics.[48]

The cosmopolitan and his adherence to the law return in Philo's two books *On the Life of Moses*, in which he says that the good man "is a world citizen

[44] Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*; Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism."

[45] Philo, *The Special Laws*, Book II, XII–XIII, section 45–46, 336–37.

[46] Philo, *On the Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses*, ch.1, §3 (p. 47). Runia emphasises in his commentary that Philo uses *kosmopolitēs* positively (p. 103).

[47] Philo, *On the Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses*, ch. 19, §142 (p. 84). See also Runia's comment about the cosmopolitan ideals as fulfilled by Adam (p. 339).

[48] Passages in Philo of Alexandria which have been attributed to the Stoic Chrysippus (3rd c. BCE) are probably incorrect, according to Martens, *One God, One Law*, 137: When "Philo's discussion of Adam is attracted to the Stoic ideal of the first man, the cosmopolitan", this "connection between Adam and the Stoic sage must have been made first by Philo or some other Jewish writer, not by Chrysippus."

[*kosmopolitēs*], and therefore not on the roll of any city of men's habitation, rightly so because he has received no mere piece of land but the whole world [*kosmos*] as his portion."[49] In another treatise, *On the Confusion of Tongues*, Philo explicitly presents Moses as one "who in virtue of his larger citizenship [*kosmopolitēs*] took the world [*kosmos*] for his township and country."[50]

The concept of Adam, the first man, and Moses, the law-giver, as cosmopolitans was thus established on Stoic grounds from early on in the Christian era by the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria, who was later widely studied in Byzantium.[51] Both Jews and early Christians could gain an understanding of their "original ancestor" Adam as a cosmopolitan, because before the Fall Adam was good, virtuous and wise, living close to nature—in short, he was behaving like an early Stoic. However, in the continued Christian tradition the role played by Adam changed, since according to allegorical interpretations of the Bible he also functions as a *typos* or *figura* of Christ. This broadens the view of who a cosmopolitan is. According to the Stoics, cosmopolitanism could "only include a few virtuous wise friends,"[52] but after the resurrection of Christ, Paul writes in the Epistle to the Ephesians (2:11, 19) that people of all nations, including those who were Gentiles by birth, can become "fellow citizens with the saints."

A few centuries later, the idea of Adam as a cosmopolitan resounded in *The Constitutions of the Holy Apostles*, a work of Syriac origin from the late fourth century. In various contexts, it describes man as the citizen of the world, for example when the creation of the world is retold in praise of God in a liturgical setting: "Thou hast not only created the world [*kosmos*] itself, but hast also made man for a citizen of the world [*kosmopolitēs*], exhibiting him as the ornament of the world [*kosmos*]."[53] The creation of man as a cosmopolitan is also recalled in prayers for the deceased: "And let the bishop say: O Thou [...] who didst make man a rational creature, the citizen of this world [*kosmopolitēs*]."[54] Similar phrasings are found in instructions before baptism: "Let him [the baptismal candidate] be instructed why the world [*kosmos*] was made, and why man was appointed to be a citizen [*kosmopolitēs*] therein; let him also know his own nature, of what sort it is."[55] Though these texts have mainly didactic and liturgical purposes, they nevertheless build up a literary world specifically characterised by the fact that man was appointed a cosmopolitan in the *kosmos* created by God, whose intention was not only to make him a citizen of the world but, with a wordplay on the cosmetic aspects of *kosmos*, to shape him "as the ornament of the world."

49 Philo, *On the Life of Moses*, Book I, XXVIII, section 157, 356–7.

50 Philo, *On the Confusion of Tongues*, XXII, section 106, 66–67.

51 See Runia's commentary to Philo, *On the Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses*, "Excursus one: Law, cosmos, and nature", 106–7.

52 Mitsis, "A Stoic Critique of Cosmopolitanism," 187.

53 *Constitutions of the Holy Apostles: Book VIII. Concerning Gifts, and Ordinations, and the Ecclesiastical Canons*, ch. 12, section 16, in Roberts, Donaldson, and Coxe, *The Ante-Nicene Fathers,* 487. Greek text: *Les constitutions apostoliques. T. 3, Livres VII et VIII*, 184.

54 *Constitutions of the Holy Apostles: Book VIII*, ch. 41, section 4, 497. Greek text: *Les constitutions apostoliques. T. 3, Livres VII et VIII*, 256.

55 *Constitutions of the Holy Apostles: Book VII. Concerning the Christian Life, and the Eucharist, and the Initiation into Christ*, ch. 39, section 2, 475–6. Greek text: *Les constitutions apostoliques. T. 3, Livres VII et VIII*, 92.

Early Christians could however identify themselves as cosmopolitans from an existential point of view as well, that is, as strangers. Patristic sources within the Orthodox Christian tradition say that Christians are simultaneously citizens *and* strangers—they are guests on earth, travellers only staying overnight. A well-known example is the early Christian so-called *Epistle to Diognetus* (2nd c.):

> [The Christians] live in their own homelands, but as resident aliens; they participate in all things as citizens, but endure all things as strangers. Every foreign country is their homeland but every homeland is a foreign country.[56]

It seems to be this understanding of the world as worldly, together with the striving for estrangement from the world, which later gains ground in Byzantine tradition, as Orthodox Christians saw the cosmos as doubled, perceiving its "external, material, eschatologically or ontologically transient character in contrast to the inner, spiritual, eternal life yet to come."[57] When in the twelfth century the Byzantine scholar and Archbishop Eustathios of Thessalonike writes a treatise on the life of the monks, he apostrophises the monks and hermits as citizens of heaven (*ouranopolitēs*)—a Greek designation which perhaps could be Anglicised as *ouranopolitans*—thereby contrasting them with cosmopolitans as citizens of the world.[58] The monks had already chosen sides in life, so to speak, and no longer belonged to the worldly life. Thus Christians were not only living in the world as cosmopolitan strangers—as citizens of heaven, or *ouranopolitans*, they hearkened to a special address.

Here we can note a certain tendency to use the words *kosmos* and 'cosmopolitan' in another sense than in the earlier cases of Diogenes of Sinope, Adam, and Moses, in which it had been the narrow, local world that was opposed to the wholeness of the created, surrounding, wider world, which included heaven and was understood as the *kosmos* of the cosmopolitans. Henceforth it is instead the secular world, where cosmopolitans live and Christians reside as aliens and strangers, which is contrasted to the religious world, where the *ouranopolitans* live, as "fellow citizens with the saints."[59] The topic of language(s) in connection to these cosmopolitans seems so far to be a non-issue, but if we turn to the *kosmos* that is engaged in at the celebration of Pentecost, various issues of languages and their rhetorical use instead form the main theme.

4 The many tongues of Pentecost

Kosmos conceived as a worldly world, as opposed to the heavenly world, is a world with a multitude of languages. This aspect is thematised in the liturgical hymns and icons for the Orthodox Christian celebration of Pentecost. After the

[56] Dunning, *Aliens and Sojourners*, 65. Greek text: "Epistle to Diognetus", ch. 5, section 5, in *The Apostolic Fathers, Volume II*, 139–40.

[57] Uthemann, "Cosmos," 537.

[58] Eustathios of Thessalonike, *Eustathii Thessalonicensis De emendanda vita monachica*, 1.9 (p. 6); 130.1 (p. 146).

[59] Kleingeld and Brown, "Cosmopolitanism."

confusion of tongues at the Tower of Babel, as narrated in Genesis 11, the Pentecostal miracle in Jerusalem meant the rehabilitation of the use of many different languages among the disciples gathered in the service of God:

> Divided tongues, as of fire, appeared among them, and a tongue rested on each of them. All of them were filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in other languages, as the Spirit gave them ability.
>
> Now there were devout Jews from every nation under heaven living in Jerusalem. And at this sound the crowd gathered and was bewildered, because each one heard them speaking in the native language of each. Amazed and astonished, they asked, "Are not all these who are speaking Galileans? And how is it that we hear, each of us, in our own native language? Parthians, Medes, Elamites, and residents of Mesopotamia, Judea and Cappadocia, Pontus and Asia, Phrygia and Pamphylia, Egypt and the parts of Libya belonging to Cyrene, and visitors from Rome, both Jews and proselytes, Cretans and Arabs—in our own languages we hear them speaking about God's deeds of power."[60]

One of the liturgical hymns, a canon sung at matins of Pentecost, explicitly mentions the "strange tongues" spoken on this occasion, and further hymns for the celebration of Pentecost proclaim that the world—*kosmos*—is illumined by the light of the Holy Spirit (the Advocate): "The light of the Advocate has come and enlightened the world [*kosmos*]."[61]

This enlightening of the world constitutes yet one of the topics in an influential homily by John Chrysostom, Archbishop of Constantinople in the fourth century. He says that Peter's voice is like "a great light shining out in the dark," and that Peter with his voice "scattered the mist and darkness of the whole world [*oikoumenē*]."[62] Further, this elaborated comparison between enlightenment and darkness also addresses the difference between on the one hand the apostles, in particular Peter, who "utters his voice everywhere," and on the other Plato, who talked in the past but now is silent:

> [...] without experience, without skill of the tongue, and in the condition of quite ordinary men, matched against juggling conjurors, against impostors, against the whole throng of sophists, of rhetoricians, of philosophers grown mouldy in the Academy and the walks of the Peripatetics, against all these they [the Apostles] fought the battle out. And the man [Peter] whose occupation had been about lakes, so mastered them, as if it cost him not so much ado as even a contest with dumb fishes: for just as if the opponents he had to outwit were indeed more mute than fishes, so easily did he get the better of them! And Plato, that talked a deal of nonsense in his day, is silent now, while this man utters his voice everywhere; not among his own countrymen alone, but also among Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and in India, and in every part of the earth [*gē*], and to the extremities of the world [*oikoumenē*]. Where now is Greece, with her big pretentions? Where the name of Athens? Where the ravings of

60 Acts 2:3–11.

61 *Pentecostarion*, Matins of Pentecost, the canon by "Kyr John Arklas", tone 4, ode 4, troparion, and sessional hymn, tone 4. See also, from the same service, the canon by the Monk Kosmas, tone 7, ode 1, troparion: "As you promised your Disciples of old, you have sent forth the Advocate Spirit in deed, O Christ, and shed light on the world [*kosmos*], O Lover of mankind." The hymns quoted from the celebration of Pentecost are found in the *Pentecostarion*, available online in Greek (Πεντηκοστάριον). English translations by Archimandrite Ephrem are quoted from the *Pentecostarion* at his website Anastasis.

62 John Chrysostom, "Homily IV (Acts 2:1–2);" Greek text in Migne, vol. LX, col. 47.

> the philosophers? He of Galilee, he of Bethsaida, he, the uncouth rustic, has overcome them all.[63]

While *kosmos* was the word used to signify the totality upon which the Holy Spirit shed light in the Pentecostal hymn quoted earlier, the homily uses instead the designations *oikoumenē* (the inhabited world) and *gē* (the earth) to describe the more delimited outreach of Peter's voice. According to John Chrysostom, the Pentecost miracle concerned not only the use of various native languages, but also a new distribution of the "skill of the tongue," so that Greek sophists, rhetoricians and philosophers were overcome by the voices of ordinary men, of fishermen from Galilee without rhetorical experience but speaking other languages. Such a comparison between the eloquence of the apostles and the silence of Plato and other philosophers later becomes a favoured topic which recurs in several liturgical hymns.

One elaborate example is the kontakion on Pentecost by Romanos the Melodist, first performed in Constantinople in the first half of the sixth century as a sung sermon with a recurring refrain (rendered in italics, below). Its *prooimion*, which presents the feast's theme and is still sung today at matins of Pentecost, underlines the effect of unity, accomplished by the many tongues, in which the apostles are paradoxically speaking with one voice, and contrasts it with the earlier confusion of tongues in Babel:

> When the Most High came down he confused the tongues, divided the nations; but when he parted the tongues of fire, he called all to unity, and with one voice we glorify *the All-Holy Spirit*.[64]

In a wordplay on fish, fishermen and webs which elaborates further on the contrasts developed by John Chrysostom in his homily, the disciples, being unlearned fishermen, are then portrayed by Romanos the Melodist as orators. It is now the former fishermen who, having overcome the Greek philosophers and rhetoricians, "unravel the webs of orators." Next, the famous Greeks—among them Plato, Demosthenes, Homer, and Pythagoras—are outplayed by the simplicity of the fishermen, who "overcome all through the tongues they speak":

Now those who before were fishermen have become skilled
    speakers. Now those who once
stood by the shores of lakes are orators, and clear ones.
Those who previously used to mend their nets
now unravel the webs of orators and make them worthless with
    simpler utterances.
For they speak one Word, instead of many,
they proclaim one God, not one of many.
The One as one they worship, a Father beyond understanding,
a Son consubstantial and inseparable, and like to them

[63] John Chrysostom, "Homily IV (Acts 2:1–2) ," 29.
[64] *Pentecostarion*, Matins of Pentecost, kontakion.

the All-Holy Spirit.

Was it not then given them to overcome all through the tongues
they speak?
And why do the fools outside strive for victory?
Why do the Greeks puff and buzz?
Why are they deceived by Aratos the thrice accursed? Why err like
wandering planets to Plato?
Why do they love debilitated Demosthenes?
Why do they not consider Homer a chimera?
Why do they go on about Pythagoras, who were better muzzled?
Why do they not run believing to those to whom has appeared
the All-Holy Spirit?[65]

If Romanos the Melodist in this case considers Homer a chimera, another illusion is that any Byzantine preacher or singer—be he the Archbishop of Constantinople or the Melodist himself—could have managed without "the Greeks" and their sophisticated eloquence. In the hands of the Cappadocian Fathers in the fourth century, the Greek language became a rhetorically sharpened tool for confessional Christian texts, as well. The paradox which made it possible for preachers and hymnographers to misrepresent and leave "the Greeks" behind while continuing to write and speak in Greek is that Pentecost caused "one Word"—the *Logos* as Christ—to be spoken consistently, though in many different languages. If the narration and praise of the Pentecostal miracle in the Acts, hymns and homilies are read as parts of one single literary world, that world would to a great extent be characterised by its issue with the Greek language and education, resulting in the praise—though, ironically, still in Greek—of unskilled tongues speaking "one Word" in a multitude of languages.

Kosmos and the many languages of Pentecost are also present in the iconography of Pentecost, as it receives a new design in the Middle Byzantine period. From early on, it depicted the Virgin or the *Theotokos* (the God-bearer or Mother of God) sitting surrounded by the disciples (according to Acts 1:14), and there were also examples where people from the nations mentioned (such as "Parthians, Medes, Elamites," Acts 2:9) were present. But from the ninth and tenth century the Theotokos is replaced, or supplemented, by a new character, an old man who is set in the darkness below the group of apostles.[66] He is dressed and crowned like a Byzantine noble, and his name, inscribed in Greek, is *Kosmos*.

The traditional Greek manual for icon painters, the *Hermeneia* by Dionysius of Fourna (1730–1734), which instructs on how to paint standard iconographies, describes the whole scene of the icon as "the descent of the Holy Spirit", including the old man and his name:

[65] Romanos the Melodist, "Kontakion on Pentecost," oikos 16–17 (p. 215). Greek text: Romanos le Mélode, "XLIX. La Pentecôte," 202–6.

[66] Réau, "La Pentecôte," for "Le cosmos," see 595; Ouspensky, "Quelques considérations au sujet de l'iconographie de la Pentecote," 57–59; Grabar, "Le schéma iconographique de la Pentecôte"; Ouspensky and Lossky, "The Descent of the Holy Spirit," 206–8.

> A house; the twelve apostles are sitting in a circle. Below them is a small chamber in which an old man holds before him in his hands, which are covered by the veil, twelve rolled scrolls; he wears a crown on his head, and over him these words are written: The World. Above the house is the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove; a great light surrounds it, and twelve tongues of flame come down from it and rest on each of the apostles.[67]



Figure 1: Contours of the Pentecost iconography. Source: Phōtēs Kontoglou, *Ekphrasis tēs orthodoxou eikonographias. T. 1, Technologikon kai eikonographikon* (Athēnai: Astēr 1960), 184.

In this iconography of the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, the old man named *Kosmos* is clearly an allegorical personification of the world. As Leonid

[67] Dionysius of Fourna, *The 'Painter's Manual' of Dionysius of Fourna*, 40. The commentary (p. 103) says that the twelve scrolls correspond to the preaching of the twelve apostles. For a fuller theological interpretation of the Pentecost iconography, see Lemopoulos, "The Icon of Pentecost: A Liturgical Bible Study on Acts 2:1–4," 92–97.

Figure 2: Russian Pentecost icon, c. 1497. Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery. Public domain: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pentecost_(Kirillo-Belozersk).jpg.

Ouspensky remarks, because of the liturgical and theological content of the icon, the world's wholeness cannot in this case be sufficiently represented by its parts—the various peoples and nations as mentioned in the Acts — and it is therefore better expressed by an allegory.[68] Since the twelve scrolls that the old man *Kosmos* holds traditionally represent the coming preaching of the apostles, the many languages of the world, of the enlightened *kosmos*, are also depicted in the icon.

It is tempting to speculate as to what languages they are written in, since their script is not visible, but Romanos the Melodist mentions several of them in his kontakion on Pentecost, which in this respect brings to mind John Tzetzes' greetings in the many languages of Constantinople several hundred years later. According to Romanos, elaborating on the passage from the Acts, the apostles speak:

> to the Romans not as foreigners, to the Parthians like themselves and to the Medes as their own. To the Elamites they appeared to be speaking well and clearly, to the

[68] Ouspensky, "Quelques considérations," 83. For a detailed description of the Kosmos-figure, see Ouspensky and Lossky, *The Meaning of Icons*, 208, quoting Pokrovsky (1892).

> Arabs they were immediately their kin. To Asians and Phrygians they spoke clearly and distinctly and to all the nations they were speaking [...][69]

When this image of the personified *kosmos* with the many scrolls spread in the Byzantine Commonwealth in the Middle Byzantine period, the Byzantine noble retained his Greek name in the Russian Orthodox context, as well. Although it is neither translated, nor rendered in Greek in any inscription in the Russian icons, he may be mentioned as *Tsar' Kosmos*, that is, in a mix of Slavonic and Greek.[70]

The Orthodox Christian celebration of Pentecost in hymns, homilies and icons offers in this way a rich material for reflections on the linguistic aspects of Byzantine cosmopolitanism. It has been a long way from Adam and Moses as cosmopolitans, fulfilling Stoic ideals, to *Tsar' Kosmos* dressed as a Byzantine noble, placed in the darkness of the world and prepared with the old-fashioned scrolls of the apostles' preachings in various languages. Yet, all of them—Adam, Moses, and *Tsar' Kosmos*—co-exist within this one single literary world, which is characterised by its issues with and misrepresentations of learned Greek as well as its favouring of a multitude of languages due to the Pentecostal miracle.

5 Cosmopolitan strategies bordering between universality and difference

The worlds of the cosmopolitans mentioned in this article are available to us today only by means of written words making up literary worlds, and as such they depend not only on philosophy, politics, or theology, but also on language(s) and language skills. As this exploration of cosmopolitanism in Byzantine tradition has demonstrated, there is no particular period, single ideology or political view with set values that may be regarded as *the* Byzantine cosmopolitanism, as a fixed characteristic of Byzantine tradition over time. Instead, two strategies involving different cosmopolitan and linguistic practices may be identified. Referring once more to Appiah's short, slogan-like definition of cosmopolitanism, what matters in this case is whether it is universality or difference—alternatively, unity or plurality—that is accentuated. To conclude, these two strategies will be discussed as to how they can be reflected in the miniature dialogue related by Diogenes Laertius with its single question, "Where are you from?" and single reply, "I am a cosmopolitan."

The first strategy prioritises universality and unity with norms that are inspired by Stoicism in the Jewish-Hellene and early Christian holistic *kosmos*. This strategy claims cosmopolitanism (or a cosmopolitan identity) as worldwide and universal in a cosmopolitan language, in this particular case Greek. It depends on monolingualism and insists on mutual understanding without interlingual translations and intercultural transfers. This is the homogenising kind of cosmopolitanism, applied in narratives where the Jewish and Christian God institutes man as a cosmopolitan in the created world. It is the cosmopolitanism of Adam, the

[69] Romanos the Melodist, "Kontakion on Pentecost," oikos 14 (p. 214). Greek text: Romanos le Mélode, "XLIX. La Pentecôte."

[70] See, e.g., Trubetskoi, *Tri ocherka o russkoi ikone*, 42, and Antonova and Mneva, *Gosudarstvennaia Tret'iakovskaia gallereia*, 242.

first man, referring to *kosmos* as the motherland and loyalty of man; it unites heaven and earth in one holistic *kosmos* or universe while opposing the local to the worldwide. Though Diogenes of Sinope spoke from an outsider's position, the dialogue he was involved in presupposes a shared understanding within a monolingual paradigm. Thus this cosmopolitan strategy constitutes the replying part of the dialogue, where "I am a cosmopolitan" is said in a language that is accepted worldwide, in the whole *kosmos*.

The other strategy prioritises difference and plurality and is characterised by a split between the worldly world and the heavenly world, which follow different norms. It does not engage in the opposition between the local and the worldwide but opposes instead earth and heaven, thus separating the secular from the heavenly, and cosmopolitans from *ouranopolitans*. This strategy operates in the worldly world of a multitude of languages, ethnicities and religions. It represents the heterogenising kind of cosmopolitanism, grounded in multilingual experiences of extensive processes of translations and transfers between languages and cultures, as John Tzetzes demonstrated in the epilogue of his *Theogony*. It involves the *kosmos* of the Pentecostal miracle, a *kosmos* which Orthodox Christians praise as enlightened by the Holy Spirit so that the disciples can proclaim the gospel in different languages. Furthermore, this *kosmos* of many languages is the one which is depicted allegorically in the shape of a crowned Byzantine noble, the so-called *Tsar' Kosmos*, in later iconographies of Pentecost. The cosmopolitans of the worldly world have, in this way, adapted to its multilingual standards. Thus this strategy reflects the questioning part of the dialogue. It asks "Where are you from?" in as many languages as are needed to receive an answer, as John Tzetzes did, or preaches the Christian gospel in "strange tongues," as the apostles did.

These two strategies show that it is possible to perform the dialogue in various ways, so that it activates a complex understanding of cosmopolitanism. The discussion of cosmopolitanism in Byzantine tradition verifies, therefore, that when studying literary history and its literary worlds, one should avoid presupposing or prioritising either of these two strategies beforehand. As a concept that borders between mono- or multilingual practices, cosmopolitanism may represent homogenising as well as heterogenising tendencies which alternately accentuate universality or difference.

What is more, the questioning part of this dialogue is assigned to us, as readers, scholars and researchers whenever we engage in literary or "workly" texts. To find out more about the various literary worlds of Byzantine tradition, our task is to keep asking: "Where are you from?" Replies may come from citizens in a Greek-speaking *kosmos* of universality and unity, as well as from inhabitants in a multilingual *kosmos* of linguistic difference and plurality.

References

Agapitos, Panagiotis A. "John Tzetzes and the Blemish Examiners: A Byzantine Teacher on Schedography, Everyday Language and Writerly Disposition." *Medioevo greco: Rivista di storia e filologia bizantina* 17 (2017): 1–57.

Anderson, Benjamin. *Cosmos and Community in Early Medieval Art*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.

Anonymous. "Epistle to Diognetus." In *The Apostolic Fathers, Volume II: Epistle of Barnabas. Papias and Quadratus. Epistle to Diognetus. The Shepherd of Hermas*. Edited and translated by Bart D. Ehrman. Loeb Classical Library 25. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.

Antonova, V. I., and N. E. Mneva. *Gosudarstvennaia Tret'iakovskaia gallereia: Katalog drevnerusskoi zhivopisi*, T. 1. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Iskusstvo, 1963.

Appiah, Kwame Anthony. *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*. London: Penguin, 2007.

Bal, Mieke. *Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002.

Beecroft, Alexander. *An Ecology of World Literature: From Antiquity to the Present Day*. Brooklyn, N.Y.: Verso, 2015.

Bodin, Helena. "'The clamour of Babel, in all the tongues of the Levant': Multivernacular and Multiscriptal Constantinople around 1900 as a Literary World." *Textual Practice* 34, no. 5 (2020): 783–802.

Bodin, Helena. "Whose Byzantinism—Ours or Theirs?" In *The Reception of Byzantium in European Culture since 1500*, edited by Przemysław Marciniak and Dion Smythe, 11–42. Farnham: Ashgate, 2016.

Casanova, Pascale. *The World Republic of Letters*. Translated by M. B. Debevoise. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Caudano, Anne-Laurence. '*Let There Be Lights in the Firmament of Heaven': Cosmological Depictions in Early Rus*. Cambridge, Mass.: Palaeoslavica, 2006.

Constitutions of the Holy Apostles: Book VII–VIII. Concerning the Christian Life, and the Eucharist, and the Initiation into Christ. In *The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Transl. of the Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325. Vol. 7, Lactantius, Venantius, Asterius, Victorinus, Dionysius, Apostolic Teaching and Constitutions, Homily, and Liturgies*, edited by Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1995 [1886]. Accessed 28 July, 2020. https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07

Diogenes Laertius. *Lives of Eminent Philosophers.* Vol. II*, Books 6–10*. Translated by R. D. Hicks. Loeb Classical Library 185. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925.

Dionysius of Fourna. *The 'Painter's Manual' of Dionysius of Fourna*. Translated by Paul Hetherington.

London: The Sagittarius Press, 1974.

Dunning, Benjamin H. *Aliens and Sojourners: Self as Other in Early Christianity*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.

Eustathios of Thessalonike. *Eustathii Thessalonicensis De emendanda vita monachica*, edited and translated by Karin Metzler. Berolini: De Gruyter, 2006.

Grabar, André. "Le schéma iconographique de la Pentecôte." [1928] *L'Art de la fin de l'Antiquité et du Moyen Age*. Vol. 1, 615–27. Paris: Collège de France, 1968.

Hayot, Eric. *On Literary Worlds*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Herrin, Judith. *Byzantium: The Surprising Life of a Medieval Empire*. London: Penguin, 2008.

John Chrysostom. "Homily IV (Acts 2:1–2)." *Patrologiae cursus completus: Series graeca*. Vol. LX, edited by Jacques-Paul Migne. Paris, 1862.

John Chrysostom. "Homily IV (Acts 2:1–2)." In *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Ser. 1. Vol. 11, Homilies on the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistle to the Romans*, edited by Philip Schaff. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975 [1889]. Accessed 28 July, 2020. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf111.vi.iv.html

Kazhdan, A. P., and Ann Wharton Epstein. *Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

Kleingeld, Pauline, and Brown, Eric. "Cosmopolitanism." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed 28 July, 2020. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/cosmopolitanism/.

Kominko, Maja. *The World of Kosmas: Illustrated Byzantine Codices of the Christian Topography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Kontoglou, Phōtēs. *Ekphrasis tēs orthodoxou eikonographias. T. 1, Technologikon kai eikonographikon*. Athēnai: Astēr 1960.

Kristeva, Julia. *Nations Without Nationalism*. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

Lavan, Myles, Richard E. Payne, and John Weisweiler, "Cosmopolitan Politics: The Assimilation and Subordination of Elite Cultures." In *Cosmopolitanism and Empire: Universal Rulers, Local Elites, and Cultural Integration in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean*, edited by Myles Lavan, Richard E. Payne, and John Weisweiler. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Lemopoulos, George. "The Icon of Pentecost: A Liturgical Bible Study on Acts 2:1–4." *The Ecumenical Review* 42, no. 2 (April 1990): 92–97.

Lettevall, Rebecka, and Kristian Petrov. "Toward a Critique of Cosmopolitan Reason." In *Critique of Cosmopolitan Reason: Timing and Spacing the Concept of World Citizenship*, edited by Rebecka Lettevall and Kristian Petrov. Bern: Peter Lang, 2014.

Magdalino, Paul. "Byzantium = Constantinople." In *A Companion to Byzantium*, edited by Liz James, 43–54. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

Mansel, Philip. *Constantinople: City of the World's Desire, 1453–1924*. London: John Murray, 1995.

Martens, J. W. *One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Romano Law*. Boston: Brill, 2003.

Melling, David J. "Constantinople." In *The Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity*, edited by Ken Parry, David J. Melling, Dimitri Brady, Sidney H. Griffith, and John F. Healey, 125–29. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.

Metzger, Marcel, ed. *Les constitutions apostoliques. T. 3, Livres VII et VIII*. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1987.

Mitsis, Philip. "A Stoic Critique of Cosmopolitanism." In *Cosmopolitanisms*, edited by Bruce Robbins and Paulo Lemos Horta, 171–89. New York: New York University Press, 2017.

Neumann, Birgit, Ansgar Nünning, and Mirjam Horn, eds. *Travelling Concepts for the Study of Culture*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012.

Nussbaum, Martha C. "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism." In *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, edited by Joshua Cohen, 2–17. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Obolensky, Dimitri. *The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe 500–1453*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971; new ed. London: Phoenix, 2000.

Ouspensky, Leonid. "Quelques considérations au sujet de l'iconographie de la Pentecôte." *Messager l'exarchat du Patriarche Russe en Europe occidentale* 9, no. 33–34 (1960): 45–92.

Ouspensky, Leonid, and Vladimir Lossky. *The Meaning of Icons*. Translated by G. E. H. Palmer and E. Kadloubovsky. Crestwood, N.Y.: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1983.

Pentecostarion. Translated by Archimandrite Ephrem. Accessed 28 July, 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20130730200335/http://www.anastasis.org.uk/PentAll.htm

Πεντηκοστάριον. In Greek. Accessed 28 July, 2020. http://glt.goarch.org/texts/Pen/p49.html

Philo of Alexandria. *On the Confusion of Tongues*. In *On the Confusion of Tongues. On the Migration of Abraham. Who Is the Heir of Divine Things? On Mating with the Preliminary Studies*. Translated by F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker. Loeb Classical Library 261. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932.

Philo of Alexandria. *On the Life of Moses*. In *On Abraham. On Joseph. On Moses*. Translated by F. H. Colson. Loeb Classical Library 289. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935.

Philo of Alexandria. *The Special Laws*. In *On the Decalogue. On the Special Laws, Books 1–3*. Translated by F. H. Colson. Loeb Classical Library 320. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937.

Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses*. Introduction, Translation, and Commentary by David T. Runia. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005.

Pizzone, Aglae. "The Historiai of John Tzetzes: a Byzantine 'Book of Memory'?" *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 41, no. 2 (2017): 182–207.

Pollock, Sheldon. *The Language of Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture and Power in Premodern India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.

Réau, Louis. *Iconographie de l'art chrétien*. T. 2:II*, Iconographie de la Bible: Nouveau Testament*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957.

Robbins, Bruce, and Paulo Lemos Horta, eds. *Cosmopolitanisms*. New York: New York University Press, 2017.

Romanos the Melodist. *Hymnes. T. V*. Edited and translated by José Grosdidier de Matons. Sources Chrétiennes 283. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1981.

Romanos the Melodist. *On the Life of Christ. Kontakia. Chanted Sermons by the Great Sixth-Century Poet and Singer*. Translated by Archimandrite Ephrem Lash. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1994.

Russell, Eugenia. *Literature and Culture in Late Byzantine Thessalonica*. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.

Schimanski, Johan, and Stephen F. Wolfe, eds. *Border Aesthetics: Concepts and Intersections*. New York: Berghahn, 2017.

Shepard, Jonathan. "The Byzantine Commonwealth 1000–1500." In *The Cambridge History of Christianity*. Vol. 5, *Eastern Christianity*, edited by Michael Angold, 3–52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014 [2006].

Spira, Ivo. "'World': An Exploration of the Relationship between Conceptual History and Etymology."

In *Conceptualizing the World: An Exploration across Disciplines*, edited by Helge Jordheim and Erling Sandmo, 27–39. New York: Berghahn Books, 2019.

Stephanides, Stephanos, and Stavros Karayanni. "Introduction: Vernacular Worlds, Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Intimate Estrangement of Homecoming." In *Vernacular Worlds, Cosmopolitan Imagination*, edited by Stephanos Stephanides and Stavros Karayanni. Leiden: Brill Rodopi, 2015.

Thesaurus Linguae Graecae. Accessed 20 July, 2020. http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu

Trubetskoi, Evgenii. *Tri ocherka o russkoi ikone: Umozrenie v kraskakh dva mira v drevne-russkoi ikonopisi rossiia v ee ikone*. Parizh: YMCA Press, 1965.

Uthemann, Karl-Heinz. "Cosmos." In *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*. Vol. 1, edited by A. P. Kazhdan, 537–38. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

JOLCEL

Journal of Latin Cosmopolitanism and European Literatures.

Current Contribution

Tycho Maas, "The Classics at World's End. A VOC Secretary Reframes the Cape Khoi," JOLCEL 5 (2021): 53–71. DOI: 10.21825/jolcel.v5i0.16569.

*

Note

This contribution is part of a larger dialogue of three articles and one responding piece that form the current issue of JOLCEL. The other contributions are "Latin Cosmopolitanism and the Roman Empire" by Christoph Pieper (pp. 1–26) and "From Adam to Tsar' Kosmos: Cosmopolitanism in the Byzantine Tradition" by Helena Bodin (pp. 28–51). The response piece is "Thinking about Cosmopolitanism" by Theo D'haen (pp. 73–79).

*

The Classics at World's End
A VOC Secretary Reframes the Cape Khoi

TYCHO MAAS

University of Amsterdam

ABSTRACT

The Dutchman Johannes Willem van Grevenbroek (1644-circa 1726) was secretary of the Dutch East India Company's Council of Policy at the Cape from 1684 to 1694. In the years that had passed since Jan van Riebeeck's landing at the Cape in 1652, marking the first permanent European settlement in modern-day South Africa, regular expeditions had been launched into its hinterland. A year after his retirement from VOC service, Grevenbroek wrote a letter in Latin about the Cape's native inhabitants: Elegans et accurata gentis Africanae circa Promontorium Capitis Bonae Spei vulgo Hottentotten Nuncupatae Descriptio Epistolaris (An Elegant and Accurate Account of the African Race Living Round the Cape of Good Hope, Commonly Called Hottentots). In this paper, I consider Grevenbroek's engagement with ancient (Greek and Roman) antiquity in his framing of the Khoi. Ancient times had left early modern Europe with an authoritative literature on the world's geography and history, descriptions about its then-known people, and suppositions about the ways of life of its many un-known people in yet to be discovered realms. In his letter, Grevenbroek returns to the Classical sources to meaningfully recapture the Cape native people and thus renegotiate the popular contemporary European image about them.

***

From 1684 to 1694, the Dutchman Johannes Willem van Grevenbroek (1644-circa 1726) was secretary of the Council of Policy at the Cape for the Dutch East India Company (VOC).[1] Since Jan van Riebeeck's landing at the Cape in 1652,

[1] This paper follows from my PhD thesis, defended at the University of Amsterdam on 2 June 2020: Tycho Maas, *Shifting Frameworks for Understanding Otherness*. I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their feedback on this article in an earlier stage.

marking the first permanent European settlement in modern-day South Africa, regular expeditions had been launched into its hinterland. A sustainable relationship with the Cape's native inhabitants, involving their willingness to barter and to share pasture, was key to the settlement's success as a self-sufficient half-way post on the VOC's trade route to the East. A year after his retirement from VOC service, Grevenbroek wrote a letter in Latin about the Cape's indigenous peoples: *N.N. Graevenbroeckii Elegans et accurata gentis Africanae circa Promontorium Capitis Bonae Spei vulgo Hottentotten Nuncupatae Descriptio Epistolaris Anno MDCLXXXXV* (*An Elegant and Accurate Account of the African Race Living Round the Cape of Good Hope, Commonly Called Hottentots, From a Letter written by J.G. Grevenbroek in the Year 1695*).[2] The nick-name 'Hottentots'–an onomatope for the clucking of a brood hen that was said to resemble native speech–is exemplary of the derogative animalisation that is common in 17th-century European writing about Cape native peoples. Yet, in his letter Grevenbroek appears to argue against this dominant representation: he not only argues for their civility, he also blames his countrymen for deteriorating relations with them and for maintaining a false image about them.

In this paper, I consider Grevenbroek's engagement with Classical Latin literature in his framing of the Khoi (as I will refer to the large diversity of Cape native tribes and peoples for ease of reference).[3] Ancient times had left early modern Europe with an authoritative literature on the world's geography and history, descriptions about its then-known people, and suppositions about the ways of life of its many un-known people in yet-to-be-discovered realms. In conjunction with this, Christian eschatology explained the dispersal of people across the world as it was known to early modern Europe. I provide a close reading of the opening paragraphs of Grevenbroek's letter, analysing Grevenbroek's references to Roman authors. I ask how Grevenbroek returns to the Classical sources to meaningfully recapture the Cape native people and renegotiate the popular contemporary European image about them. It becomes apparent that although Grevenbroek's Latin is part literary play, his intertextualities strategically move the Khoi away from the derogative early-modern European image about them. At the same time, Grevenbroek is able to reinvigorate the extant Classical and biblical frameworks of knowledge that gave rise to the representation he argues against. This makes him a unique voice in studying the Khoi and the history of knowledge.

[2] The sole extant copy of the letter is kept as MSB203 at the National Library of South Africa, Special Collections, Cape Town Campus. Unless otherwise stated, I cite Latin and its English translations from the only text edition, Benjamin Farrington and Isaac Schapera, *The Early Cape Hottentots described in the writings of Olfert Dapper (1668), Willem ten Rhyne (1686) and Johannes Gulielmus de Grevenbroek (1695)*. On the issue of the spelling and Latin rendering of Grevenbroek's name, see Tycho Maas, *Authorship of a Letter about the Khoi in the National Library*, 7–10.

[3] More information about the tribes that inhabited the Cape peninsula and the colonisers' nomenclature for them can be found in, among others, Elphick, *Kraal and Castle,* and Nienaber, *Khoekhoense stamname*.

1 Europe's Outward Gaze

Books about 'newly discovered' peoples were as popular in 17th-century Europe as the novel is today.[4] Overseas explorations continued to bring home knowledge of peoples that had existed on the pages of ancient books and in popular oral tradition but that until then no European had seen with his own eyes. Two Dutch examples of books about a 'new' people are *Kaffrarie of Lant der Kaffers, anders Hottentots genaemt* (*Kaffraria or Land of the Kafirs, also named Hottentots*) (1668) by Olfert Dapper, and *Schediasma de Promontorio Bonae Spei; ejusve tractus incolis Hottentotis* (*A Short Account of the Cape of Good Hope and of the Hottentots who inhabit that region*) (1686) by Willem ten Rhyne.[5] They rank as the longest continuous treatises about the Khoi by Dutchmen from the decades preceding Grevenbroek's letter. Titles of such treatises typically introduce a particular people and the region they inhabit, and their content and structure are to a large extent informed by a conventional set of ethnographical parameters, each of which is commented upon in assessment of the people's (degree of) civility.[6] Ten Rhyne, for example, devotes a chapter to the 'nature' of the 'Hottentots,' focusing, as was common, on their observed lack of virtue. It starts thus:

> Cap. XIV. De Indole. // Enimvero nativa barbaries & otiosa solitudo illorum animis voluptatum omnium ac vitiorum genera miserabilis virtutum inscitia subjicit: levitate quippe, & inconstantia, mendaciis, fraudibus, perfidia ac infamibus omnis libidinis curis turpissime exercentur, nequissime sanguinarii nec enim imbelles satis est prostrasse, dum trucidatis multis etiamnum insultant telis & baculorum ictibus; ita durissima indole omnem eluctati humanitatem, in majorum feritate perseverant, furto deditissimi: alter enim alterius fraudulenter saepe ditatur pecore. Humaniores & mage casti fuerint Africani illi, qui tibi triumfale nomen imposuêre, Africane Scipio! magnum urbanitatis & castimoniae exemplar![7]

For the purpose of this article, I centre on Ten Rhyne's concluding remark, in which he advances a famous case from ancient history in support of the assumed distinction between the Khoi and the people of northern Africa. In the context of early modern ethnographic literature, references to Classical literature not only served as a stylistic display of the author's eloquence, but also provided an

4 Kieskamp, *De Khoekhoe tijdens het bewind van Jan van Riebeeck 1652–1662*, Introduction.

5 Benjamin and Schapera, *The Early Cape Hottentots*.

6 The order in which items were discussed varied. On the development of ethnography and travel writing as separate genres, see Stagl, "Die Apodemik oder "Reisekunst, als Methodik der Sozialforschung," Stagl, *A History of Curiosity*, and Szaly, *Ethnologie und Geschichte*.

7 Farrington and Schapera, *The Early Cape Hottentots*, 122, emphasis in text. "Chapter 14. Their Character. // Their native barbarism and idle desert life, together with a wretched ignorance of all virtues, imposes upon their minds every form of vicious pleasure. In faithlessness, inconstancy, lying, cheating, treachery, and infamous concern with every kind of lust they exercise their villainy [...]. They are so bloody in their inclinations as to practise their cruelties even upon their vanquished enemies after their death, by striking their arrows and weapons into their dead carcases. Thus in the hardness of their hearts, resisting every impulse of humanity, they persist in the savagery of their fore-fathers. They are so addicted to theft, that one neighbour does not stick to enrich himself by stealing the cattle of another. Those *Africans* who gave you your triumphal name, *O Scipio Africanus*, lofty exemplar of culture and sainthood, must have been more humane, more chaste, than these."

authoritative voice to meaningfully frame the foreign. The Roman general Scipio Africanus ended the Second Punic War against Carthage (217–202 BCE), finally bringing victory to Rome.[8] His campaign proved a turning point in Roman history, with Rome defeating an age-old nemesis and enforcing its authority over North-African shores. For his triumphs, the Roman senate awarded Scipio the honorary 'agnomen' (victory title) 'Africanus': Scipio-of-Africa.[9] Ten Rhyne suggests that "those Africans" whom the Romans deemed worthy of their efforts are indeed "more humane" than their southern African counterparts, who "persist in the savagery of their fore-fathers" ("feritas," literally: beastliness). Organising their lives thus, "their native barbarism" (*nativa barbaries*), "idle desert life" (*otiosa solitudo*) and "wretched ignorance of all virtues" (*miserabilis virtutum inscitia*) makes Khoi hearts resist "every impulse of humanity" (*omnem humanitatem*).[10]

Ten Rhyne's pejorative voice with regard to the Khoi was not unique. Commonly described in negations of Christian civility, the habits and life of the Cape natives seemed a long stretch from the European benchmark in the majority of early modern writings about them. When the English took possession of the Cape on 24 June 1620, being the first Europeans to do so, and ousting the Dutch in the process, the observed absence of a Christian society legitimised their actions: "[i]t was concluded that to intitle [sic] his Majeste king supreme head and governor of that continent not yet inhabited by any Christian prince."[11] Although the Khoi are still referred to as 'men' in the contract that was drawn up at the Cape's annexation, in the decades that follow they are gradually denied the rank of Christian people and grouped with heathens or beasts. Some of the dominant ethnographic criteria at the basis of such judgments are summarised by ship surgeon Nicolaus de Graaf in a report from his first calling at the Cape for the VOC in 1640:

> [The Khoi are] very uncivilised, [living with] no laws, policies, religions or ordinances [...]. [They are] nothing other than wild heathen, dirty and stinking men, in their customs more beasts than men. [...] [They have] no Christian civilisation.[12]

By the time Jan van Riebeeck landed at the Cape in 1652, the Khoi, thus bereft of human, Christian civility, had gradually come to confirm the trope of the

[8] At the concluding Battle of Zama, Scipio Africanus conceded to the Carthage general Hannibal the civic leadership of the Empire of Carthage, in modern Tunisia. Scipio's son, Scipio Africanus the Younger, would destroy Carthage and annex it into the Roman Empire in the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE).

[9] Such *agnomens* were not uncommon for Roman generals: Marcus Antonius (Mark Anthony), for example, was granted the agnomen 'Creticus' (the Cretan) for his conquest of Crete.

[10] Farrington and Schapera, The Early Cape Hottentots, 122 translate '*feritas*', the untamed nature as it pertains to wild beasts (literally beastliness), as 'savagery.' '*Otiosa solitudo*' they translate as 'idle desert life'; '*otium*' is the opposite of '*negotium*' (work, labour) and the ancients associated it with laziness, a vice. '*Solitudo*,' 'solitude,' translated as 'desert,' conveys a sense of unhindered indulgence.

[11] *Eustace Man to the East-India Company*, October 13 1620, by Humphrey Fitzherbert, VC58 (Theale), Western Cape Archives and Records Service, Cape Town. The ceremony was deferred and the English formally annexed the Cape on 3 July 1620. Under naval law, a nation could take possession of a land by simply putting up a sign and a flag. In this case, a mount of stones was raised, which they called King James' Mount, and a small English flag was delivered to the natives, which, according to the report, they carefully kept.

[12] Cited from Raven-Hart, *Before Van Riebeeck*.

ignoble savage, by far the dominant trope that described the foreign peoples that Europe encountered during the Age of Discovery (15th-17th century).[13] The ignoble savage became a standard that defined and judged a non-European people as corrupt, unprincipled, and vicious. Noting that the early modern European image of the Cape was bound by an evident ideological bias and built around a body of exclusively white writing, the South African writer, translator, and Nobel laureate J.M. Coetzee maintains in his book *White Writing*. On the *Culture of Letters in South Africa* (1988) that knowledge about the Khoi did not actually advance. He notes a reiteration of stock images about the ignoble savage as fixed knowledge about the Khoi in early modern times that he describes as the "echo chamber of the discourse of the Cape."[14] As a consequence of its pervasive reverberations, Coetzee argues, the question why the Khoi should rank below the civil, Christian state was never asked:

> Nowhere in the great echo chamber of the Discourse of the Cape is a voice raised to ask whether the life of the Hottentot may not be a version of life before the Fall [...]. The idea that the Hottentot may be Adam is not even entertained for the sake of being dismissed.[15]

Various authors, among whom Olfert Dapper, do not appear to have ever left Europe to see with their own eyes the people they describe, if we look at a compilation of extant works. The full burden of this 'echo chamber' of copying, collating, and configuring extant knowledge within Europe's dominant outward gaze is infamously summed up by John Matthews, lieutenant in the Royal Navy, in 1788:

> Trace the manners of the natives, the whole extent of Africa from Cape Cantin to the Cape of Good Hope, and you find a constant and almost regular gradation in the scale of understanding, till the wretched Cafre sinks nearly below the Ouran Outang.16

Thus, Ten Rhyne's parallel from ancient history in support of his observations about the Khoi is not an innocent comparison. It should be understood within the context of selective and partial reading of the Classical library, biblical exegesis, and contemporary travelogues and encyclopaedias on the world's peoples that gave rise to a repertoire of stock representations–stereotypes that could hardly be traced to specific sources.[17]

13 On this topic, see note 6.

14 Coetzee, *White Writing*.

15 Coetzee, *White Writing*, 18. van Wyk Smith, "Review: White Writing," 94, points out in a review of Coetzee's book that the latter relies heavily on Raven-Hart's 1967 anthology and, as a result, misses out on 'the more positive and revisionary discourse about the Khoi'. van Wyk Smith, ""The Most Wretched of the Human Race," 287, asserts that the iconography of the Khoi in early European travelogues about Africa reveals that the Khoi were considered in two ways: "either indigenes were beings of natural innocence [...] or they were still in a state of brute savagery exiled even from divine grace." He shows that the analogy between the Cape and Paradise, and the accompanying interpretation of the Khoi as living in a state of positive primitivism was common, albeit less so than the pejorative voices.

16 Matthews, *A Voyage to the River Sierra-Leone*, 159.

17 On the idea of a stereotype as a form of 'knowledge' that cannot be traced to any particular source, see, for example, Hall, *Representation and the Media*.

Finally, it should be noted that in appreciating an expanding world and the peoples that inhabited it, early modern Europe meaningfully framed Classical antiquity in a larger biblical history of the world. Although the 15th to the 17th centuries witnessed an unprecedented surge in travel writing and reports on foreign people under the influence of crusades and journeys of exploration into Asia and Africa, anthropologist Michael Ryan rightly maintains that "the bewildering variety of peoples and diversity of cultures did not bowl over a Europe which had cause to appreciate that variety was a fact of life."[18] As Ryan indicates in his paper *Assimilating New Worlds in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (1981), "Montaigne and other humanists knew this [variety and diversity of the human form] from their reading of ancient, not [medieval] travel, texts."[19] Yet, as Ryan observes, "the real discovery was not the exoticism of the other but his ultimate similarity with peoples already assimilated into European consciousness."[20] The book of Genesis allows for the visualisation of the dispersal of man as a grand outward sweep from the Christian centre of the world, with each of Noah's three sons repopulating one of the then-known continents: Shem into Asia, Iafeth into Europe, and Cham into Africa. Consequently, the novel was interpreted as an extension to the familiar, so that a pagan became a Christian who had erred from the faith: medieval world maps with Jerusalem at the centre of a concentric world stood at the basis of later variations to the idea that the further a people was removed from Jerusalem, the longer their separation from the faith, and–supposedly–the more 'rusty' their civility.[21] Hence John Matthews' observation about a 'regular gradation in the scale of understanding' moving southwards across Africa, and Ten Rhyne's contrast of the Khoi at the continent's southernmost extremities with 'the more humane Africans' of northern Africa. Within this narrative of man's dispersal across the globe, to the early modern mind the ancient Romans–the one great heathen civilisation converted to Christianity–represented an earlier age in world history. Roman literature, it was surmised, could thus provide insight into the habits of other pagan civilisations, like those found in southern Africa, and shed light on how far they had become removed from the faith, or–in other words–how close they were to conversion.[22] This ideological bias in Europe's outward gaze not only underpins the echo chamber and the majority of early modern travel writing, but it also stands at the basis of Grevenbroek's argument for Khoi civility.

18 Ryan, "Assimilating New Worlds in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," 520.

19 *Ibidem*.

20 *Ivi*, 529.

21 Hodgen, *Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, 389ff., discusses various popular theories such as the chain of being, allowing for the insertion of tiers between the ranks of mankind and animals, and that of the 16th century Spanish Jesuit missionary José de Acosta who proposes in the introduction to his *De procuranda salute indorum* (*The Natural and Moral History of the Indies*) (1589) that all 'barbarians'–which in practice meant all non-European, remotely Christian, people–be classified into three classes.

22 From this model sprang the effort of many early-modern thinkers to establish a (supposed) genealogy of any exotic people with one of the Noahides.

2 Grevenbroek's Introduction

Having spent a decade at the Cape, Grevenbroek has become convinced that the dominant image of the Khoi as an uncivil people demands renegotiation. Firstly, rather than relying on contemporary writing, he returns to the Classical sources, thereby effectively bypassing the echo chamber of discourse on the Cape. Secondly, he relies on the Christian model for the dispersal of people across the globe, (re)capturing the Khoi as fellow brethren.

In the opening of his letter, Grevenbroek does not introduce the Khoi or his argument right away. Instead, the opening lines take the form of a Classical Roman salutation, after which follows an extensive *captatio benevolentiae*, the winning or capturing of (the reader's) goodwill. This then leads up to Grevenbroek's argument about the people that–in the single publicly available English translation of the entire letter–are introduced as "our Africans" ("*Afri[s] nostri[s]*"):

> Admodum Revdo. Doctissimoque [Doctissimoq.] Viro
> N.N. S.P.D.
>
> Voluptatem, quam ex litteris meis te sensisse testaris, eandem et forte majorem, ex tuis in me propensae voluntatis testibus, venustate et prudentiâ plenis, quibus me dignatus percepi: quarum lectione et delectatione satiari [Satiari] nequeo, gratiasque [gratiasq.] penitissimo pectore [Pectore] Superis ago, quorum benignitate, in experimentum forsan, peculiolum aliquod mihi concessum, ut pietatis meae erga te [Te] specimen [Specimen] videant. [:] Demiror Famam, nunquam ad liquidum perductam, tantas acqui(si)visse eundo vires, fictique adeo tenacem, ut illa quae veritati affinia de Afris nostris divulgantur, etiam apud vos percrebuerint;[23]

The opening lines signal to the reader that what awaits is a text not just in Latin but in a Classicising, Romanising Latin. S.P.D. (*salutem plurimam dicit*) is a Roman epistolary salutation: "the sender sends greetings (literally: 'says "many greetings"') to the addressee." "N.N." could take the place of the name of the writer, where the name was genuinely unknown or the writer wanted to remain anonymous. It is short for *nomen nominandum* ("name hitherto unknown," literally: "the name is yet to be announced") or *nomen nescio* ("I do not know the name"). The *captatio benevolentiae* which follows next is a rhetorical technique that delivers explicit praise of the addressee's ethical qualities and emphasises his intention to

[23] Farrington and Schapera, *The Early Cape Hottentots*, 172. Throughout this article, I quote from this translation of Grevenbroek's letter, published in volume 14 of the Van Riebeeck Society Series. The syntax of Grevenbroek's opening paragraph is quite confused – following Farrington and Schapera, I have not supplied an equivalent for the words "qui legum severitate et judicorum metu se alligari." "To the right reverend and learned gentleman..... Greetings. You say that you receive great pleasure from my letters; I feel the same and perhaps more from the expressions of your goodwill towards me, so full of charm and thought, with which you honour me. I can never read nor relish them enough, and from the bottom of my heart I thank the Powers above through whose kindness there has been granted me, perhaps to test me, some little share of this world's goods so that they may see a proof of my pious devotion to you. I am astonished that Rumour, never bearing a clear report, should have acquired such strength in her course and proved so tenacious of falsehood that those half-truths that are spread abroad about our Africans should have reached even your ears."

win the audience's sympathy and support.[24] Through his *captatio*, Grevenbroek enters into dialogue with the Roman Stoic philosopher Seneca, who famously advanced *captationes* in the opening lines of his letters to Lucilius, his assumed student.[25] Grevenbroek's extensive Classical book collection at the Cape included an edition of these Epistles ('moral letters'), which he studied, as marginalia in his hand indicate.[26] Two extracts from Seneca's letters illustrate similarities in wording and content with the opening of Grevenbroek's letter:

> Magnam ex epistula tua percepi voluptatem [...][27]

> Ex iis, quae mihi scribis, et ex iis, quae audio, bonam spem de te concipio: non discurris nec locorum mutationibus inquietaris. Aegri animi ista iactatio est: primum argumentum compositae mentis existimo posse consistere et secum morari. [28]

Mastering a Classical Latin style of writing in early modern times was, at least in part, an exercise in style and good taste, with the two major tiers of engagement at the time being imitation (*imitatio*) and emulation (*aemulatio*). The latter was generally regarded as the loftier one, where a writer sought to match or ultimately surpass the greatness of the Classical example.[29] Although Grevenbroek's lengthier opening is built around the same motifs as Seneca's, it could be argued that his implied role as mentor, praise of the addressee—in service of the argument—, and the introduction of the subject in the final line are less naturally and elegantly intertwined than in Seneca. Scholars have interpreted Grevenbroek's Latin accordingly, describing it as literary play, a learned gentleman's pastime, and an unsatisfactory medium.[30] However, my primary concern is not with Grevenbroek's

[24] Cicero, *Orator* 2.128. Lausberg, Orten and Anderson, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, 129–30, §274–5. Throughout this article, I use English titles as per the Loeb Classical Library in reference of literature from antiquity, and cite Latin and their English translations from the latest Loeb edition, unless otherwise stated.

[25] Cicero, *Orator* 2.115.

[26] National Library of South Africa, Special Collections, D09.d.36. On Grevenbroek's library, See Van Stekelenburg, *Een intellectueel in de vroege Kaapkolonie*, 3–34, and also *The Cape in Latin and Latin in the Cape in the 17th and 18th Centuries*, 89–109.

[27] Seneca, *Epistles* 59.1. "I derive great pleasure from your letter [...]" The translation is mine. A more verbatim translation than Benjamin and Schapera, *The Early Cape Hottentots,* of Grevenbroek's opening paragraph would be: "Pleasure, which you say you feel from my letters, —the same and perhaps a greater [pleasure] even—from your expressions of goodwill towards me, full of warmth and thought, with which I am honoured, I derive."

[28] Seneca, *Epistles* 2.1. "Judging by what you write me, and by what I hear, I am forming a good opinion regarding your future. You do not run hither and thither and distract yourself by changing your abode; for such restlessness is the sign of a disordered spirit. The primary indication, to my thinking, of a well-ordered mind is a man's ability to remain in one place and linger in his own company." The translation is mine.

[29] Pigman, *Versions of Imitation in the Renaissance*, 1–32, remains a seminal study.

[30] Archival note *De Nalatenschap van Albert van Stekelenburg* by Albert van Stekelenburg, 2001, MS381, Special Collections Stellenbosch University Library. Van Stekelenburg notes that a single page (Farrington and Schapera, *The Early Cape Hottentots*, 295) could boast at least eight allusions or direct citations from Martial, Plinius Minor, Cicero, Vergil, Horace and Quintilian. Van Stekelenburg, *Een intellectueel in de vroege Kaapkolonie*, n14: "[Grevenbroek's effort] to write about the Cape in a laboriously compiled Latin and an overdose of Classical references [are] so out of synch, that the effect is comical, if not irritating" (translated from the Afrikaans by the author of this article). Van Stekelenburg, "The Cape in Latin and

style per se, but with the rhetorical or philosophical effect of Grevenbroek's engagement with the Classics, which was carefully geared to his argument about the Khoi.

After the opening salutation, Grevenbroek introduces his subject and argument, making clear his reason for writing the letter: he has come to understand that "rumour" has proved so "tenacious" that "half-truths" about "our Africans" are now circulated widely. He did not expect this, since the source of half-truths cannot be traced: "[Rumour,] never bearing a clear report" ("*Numquam ad liquidum perductam*").[31] The issue that he outlines in his opening paragraphs, then, is how to think of "our Africans," the native inhabitants of the Cape, in a way that goes beyond rumour. He substantiates this in his first remarks on the Khoi, which follow the letter's introduction:

> Caloris, frigoris, inediae, omniumque laborum supra fidem patientissimi, injuriarumque minime, quippe in vindictam proni, [...]. Aspectu rancidi, cultu feri, vita agrestes, bellicosi tamen et insuetae servitutis, aëripedes agilitatem pernicitatem nonnumque equorum, et Cretenses nandi facilitate, praevertentes. Candore animi multis nostratium superiores sunt, corporis vero nonnullis, et arbitratu meo, forte omnibus albore pares, si nit[i]ori studerent, nunc adipe et radiis solaribus usti, asperoque faciei pigmento infuscantur, suntque coloris ravidi adustioris [...].[32]

The passage treats conventional ethnographic aspects: hygiene, appearance, and character. The Khoi habit of putting animal grease on their bodies was a recurring motif in early modern writing about them, and a ground for their classification as 'beasts,' as outward appearance was taken to be indicative of a people's character. Yet, although there is a normative judgment also in Grevenbroek–the Khoi are deemed unclean–, he argues that outside appearance provides a poor ground for an assessment of Khoi character. In opposition to the echo chamber of discourse of the Cape, and in a radical inversion of the conventional image, Grevenbroek introduces the Khoi as superior to many a Dutchman in whiteness of soul, with the (Classical) Latin word for bright white, '*Candore*,' notably capitalised in Grevenbroek, also conferring notions of purity and integrity in mind or character. Additionally, where Ten Rhyne's reference to antiquity supported a derogatory

Latin in the Cape," 101: "A peculiarly distressing feature of the style is the accumulation of masses of synonyms which add nothing to the narrative but confusion. Although the Cape knows only one genus of Lobster, Grevenbroek calls it cammarus, astacus, pagurus, carabus (184) – in one breath. The knife used at circumcision is secespita, clunaculus, aut excisorium scalpellum (208)." Ibidem: "Grevenbroek's descriptions of himself as 'studiis assertum, involutum literis, et mansuetiorum Musarum amicum' ('dedicated to his studies, engrossed in books and a friend of the sweet Muses') is no doubt justified, yet it is no claim to good taste or creative talent." See Farrington and Schapera, *The Early Cape Hottentots*, 169.

31 Farrington and Schapera, *The Early Cape Hottentots*, translate this as "never bearing a clear report."

32 Farrington and Schapera, *The Early Cape Hottentots*, 174: "They are beyond belief patient of heat, cold, fasting, and every kind of toil, but utterly impatient of injury, and prone to vengeance. [...] They are offenin (to look at, savage in their dress, wild in their mode of life, but warlike and unaccustomed to slavery. They are as swift as the wind, often outstripping horses in fleetness of foot and Cretans in swimming. In whiteness of soul they are superior to many of our countrymen, and in whiteness of body they are equal to some, and, in my judgment, would perhaps be so to all, if they cared for cleanliness. But as things are, what with fat and the scorching heat of the sun and the sharp pigment they put on their faces, they have grown dark and are of a swarthy brown colour."

impression of the Khoi, Grevenbroek claims that the Khoi outdo antiquity's most notable swimmers, the Cretans. He presents the Khoi as "patient beyond belief," and observes that however savage the Khoi may be in appearance, the facts that they were ready to wage war to defend themselves and that they had not been enslaved suggest ("*tamen*") that they did not live what Ten Rhyne described as an "idle desert life." The argument advanced in An Elegant and Accurate Account is, then, in part a negation of extant discourse about the Khoi, presented as moral advice to the reader. In the remainder of his introduction, Grevenbroek develops this as a twofold argument around Classical literature and a Christian worldview.[33]

First, in the next lines Grevenbroek admits that the echo chamber used to dictate his own youthful prejudices about the Khoi, but that a prolonged period of first-hand experience with them has led him to change his mind:

> gentem hanc [sc. Khoi] uno animo, in diem et in commune, ad naturae legem congruenter convenientem viventem, in quodcunque genus hominum hospitalem, candidam, fidam, veritatis, aequitatisque amantem, nec ab omni Numinis alicujus cultu funditus expertem, et singularem illi inesse ad omnia naturalis ingenii dexteritatem, **ut est hominum captus, capacique ad praecepta** animo inveni, qui legum severitate, et judiciorum metu se alligari, quondam praejudiciis juvenilibus abrepta, temeraria mea Musa cecinit:
>
> ***Quamvis sint homines, hominis vix nomine digni*** etc. [34]

The entire letter is an intertextual web of seamlessly integrated references to Roman Latin literature, leading Grevenbroek's English translator Benjamin Farrington to comment that "the Latin of Grevenbroek [...] is dictionary Latin, laboriously compiled by a man of poor taste and inaccurate though very likely wide scholarship. [It] is full of tags from Virgil, Horace, Lucretius and others."[35] Exemplary for the letter as a whole, the highlighted clauses in this passage are taken from canonical works by Roman authors from the first century before and after the common era: "ut est captus hominum" (Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 2.27.65), "capax ad praecepta" (Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 8.243) and "Sive homines, vix sunt homines hoc nomine digni" (Ovid, *Tristia* 5.7.45). As pointed out, Grevenbroek structures his discussion of the Khoi partly along criteria familiar from early modern ethnographic literature–such as justice, worship, and character–, yet his references typically are not found in contemporary writings, such as that of Ten

[33] Van Stekelenburg, *Een intellectueel in de vroege Kaapkolonie*, 95, suggests that the letter was sent to a church minister in the Netherlands: 'The long letter was written at the recipient's request, as Van Grevenbroek states at the end (290)'. I propose that, as is commonly assumed for Seneca's letters, Grevenbroek's letter was not intended for a particular individual, but that instead the form provided a more personal and compelling medium for presenting a moral argument than the traditional dialogue or tractate (Maas, "Authorship of a Letter about the Khoi"). The epistolary form was advanced to that effect elsewhere in early modern ethnography: Huigen, *Verkenningen van Zuid-Afrika*, 43.

[34] Farrington and Schapera, *The Early Cape Hottentots*, 172. Highlights in bold throughout this paper are mine, TM. "I found this people with one accord in their general daily life living in harmony with nature's law, hospitable to every race of men, open, dependable, lovers of truth and justice, not utterly unacquainted with the worship of some God, endowed, within their own limits, with a rare nimbleness of mother wit, and **having minds receptive of instruction**. My rash Muse was swept away by youthful prejudices when I formerly sang: **Though men, they scarce deserve the name of man**."

[35] Farrington and Schapera, *The Early Cape Hottentots*, 169.

Rhyne or Dapper. The above citation from Cicero's philosophical work *Tusculan Disputations*, for example, is part of a passage that deals with the bearing of pain in foreign peoples. It is observed that some nations that are inclined to glory and victory are able to bear the pain from battle wounds, while they cannot bear the pain from disease, "neque enim illum [dolorem] quem facile tulerant ratione aut sapientia tulerant, sed studio potius et Gloria."[36] To illustrate his point, in what follows, Cicero opposes the Grecians (Greeks) to the Cimbrians and Celtiberians:

> Itaque barbari quidam et immanes ferro decertare acerrime possunt, aegrotare viriliter non queunt; Graeci autem homines non satis animosi, prudentes, **ut est captus hominum**, satis, hostem aspicere non possunt, eidem morbos toleranter atque humane ferunt. At Cimbri et Celtiberi in proeliis exsultant, lamentantur in morbo: nihil enim potest esse aequabile quod non a certa ratione proficiscatur.[37]

The Cimbrians were a Germanic tribe who invaded the northern Iberian Peninsula, inhabited by the Celtiberians. To Roman eyes, both were barbaric peoples, for they appeared to be foreign to the Roman ways of life.[38] Although the Grecians, according to Cicero, lack the level of courage appropriate for battle, at least their behaviour is founded on reason and philosophy (fixed principles: "a certa ratione proficiscatur"), which is lacking in the Cimbrians and Celtiberians. Indeed, they are as sensible as suits mankind ("prudentes, ut est captus hominum"). Similarly, for Grevenbroek the Khoi may appear foreign to European behaviour and customs, but they are no less civil–quite the opposite, as the word '*Candore*' will make clear. The Khoi possess key characteristics of (European ideas of) civil culture, such as a love for truth ("*veritatis*"), justice ("*aequitatis*"), and worship of some God ("nec ab omni Numinis alicujus cultu funditus expertem," note the litotes). What is more, however, is that a consistent rationale underpins their way of life: they have "a rare nimbleness of mother wit" and "minds receptive of instruction." More than writing a classicising Latin, Grevenbroek thus engages Classical literature that has a foreign people as its subject matter directly, to elaborate his own position regarding Khoi civility.[39]

This can be further illustrated through the highlighted clause at the end of the passage, which is the only line in the entire letter that draws attention to itself as a citation: it is centred on the (manuscript) page, has an empty line before and after it in an otherwise left-aligned script that runs page-wide, and has "etc." at

[36] "[f]or they did not support themselves under their former [battle] sufferings by reason or philosophy, but by inclination and glory."

[37] Idem. "We find accordingly some uncivilized barbarians able to fight desperately to the end with the sword but unable to behave like men in sickness. The Greeks on the other hand, who are not so very courageous but have a sufficiency of sense **answering to their mental powers**, cannot look an enemy in the face; and yet these same men show endurance and spirit, as human beings should, in bearing sickness, while the Cimbri and Celtiberians revel in battle and wail in sickness. For nothing can keep the same level unless it starts with fixed principle."

[38] On Roman ideas of *barbaritas* and *humanitas*, see for example Braund, *Roman Assimilations of the Other*, 15–32 and Veyne, *Humanitas: Romans and Non-Romans*, 342–69.

[39] This, in turn, he supports with examples from his own experiences at the Cape.

its end (notably absent in the English translation).[40] It is a verse from Ovid's *Tristia* (circa 11 CE), poems of sorrow and lament written after he was banned from Rome to Tomi (now Constantia, on the Romanian coast). The particular poem from which Grevenbroek quotes deals with the Getae and the Sarmatians, local peoples whose habits and livelihood, so the poet reminds the reader, had little in common with Roman civility:

> sive locum specto, locus est inamabilis, et quo
> esse nihil toto tristius orbe potest,
> sive homines, vix sunt homines hoc nomine digni,
> quamque lupi, saevae plus feritatis habent.
> non metuunt leges, sed cedit viribus aequum,
> victaque pugnaci iura sub ense iacent.
> pellibus et laxis arcent mala frigora bracis,
> oraque sunt longis horrida tecta comis,
> in paucis remanent Graecae vestigia linguae,
> haec quoque iam Getico barbara facta sono.
> unus in hoc nemo est populo, qui forte Latine
> quaelibet e medio reddere verba queat.[41]

The explicit reference engages Classical discourse about foreign (non-Roman, non-civil) peoples, inviting the reader to explore Ovid's first-century description of the Getae against the 17th-century prevailing opinion about the Khoi, and Grevenbroek's claim that these are "half-truths." According to the poet, the locals are more savage than wolves, they dress and do their hair like beasts, and (importantly) they fear no law and speak no civil language.[42] In his book *Banished Voices: Readings in Ovid's Exile Poetry* (1994), Gareth Williams remarks that "All these details emphasise Ovid's isolation from his fellow Tomitans while at the same time making clear their need for the civilising influences of Rome."[43] Where Ovid looks at the people ("specto homines") and casts his opinion, Grevenbroek, in turn, admits that there was a time when he agreed with Ovid's statement about the Getae. Formerly, then, he might have denied the Khoi their status as civilised people because, like the Getae, they lived in a state of perceived primitivism and shared a natural state with animals. But after a decade's experience with Khoi customs and habits, he parallels Ovid's assessment of the non-Roman peoples with his own youthful prejudices. It is also interesting that Ovid–on grounds of the observed lack of civility among the people–rejects the place as hateful and the saddest on the planet ("locus est inamabilis, et quo esse nihil toto tristius orbe

[40] Given the care and consistency with which the copyist of Grevenbroek's letter handled typographical features (underscore, typeface), I have no reason to assume that the positioning of Ovid's line is the copyist's intervention.

[41] Ovid, *Tristia* 5.7.43–54. "If I look at the place, the place is hateful, / and nothing could be sadder on this earth, / **if at the people, they barely deserve the name,** / they've more cruel savagery in them than wolves. / They fear no law: justice yields to force, / and right is overturned by the sword's aggression. / They keep off the evils of cold with pelts / and loose trousers, shaggy faces hidden in long hair. / A few still retain vestiges of the Greek language, / though even this the Getic pronunciation barbarises. / There's not a single one of the population who might / chance to utter a few words of Latin while speaking."

[42] The claim that the Getae spoke no Latin and only a little Greek is in all likelihood false. See Williams, *Banished Voices,* 154ff.

[43] Williams, *Banished Voices*, 158.

potest"). Some vestiges of the Greek language remain, though barbarised, but no one speaks Latin ("in paucis [...] verba queat"). Grevenbroek, conversely, laments in the conclusion to his letter that the Cape would have been better off without the acquirements of settler culture:

> Quo uno omnia verbo complectar, terram scias hanc suis contentam bonis, nec mercis aut opis alicujus (si luxuria absit) indigam, tam longè latèque se pandit Divina bonitas, abundè incolis exhibens alimenta.[44]

Putting himself apart from much of the European early modern ethnographical tradition, Grevenbroek not only critically re-appreciates Khoi culture, but also scrutinises the early modern outward gaze and method of assessing non-European civilisations. He turns a mirror on his home culture, and claims that the acquirements of European civilisation in fact hinder the appreciation of the Cape, indeed suggesting that European settler life has removed itself from what matters most–the paramount goodness of God ('*Divina bonitas*') that affords nurture without stint to the inhabitants ("abundè incolis exhibens alimenta").

This second pillar of his worldview–the Christian roots from which he claims his countrymen have been alienated, and which the Khoi possess in a purer ('*Candore*') form–he elucidates in the final lines of his introduction. In organising their ways of life and judging those of other peoples, Grevenbroek's countrymen practice a corrupted Christian ethics that is now jumping across to the Khoi, he claims. Grevenbroek holds the settlers responsible for the deteriorating relation with the natives and paints a picture of what will happen to the hypocritical Christians who refuse to see this:

> Cujus delicti veniam petens, hic palinodiam cano, dum proh dedecus! **Nostratium vitiis**, moris patrii oblitorum, in deterius mutatos, sui celantes, tectos et a nobis abstrusos explorate perspicio et cognosco, a quibus blasphemias, perjuria, discordiam, simultates, crapulam, technas, latrocinia, furta, ingratitudinem, effraenatam alieni appetentiam ignota quondam eis Facinora, aliaque crimina non levis notae, et auri sacram famem traxit; en **praeclaros Christianarum vittarum Mystas**! en Divinae Veritatis assertores strenuos, die et judicio novissimo ab his Barbaris media amphitheatri scrobe ustulandi. Haec est futuri summa favilla mali![45]

The description of the burning of hypocrite Christians by "these barbarians" in an amphitheatre on Judgment Day provides a rather dramatic finale to the opening

[44] Farrington and Schapera, *The Early Cape Hottentots*, 290. "To put all in a word, you must know that this land is sufficient unto itself, and needs neither commerce nor any other aid, if luxury be absent, so bountifully does the goodness of God here display itself, affording nurture without stint to the inhabitants."

[45] Farrington and Schapera, *The Early Cape Hottentots*, 173–4, {...} is my deletion. "And for this fault [i.e. my youthful prejudice] I now seek pardon and sing a palinode; for, alas for the disgrace! it is through the faults of our countrymen, who have forgotten their ancestral ways, as I now plainly see and recognize, that the natives have been changed for the worse, and have become secretive, suspicious and shut away from us. From us they have learned blasphemy, perjury, strife, quarrelling, drunkenness, trickery, brigandage, theft, ingratitude, unbridled lust for {for} what is not one's own, misdeeds unknown to them before, and, among other crimes of deepest die, the accursed lust of gold. Behold the glorious priests of the Christian mysteries! Behold the strenuous champions of Divine Truth! On the last day at the last judgment they shall be burned in the middle ditch of the amphitheatre by these barbarians. 'This is the final spark of the woe to come.'"

of the letter. Indeed, Grevenbroek has received criticism for his hyperbolic style: "Grevenbroek's rhetorical exaggerations are sometimes next to hysterical."[46] Yet, the drama is in line with the strident tone and message of the preceding lines. Having turned away from the traditional European outward gaze as exemplified by Ovid's citation about the Getae and Sarmations, Grevenbroek now seeks to reverse his earlier opinion on the Khoi: seeking pardon, he now sings a palinode ("hic palinodiam cano"). Derived from the Ancient Greek '*πάλιν*' ('*palin*,' meaning 'back' or 'again') and '*ᾠδή*' ('song'), a palinode retracts a sentiment expressed in an earlier poem. As in this first part of his introduction, Grevenbroek characterises his letter in a classicising vein, and also continues the break with the tradition of writing about the Khoi. He relates the faults of his countrymen ("nostratium vitiis") to forgotten ancestral ways ("moris patrii oblitorum"): his fellow settlers have become estranged from their Christian roots to the extent that Grevenbroek associates them with a series of Christian vices that recall the seven cardinal sins and the Ten Commandments–"blasphemy, perjury, strife, quarrelling, drunkenness, trickery, brigandage, theft, ingratitude, unbridled lust for what is not one's own." The priests that preach the upholding of the mysteries of Christian worship ("praeclaros Christianarum vittarum Mystas") he ironically describes as 'glorious': they have begun to pass on their ways of life to the Khoi, who have "changed for the worse, and have become secretive, suspicious and shut away" from the Europeans ("in deterius mutatos, sui celantes, tectos et a nobis abstrusos"). There appears to be a play of words between "the faults of our countrymen" ("Nostratium vitiis") and Christian worship ("Christianarum vittarum"), where the metonym '*vitta*' (the headband worn by (Roman) priests) is now replaced by '*vitium*' ((Christian) sin). Conversely, the virtues that Grevenbroek praised in the Khoi in the first part of his introduction are based on the Christian tradition, too: "[they live] in harmony with nature's law, [are] hospitable to every race of men, open, dependable, lovers of truth and justice, not utterly unacquainted with the worship of some God." With more detail than in the first part of his introduction, Grevenbroek challenges the dominant European early modern image about the Khoi, but having come around himself, now also turns a mirror on his fellow Europeans: the settlers have betrayed their own Christianity by corrupting a pious people. This is what merits their severe punishment on Judgment Day at the hands of the Khoi ("his Barbaris").[47]

The final line of the opening of Grevenbroek's letter continues the criticism of the Europeans and the urgent tone. It alludes to a line from the Roman poet Propertius' *Elegies* (1.9.18) (first century BCE), a series of poems that portray the uneven course of a poet's love affair with a woman called Cynthia.[48] In the particular poem quoted, the poet urges his friend and fellow poet Ponticus, who is also

[46] Van Stekelenburg, *Een intellectueel in de vroege Kaapkolonie*, 96: "Merkwaardig zijn zijn retorische overdrijvingen, die soms een bijna hysterisch niveau bereiken" (English translation my own).

[47] I discuss Grevenbroek's ironical use of the term '*barbarus*' in reference to the Khoi against the background of the dominant 17th-century discourse about them in my PhD thesis: Maas, *Shifting Frameworks for Understanding Otherness*, Chapter 3. Grevenbroek adopts the stereotype only to show that it confers no inherent knowledge about the referent.

[48] This is the only citation that is marked as such in Farrington's translation; none of the other Classical references are put in quotation marks.

in love, to put away all his learned books of poetry and write his own love-elegy for his 'girl' instead:

> i quaeso et tristis istos sepone libellos,
> et cane quod quaevis nosse puella velit!
> quid si non esset facilis tibi copia! nunc tu
> insanus medio flumine quaeris aquam.
> necdum etiam palles, vero nec tangeris igni:
> **haec est venturi prima favilla mali.**
> tum magis Armenias cupies accedere tigres
> et magis infernae vincula nosse rotae,
> quam pueri totiens arcum sentire medullis
> et nihil iratae posse negare tuae.
> nullus Amor cuiquam facilis ita praebuit alas,
> ut non alterna presserit ille manu.[49]

The river and water are common symbols for inspiration, here reworked creatively by Propertius to serve as an indication of Ponticus' failure to see the obvious: as a poet, he should not be looking in books, but should find within himself a wealth of material from which to draw inspiration for writing "anything the girl wants to hear" ("quod quaevis nosse puella velit").[50] What he is feeling now, according to the poet-narrator, is only the first spark: his love will deepen, and with that the need to write a love elegy (which, it is hoped, will incline the girlfriend to open up to his affection). Grevenbroek's reworking of Propertius' elegy provides a disconcerting finale for his letter's introduction. Extending the implication of the elegy to Grevenbroek's palinode, the implication is that the European settlers have failed to see the obvious. In the same way that Ponticus is standing in a river, isolated, asking for water, the settlers and the Christian priests are deploring their solitude among savages, while in fact they are surrounded by an unremitting flow of more authentic, pious inspiration than they possess themselves. Instead of reading 'sad books' full of half-truths and rumour about the foreign, Grevenbroek has opened up his eyes to the world around him. Although he has come around himself, critically engaging the extant body of literature about the Khoi, and scrutinising trusted Classical authorities, he claims that it is too late for "the glorious priests of the Christian mysteries" and "the strenuous champions of divine truth" ("Divinae Veritatis assertores strenuos"). They will continue to fail to see their part in corrupting the Khoi, carrying the stereotype forward. Significantly, Grevenbroek replaced "prima" (first) in the Propertian line by "summa" (highest; final),

[49] Propertius, *Elegies* 1.9.13–24, translation Katz, The complete elegies of Sextus Propertius: "Please, go bury those sad books / and sing anything the girl wants to hear! / What if this abundance were not so easily yours? / Now, like a madman, you are standing in the middle of a river asking for water. / And you're not even pale yet. You haven't really felt the fire. / **This is but the first spark of the suffering to come.** / Then you'd rather face Armenian tigers / and know the bondage of hell's wheel / than to feel so often the boy's bow in your marrow / and be powerless to deny your angry girl a single thing. / Love doesn't give his wings so easily / that he does not repress with the other hand." The final two lines loosely translate to: "Love grants no one an easy passage, driving them back with either hand."

[50] On the interpretation of lines 13–16, see Yardley, *Ponticus' Inspiration: Propertius 1.9.15*, 324: "The identification of the composition of love-poetry with the experience of a love affair has, of course, already been established [at the beginning of *Elegies* 1.7]."

thus focusing on the last judgment on the youngest day. In contrast to Propertius' "you haven't really felt the fire," Grevenbroek seems to be saying that certain settlers will most definitely feel it–but that the reader of his letter might still be saved, if he pays heed to Grevenbroek's message.

3 Framing the World

However much it was *en vogue* among learned circles in early modern Europe to engage in a stylistic-aesthetic imitatio or aemulatio of Classical authorities, there is more at stake in Grevenbroek's letter. Grevenbroek's introduction takes the form of a complex interplay of implicit and explicit allusions to Classical Latin literature and a Christian worldview that not only inform his argument about Khoi civility, but that also critically reflect on the way knowledge about them is acquired. Grevenbroek radically opposes the dominant Khoi image in early modern ethnographic literature of a beastly or degraded civility, and scrutinises the civility of his fellow Europeans. The allusion to Seneca's philosophy allows for an interpretation of Grevenbroek's letter as moral advice to the reader, the reference to Cicero makes apparent how Grevenbroek aptly draws on Classical literature to bypass the prevailing images that perpetuated the stereotyped framing of the Khoi, the reference from Ovid's poetry of exile makes clear how Grevenbroek's view of the foreign has changed, and Propertius' poem he reworks creatively in support of a worldview that accommodates the Khoi as pious brethren.

At the same time, the Classics that in part inspired the half-truths about the Khoi that Grevenbroek seeks to break with, are reinvigorated by him as a source of knowledge for viewing the world and for meaningfully framing the foreign. This he does in conjunction with an appreciation of the Khoi as more authentically pious people, flowing from a Christian eschatology. Grevenbroek thus positions the Khoi at the heart of one of Europe's major intellectual crises: the radical epistemological shift away from the age-old and trusted Classical and Christian library as a source of knowledge about the world, to empirical observation as the starting point for crafting an understanding about it.[51] The fact that he is still able to extend Classical and biblical worldviews to frame his opinion about the Khoi after a decade of first-hand experiences, makes him a uniquely valuable voice in South African and European history, for it shows just how hard it is to reflect on one's understanding of the world, and the frameworks of knowledge that help to construct it.

References

Braund, Susanna. *Roman Assimilations of the Other. Humanitas at Rome*, ACTA Classica, 60 (1997): 15–32.

Cicero, *Marcus Tullius. Brutus. Orator*. Edited by George L. Hendrickson and translated by H. M.

[51] On this shift, see the seminal study by *New Worlds, Ancient Texts.*

Hubbell. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. *Tusculan Disputations*. Edited and translated by J.E. King. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1877.

Coetzee, John Maxwell. *White Writing. On the Culture of Letters in South Africa*. London: New Haven, 1988.

Elphick, Richard. Kraal and Castle. *Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1977.

Farrington, Benjamin, and Isaac Schapera, eds. *The Early Cape Hottentots described in the writings of Olfert Dapper (1668), Willem ten Rhyne (1686) and Johannes Gulielmus de Grevenbroek (1695)*. Cape Town: The Van Riebeeck Society, 1933.

Fitzherbert, Humphrey. Manuscript *Letter from Eustace Man to the East-India Company, dated from Jakarta Roads, October 13, 1620*. VC58 (Theale). Western Cape Archives and Records Service, Cape Town.

Grafton, Anthony. *New Worlds, Ancient Texts. The Power of Tradition and the Shock of Discovery*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Grevenbroek, *Johannes Willem. N.N. Graevenbroeckii Elegans et accurata gentis Africanae circa Promontorium Capitis Bonae Spei vulgo Hottentotten Nuncupatae Descriptio Epistolaris Anno MDCLXXXXV*. 1695. MSB203, National Library of South Africa, Special Collections, Cape Town Campus.

Hall, Stuart. *Representation and the Media*. Massachusetts: The Media Education Foundation, 2005.

Hodgen, Margaret. *Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964.

Huigen, Siegfried. *Verkenningen van Zuid-Afrika*. Achttiende-eeuwse reizigers aan de Kaap. Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2007.

Kieskamp, Andre. *De Khoekhoe tijdens het bewind van Jan van Riebeeck 1652–1662: een bronnenonderzoek*. MA thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2000.

Lausberg, Heinrich, David Orten, and Dean Anderson, eds. *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study*. Leiden: Brill, 1998.

Maas, Tycho. *Authorship of a Letter about the Khoi in the National Library*, The Bulletin of the National Library of South Africa 71, no. 2 (2017): 7–10.

Maas, Tycho. *Shifting Frameworks for Understanding Otherness. The Cape Khoi in pre-1652 European Travelogues, an Early Modern Latin Letter, and the South African Novel Eilande*. PhD diss., University of Amsterdam, 2020.

Matthews, John. *A Voyage to the River Sierra-Leone*. London: B. White, 1788.

Nienaber, Gabriel. *Khoekhoense stamname. 'n Voorlopige verkenning*. Pretoria/Cape Town: Academica vir die Raad vir Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing, 1989.

Ovid. *Metamorphoses*. Edited by Frank Justus Miller and revised by G. P. Goold. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Ovid. *Tristia*. Edited and translated by Arthur Leslie Wheeler. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Pigman, George. *Versions of Imitation in the Renaissance*, Renaissance Quarterly 33, no. 1 (1980): 1–32.

Propertius, Sextus Aurelius. *Elegies*. Edited by George Patrick Goold. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006.

Propertius, Sextus Aurelius. *The complete elegies of Sextus Propertius*. Translated by Vincent Katz. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

Raven-Hart, Rowland. *Before Van Riebeeck. Callers at South Africa from 1488 to 1652*. Cape Town: C. Struik, 1967.

Ryan, Michael. *Assimilating New Worlds in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, no. 4 (1981): 519–38.

Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. *Epistles*, edited and translated by Richard M. Gummere. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2014.

Stagl, Justin. *Die Apodemik oder "Reisekunst" als Methodik der Sozialforschung vom Humanismus bis zur Aufklärung*. In Statistik und Staatsbeschreibung in der Neuzeit, edited by Mohammed Rassem and Justin Stagl. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1980.

Stagl, Justin. *A History of Curiosity. The Theory of Travel 1550–1800*. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1995.

Szaly, Miklós. *Ethnologie und Geschichte. Zur Grundlegug einer ethnologischen Geschichtsschreibung mit Beispielen aus der Geschichte der Khoisan in Südafrika*. Berlin: Reimer, 1983.

Van Stekelenburg, Albert. Archival Note *De Nalatenschap van Albert van Stekelenburg*, 2001. MS381. Special Collections, Stellenbosch University Library.

Van Stekelenburg, Albert. *Een intellectueel in de vroege Kaapkolonie. De nalatenschap van Jan Willem van Grevenbroeck (1644–1726)*. Tydskrif vir Nederlands en Afrikaans, no. 15 (2001): 3–34.

Van Stekelenburg, Albert. *The Cape in Latin and Latin in the Cape in the 17th and 18th Centuries*. Akroterion. Tydskrif vir die Klassieke in Suid-Afrika, no. 48 (2003): 89–109. Posthumously.

Van Wyk Smith, Malvern. *Review: White Writing*. English in Africa 17, no. 2 (1990): 91–103.

Van Wyk Smith, Malvern. *The Most Wretched of the Human Race. The Iconography of the Khoikhoin* (Hottentots, History and Anthropology 5, no. 3–4 (1992): 285–330.

Veyne, Paul. *Humanitas: Romans and Non-Romans*. In The Romans, edited by Andrea Giardina, 342–69. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.

Williams, Gareth. *Banished Voices: Readings in Ovid's Exile Poetry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Yardley, John. *Ponticus' Inspiration: Propertius 1.9.15*. The American Journal of Philology 102, no. 3 (1981): 322–25.

JOLCEL
JOURNAL OF LATIN COSMOPOLITANISM AND EUROPEAN LITERATURES.

CURRENT CONTRIBUTION

Theo D'haen, "Thinking about Cosmopolitanism," JOLCEL 5 (2021): 73–79. DOI: 10.21825/jolcel.v5i0.18314

*

NOTE

This contribution is the response piece to a larger dialogue of three articles that form the current issue of JOLCEL. The other contributions are "Latin Cosmopolitanism and the Roman Empire" by Christoph Pieper (pp. 1–26), "From Adam to Tsar' Kosmos: Cosmopolitanism in the Byzantine Tradition" by Helena Bodin (pp. 28–51), and "The Classics at World's End. A VOC Secretary Reframes the Cape Khoi" by Tycho Maas (pp. 53–71).

*

Thinking about Cosmopolitanism

THEO D'HAEN

Catholic University of Louvain

I am not a scholar of classical antiquity but of modern literature, so I cannot comment in detail on the three substantial essays making up this particular issue of *JOLCEL*. Rather, what I offer are a series of remarks on cosmopolitanism triggered by my reading of these essays.

If I were asked to summarize what unites the three essays in this issue of *JOLCEL* I would say that it is the opposition between the ideal and the real cast as a distinction between in- and outgroup they see as marking the discourse on cosmopolitanism for the period leading up to the eighteenth century and as framed by classical texts. The starting point of that discourse, as recounted in Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (around AD 200), namely the Cynic philosopher Diogenes of Sinope's reply to the question where he was from that he was a cosmopolitan, that is to say "a citizen of the world," immediately raises a number of issues that have determined the various ways the term and the concept have been interpreted through the ages. As the essays demonstrate, some of these have to do with the very parts from which the original Greek term is composed: *kosmos* and *politēs*. Others have to do with how that original term has come down to us as translated in the European vernaculars; for simplicity's sake I will focus on the English version. In antiquity the opposition real/ideal takes the form of a contrast between the realms of Man and God, or, more mundanely, of those that speak Greek/Latin and those that do not—the *barbaroi*, or yet again, more legalistically, between those that by rights inhabit the Roman empire and the strangers from beyond. Modified by changing circumstances these dichotomies return in later discussions specifically inspired by classical examples, as when Valla reclaims an ideal yet virtual Roman empire through the universal use of Latin or Grevenbroek claims the Khoi, although pagan, as essentially Christian through their piety. They also return in more recent discussions of cosmopolitanism although the terms in which they are then couched may be very different, responding as they do to newer questions thrown up by later developments. As with the classical distinctions

intervening in these discussions, though, the dichotomies here too turn upon in/out-groups.

When we talk of being a citizen of the world, we first of all have to determine what the terms involved cover. Other than the *kosmos* of cosmopolitanism, which in the original Greek at least potentially extends to both the realms of Man and the Gods, *world* in English—or by extension in the various European vernaculars, let alone in non-European languages—has a more limited range, essentially covering only the realm of the human. For what extends beyond we have terms such as the planetary, comprising the very earth and all it harbours, or —indeed—the cosmos, by which we mean the universe in its widest interpretation, that is to say, everything that exists, including our planet earth. Somewhat confusingly, in English, as in most other European languages I am familiar with, *universal* may also be used to mean 'worldwide,' 'applicable to the entire world,' or, at least theoretically, 'comprising every wo/man on earth.' Now, who can be a *citizen* of such a human world? In antiquity, not everyone could be a *politēs* —for one, women and slaves were excluded. As Bodin mentions in her essay, the term basically only extended to inhabitants holding legal rights in Greek city-states, and thus in practice Diogenes of Sinope's *kosmos* confined itself to the 'world' of the Greeks. In English, 'citizen' can usefully be interpreted as equivalent to 'inhabitant'. So, inhabitant of the human world. But who is reckoned 'human'?

Taking up what I earlier referred to as one of the possible uses of the term 'universal', Appiah in his *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* addresses the issue who is considered human from the point of view of "universal truth" and what he calls "counter-cosmopolitanism." If one believes one truth and one truth only to be universal this implies excluding those that do not subscribe to the same truth. In such a view, only believers are truly 'human'; all others fail the test. Most often we think of such exclusionary views as religiously inspired, but they may also be fuelled by what in the widest sense we might call civilizational views. Often, but not always and not necessarily, the two reinforce one another, as one can see from the essay on Grevenbroek, even if in this particular case the group initially excluded—the Khoi—comes to be redefined as finally fit for inclusion. We here should note that if Grevenbroek could be said to *avant-la-lettre* turn the ethnographic look inward upon the ethnographer's own society to blur the line between what was considered human and non-human in his time and from his civilization's perspective, this in fact was not so unusual for the time in which he was writing. Already a century earlier, Montaigne had done the same in his essay *Des Cannibales*, in which he argues that:

> I am not sorry that we should here take notice of the barbarous horror of so cruel an action, but that, seeing so clearly into their faults, we should be so blind to our own. I conceive there is more barbarity in eating a man alive, than when he is dead; in tearing a body limb from limb by racks and torments, that is yet in perfect sense; in roasting it by degrees; in causing it to be bitten and worried by dogs and swine (as we have not only read, but lately seen, not

> among inveterate and mortal enemies, but among neighbours and fellow-citizens, and, which is worse, under colour of piety and religion), than to roast and eat him after he is dead.[1]

In the eighteenth century, which Grevenbroek is leading up to, such a reverse auto-ethnographic approach, looking at and critiquing one's own society through the eyes of a purported stranger, is practised by Montesquieu in his *Lettres persanes* (1721) but also by Voltaire in his *Lettres philosophiques* (1734), first published in English as *Letters Concerning the English Nation* (1733), and Oliver Goldsmith in *The Citizen of the World* (1762). The latter contains a series of letters purportedly written by a Chinese traveller in England. The choice for a Chinese is not as outlandish as may seem. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries European writers/philosophers/historians like Montesquieu and Voltaire saw China as the only civilized counterpart to Europe in a world otherwise constituted by barbarian nations. The Dutch seventeenth-century playwright Joost van den Vondel called China "het oostersche Europe" (fol. A4r: the Europe of the East) and "het Aziaensche Euroope" (fol. B2, at 8; Asiatic Europe).[2] The British philosopher and statesman Edmund Burke in a 1777 letter rejoiced that the advances in knowledge made in his time allowed one to compare "The very different Civility of Europe and of China; The Barbarism of Persia and Abyssinia. The erratic manners of Tartary, and Arabia. The Savage State of North America, and of New Zealand."[3] The true distinction, then, as Goldsmith put it in his preface to *The Citizen of the World*, was between refined and non-refined, civilized and non-civilized.[4] "The truth is," he says, "the Chinese and we are pretty much alike. Different degrees of refinement, and not of distance, mark the distinctions among mankind. Savages of the most opposite climates have all but one character, of improvidence and rapacity; and tutored nations, however separate, make use of the very same methods to procure refined enjoyment." Goethe in January 1827 remarked to Johann Peter Eckermann that based on his reading of a Chinese novel in translation he found that "the Chinese think, act, and feel almost exactly like us; and we soon find that we are perfectly like them, except that all they do is more clear, pure, and decorous, than with us."[5]

The civilizational and the religious definitions of who is reckoned human and therefore deserving of cosmopolitan empathy and who not come together in the racial arguments underpinning colonialism, imperialism, and slavery, commonly wielded in Europe, or the West, for most of what we refer to as modernity. The discussion often hinged upon elements of purity and contamination. Caliban, the native inhabitant of the fictive island in Shakespeare's *The Tempest* (1611), upon which the exiled duke of Milan Prospero and his daughter Miranda find themselves, is pictured as a cross between a nature spirit and an African witch, a slave, a "thing of darkness," and an intentional violator of Miranda, and is denied any form of humanity. But the taint of non-humanity because of "impure" blood

1 Montaigne, *Of Cannibals*.
2 Van Kley, *An Alternative Mus*e, 27.
3 Osterhammel, *Unfabling the East*, 7.
4 Goldsmith, *The Citizen of the World*, ii.
5 Damrosch, *What is World Literature*? 11.

extends also to Bertha Mason, Rochester's first wife in Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* (1847) because of her Caribbean creole provenance, and to Heathcliff, who is labelled a gypsy, a Lascar, and a vampire in Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights* (1847). The memory of a Lascar, a South-East Asian sailor, in this particular case a Malay, visiting his cottage haunted Thomas De Quincey's dreams in his *Confessions of an English Opium-Eater* (1822):

> The Malay has been a fearful enemy for months. I have been every night, through his means, transported into Asiatic scenes. ... The causes of my horror lie deep; and some of them must be common to others. Southern Asia, in general, is the seat of awful images and associations. ... All this, and much more than I can say, or have time to say, the reader must enter into before he can comprehend the unimaginable horror which these dreams of Oriental imagery, and mythological tortures, impressed upon me. Under the connecting feeling of tropical heat and vertical sun-lights, I brought together all creatures, birds, beasts, reptiles, all trees and plants, usages and appearances, that are found in all tropical regions, and assembled them together in China or Indostan. From kindred feelings, I soon brought Egypt and all her gods under the same law. I was stared at, hooted at, grinned at, chattered at, by monkeys, by paroquets, by cockatoos. I ran into pagodas: and was fixed, for centuries, at the summit, or in secret rooms; I was the idol; I was the priest, I was worshipped; I was sacrificed. I fled from the wrath of Brama through all the forests of Asia: Vishnu hated me: Seeva laid wait for me. I came suddenly upon Isis and Osiris: I had done a deed, they said, which the ibis and the crocodile trembled at. I was buried, for a thousand years, in stone coffins, with mummies and sphynxes, in narrow chambers at the heart of eternal pyramids. I was kissed, with cancerous kisses, by crocodiles; and laid, confounded with all unutterable slimy things, amongst reeds and Nilotic mud.[6]

As Barrell (1991) has argued, De Quincey saw the East as a source of infection and disease, a direct threat to the health of Britain and by extension of civilization. Although many parts of that East were part of the British Empire, their inhabitants are not part of the civilized world and hence underserving of cosmopolitan empathy.

I return to my earlier question: who is human? Even after at least most forms of discrimination have been addressed, the question is less tautological than it may seem, especially these days. Cyborgs and other technologically enhanced forms of human life challenge the borderline between the human and the non-human. In contemporary literature and film this topic has been prominently taken up by, for instance, Philip K. Dick in his 1968 novel *Do androids dream of electric sheep?*, which was very loosely adapted by Ridley Scott into the 1982 movie *Blade Runner*, in which Rutger Hauer plays the role of Roy Batty, an android replicant that attempts to outlive his pre-ordained lifespan and is therefore pursued by Rick Deckard, played by Harrison Ford, a bounty hunter specializing in retiring the likes of Batty. Batty, although an artificial fabrication, behaves "humanly" when at the end of the movie he saves Deckard's life. Actually, doubt is raised in the film whether Deckard himself is not in fact a replicant because of the way he handles memories triggered by photographs he apparently prizes—the memories Batty, like all other replicants, has had implanted are also reinforced by photographs. Scott takes things a step further in *Prometheus*, a 2012 movie in which David, an humanoid

[6] De Quincey, *Confessions*, 108–9.

played by Michael Fassbender, looks and acts in all respects human-like but who, not unlike many recent AI applications, as a self-teaching unit is much more knowledgeable and perhaps even intelligent than his human masters. While consistently denying to his human interlocutors that he has human feelings, his acts leave no doubt that he is swayed by what we can only label jealousy, a craving for praise, and the like. In the 2009 Jonathan Mostow movie *Surrogates*, based on a comic book series with the same title by Robert Venditti and Brett Weldele, humans no longer venture outside of their homes but instead lead idealized vicarious lives by means of humanoid remote-controlled robots. In this movie the human world is restored through the intervention of FBI agent Tom Greer, played by Bruce Willis. In the 2017 sequel to *Blade Runner*, though, *Blade Runner 2049*, the thin line separating humans and replicants is further erased when it turns out that the female replicant to whom Deckard in the earlier movie made love has given birth to a child. That same borderline separating the human and the non-human is also being challenged at the very opposite end of the spectrum, where the difference between the human and the animal is increasingly being questioned. Should a contemporary cosmopolitanism then extend Appiah's ethics of empathy to these "strangers" on a par with humans?

Finally, the question should be raised whose cosmopolitanism we are talking about when we use the term. Appiah, in his afterword to *Cosmopolitanisms*,[7] features his own family, with members living in Ghana, the UK and the United States, and gathering in Namibia's Ovamboland, to celebrate a wedding as a living example of cosmopolitanism or world citizenship. A first thought passing through my mind when reading this was that Appiah's family must be quite wealthy, not to say elite, given their respective professions and descent. In his own *Cosmopolitanism* he mentions that his family is quite influential in Asante, the old African kingdom now part of Ghana, that he is related to the royal family in fact; that while his father was Ghanaian his mother is English, and that he himself attended English boarding school as well as Oxford before moving to the United States. Still, I can think of a similar example, from my own experience. A number of years ago, in a village not far from Brussels, we had a cleaning lady of Assyrian origin. Under the pressure of ongoing conflicts between Kurds and Turks, her family had moved from a remote village in the eastern part of Turkey first to Istanbul, where, as a seven-year-old she had been put to work as a kitchen and scullery maid for French diplomats, and then on to a refugee camp in Germany, and finally to a Parisian suburb. She herself at the age of seventeen had been given in marriage to a Belgian Assyrian. Other family members had moved on to Chicago, Toronto, and elsewhere. They still regularly gathered for huge wedding parties around the world, but mostly in Paris, where the pater familias resided. Now I would call this a global family, united by descent, origins, language and religion, but I would never think of them as cosmopolitans as they continued to think of themselves as belonging to—precisely—a specific family, characterized by the features I just mentioned. Any wider allegiance they recognized was marked by language, religion and an awareness of a historical and geographic link. The difference between this family

[7] See Robbins and Horta, *Cosmopolitanisms*.

and Appiah's is both material—while some of them have done well in their new abode others have remained decidedly poor—and mental. They certainly did not see themselves as *world* citizens.

It seems to me, then, that whether or not one is a cosmopolitan is not so much a matter of actual residence than of how one looks upon the world, or more specifically how one situates oneself in the world. Appiah obviously feels at ease everywhere and probably at the same time a little alien everywhere too. In any case, he can make sense of almost anywhere he lands. My contention would be that he is able to do so because, by privilege of position, profession, descent and undoubtedly also because of native intelligence and hard work, and probably also because his working language is English, the world's present *lingua franca*, he can *choose* to be cosmopolitan. My Assyrians on the contrary have not chosen to become citizens of the world—different from "world citizens" *à la* Appiah, they have been forced out into the world through circumstances beyond their own volition. This is where we enter the territory of what Silviano Santiago calls the "cosmopolitanism of the poor."

Something similar pertains to what I just read in a book by the British travel writer Colin Thubron. In *Shadow of the Silk Road* (2007) Thubron relates how in the early 2000s he travels, by public transport, from Xian in China, the beginning or end of the silk road (although it was only labelled such at the end of the nineteenth century by the German geographer and traveller Ferdinand Von Richthofen and it never was one road but rather a system of both land and maritime routes between China and Europe), depending on which direction one favours, to Antioch, on the Mediterranean coast of Syria. In the oasis towns in Western China, in what is now the Chinese province of Xinjiang, he goes in search of Chinese with European facial or body features. His reasons for doing so lie in his having read about a Roman legion, under command of Crassus, the third member next to Caesar and Pompey of the first triumvirate, in 53 BCE somewhere beyond the Euphrates having been defeated by a Parthian force, with the remaining survivors being taken east as soldiers-slaves in the service of a Central Asian nomad warlord and, after having been defeated once again, this time by a Chinese army, forcibly being settled in an oasis town east of the Taklamakan desert, present-day Yongchang. Thubron succeeds in locating some few individuals that seem to fit the category he is looking for. Moreover, these individuals themselves, though in all other respects Chinese, seem to have a vague awareness of their being of different descent. Regardless of whether these are in fact descendants of Roman legionaries or not, what is striking again, as with Appiah and my Assyrians, is the difference obtaining between the privileged Western traveller/observer and his Chinese interlocutors. The former, by dint of his superior knowledge, fortune and experience can feel and behave quite cosmopolitan, and notwithstanding the fact that he sometimes lands in somewhat alarming situations with Chinese officials, he is always protected by his European passport, his financial means, and—although he says he never uses it—his satellite telephone in case of emergency. Again, he has the choice to be a citizen of the world; his Chinese interlocutors, even if they should be of remote European descent, do not.

Ever since the eighteenth century and Kant, cosmopolitanism has been put forward as a moral obligation for modern man. As such it is a laudable and worthwhile principle that however in different ways and for different reasons has been and continues to be curbed in practice.

References

Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2007. *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*. New York: Norton.

Barrell, John. *The Infection of Thomas De Quincey: A Psychopathology of Imperialism*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991.

Damrosch, David. *What is World Literature?* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

De Quincey, Thomas. *Confessions of an English Opium Eater*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971 [1821].

Goldsmith, Oliver. *The Citizen of the World*. Bungay: J. and R. Childs, 1820.

Montaigne, Michel de. *Of Cannibals*. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3600/3600-h/3600-h.htm#link2HCH0030 (Chapter XXX of the *ESSAYS OF MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE*, Translated by Charles Cotton, Edited by William Carew Hazlitt, 1877, after the original edition of 1685 –86). Accessed 02.04. 2021.

Osterhammel, Jürgen. *Unfabling the East: The Enlightenment's Encounter with Asia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.

Robbins, Bruce and Paulo Lemos Horta, ed. *Cosmopolitanisms*. New York: New York University Press, 2017.

Santiago, Silviano. "The Cosmopolitanism of the poor." In *Cosmopolitanisms*, edited by Bruce Robbins and Paulo Lemos Horta, 21–39. New York: New York University Press, 2017.

Thubron, Colin. *Shadow of the Silk Road*. London: Vintage, 2007.

Van Kley, Edwin J. *An Alternative Muse: The Manchu Conquest of China in the Literature of Seventeenth-Century Northern Europe*. European Studies Review 6 (1976): 21–43.